Using Tags to Monitor Numerical Limits in Arms Control Agreements

The treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) has sanctified the “zero option.” It has long been understood that it is easier to verify a complete ban on a weapon system than it is to verify a numerical limit. A complete prohibition is easier to verify because a single sighting of a banned weapon would constitute clear evidence of a violation. Moreover, a complete ban would eliminate training, testing, and repair activities that could serve as a cover for clandestine weapon deployments or could support a sudden breakout from a treaty. Although a total ban may be the best option from the standpoint of verification, this is not realistic for many weapon system. In the past, numerical limits could be verified adequately because the weapon systems in question—missile silos, bombers, and ballistic-missile submarines— were hard to conceal from national technical means (NTM) of verification (primarily reconnaissance and electronic intelligence satellites). Unfortunately, changes in technology and in the strategic environment are giving rise to new weapons whose deployment will be difficult to verify using current techniques. Mobile land-based ballistic missiles, for example, are gaining increased prominence in the strategic forces of both sides, primarily because they are less vulnerable to preemptive destruction than immobile silo-based missiles. But mobile missiles are much more difficult to count since they are designed to move around the countryside and are often hidden from view. Limits on nuclear cruise missiles would also be difficult to verify using NTM because they are small and because the conventional- and nuclear-armed versions are nearly indistinguishable. In addition, the INF Treaty is giving new impetus to the search for cooperative restrictions on the military confrontation in Central Europe, where numerical limits have been hard to agree on in part because of verification difficulties

Tags

An agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) may place numerical and geographical limits on more than 140,000 treaty-limited items (TLIs)1 in 21 countries. Monitoring limits on such huge numbers of TLIs would be extremely difficult, as well as expensive and intrusive, with human inspectors alone. This chapter examines a promising way to effectively monitor limits while reducing cost and intrusiveness: the tagging of TLIs. The use of tags transforms a numerical limit into a ban on untagged items. The result is that many of the verification advantages of a complete ban can be retained for a numerical limit. Tagging works by certifying that every TLI observed is one of those permitted under a numerical limit. A tagging system would involve the manufacture of a number of tags equal to the number of TLI, which would then be affixed to an essential part of each allowed TLI. If even one untagged TLI were ever seen—during on-site inspections (OSI), by national technical means (NTM), or even by nationals of the inspected party loyal to the treaty regime—then there would be prima facie evidence of a treaty violation. If properly designed, tags could also identify a TLI as belonging to a particular nation or as normally deployed in a particular region, which would make it easier to verify CFE sub-limits on national and regional deployments

Toward True Security: A U.S. Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade

This report proposes a nuclear weapons policy for the United States for the next decade that reflects today’s political and strategic realities. By contrast, the official policies and doctrines of both the United States and Russia are mired in Cold War patterns of thought. Eleven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, both countries still maintain massive nuclear arsenals ready for nearly instant use. Although nuclear war plans differ in size and detail from those drawn up 20 or more years ago, their basic structure remains unchanged. The US nuclear arsenal and doctrine were designed to deter a deliberate large-scale Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and a massive Soviet conventional attack on US European allies, as well as to preserve the option of a disarming first strike against Soviet nuclear forces. This force structure and doctrine are obsolete and jeopardize American national security.Federation of American Scientists, Natural Resources Defense Council, Union of Concerned Scientist

The Muon g-2

The muon anomalous magnetic moment is one of the most precisely measured quantities in particle physics. In a recent experiment at Brookhaven it has been measured with a remarkable 14-fold improvement of the previous CERN experiment reaching a precision of 0.54ppm. Since the first results were published, a persisting "discrepancy" between theory and experiment of about 3 standard deviations is observed. It is the largest "established" deviation from the Standard Model seen in a "clean" electroweak observable and thus could be a hint for New Physics to be around the corner. This deviation triggered numerous speculations about the possible origin of the "missing piece" and the increased experimental precision animated a multitude of new theoretical efforts which lead to a substantial improvement of the prediction of the muon anomaly a_mu=(g_mu-2)/2. The dominating uncertainty of the prediction, caused by strong interaction effects, could be reduced substantially, due to new hadronic cross section measurements in electron-positron annihilation at low energies. Also the recent electron g-2 measurement at Harvard contributes substantially to the progress in this field, as it allows for a much more precise determination of the fine structure constant alpha as well as a cross check of the status of our theoretical understanding.Comment: 134 pages, 68 figure

Superconducting transmission lines – Sustainable electric energy transfer with higher public acceptance?

Despite the extensive research and development investments into superconducting science and technology, both at the fundamental and at the applied levels, many benefits of superconducting transmission lines (SCTL) remain unknown to the public and decision makers at large. This paper aims at informing about the progress in this important research field. Superconducting transmission lines have a tremendous size advantage and lower total electrical losses for high capacity transmission plus a number of technological advantages compared to solutions based on standard conductors. This leads to a minimized environmental impact and enables an overall more sustainable transmission of electric energy. One of the direct benefits may be an increased public acceptance due to the low visual impact with a subsequent reduction of approval time. The access of remote renewable energy (RE) sources with high-capacity transmission is rendered possible with superior efficiency. That not only translates into further reducing $CO_2$ emissions in a global energy mix that is still primarily based on fossils, but can also facilitate the development of RE sources given for instance the strong local opposition against the construction of new transmission lines. The socio-economic aspects of superconducting transmission lines based on the novel magnesium diboride $(MgB_2)$ superconductor and on high-temperature superconductors (HTS) are compared to state-of-the-art HVDC overhead lines and underground cables based on resistive conductors

Whose shoe fits best? Dubious physics and power politics in the TMD footprint controversy

Apparent design breakthroughs in short-range missile defense systems such as Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) have prompted questions about the legality of such systems under the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Prominent physicists have used computer “footprint” methodology to prove that if engineered to specifications, THAAD might exceed ABM Treaty performance limits banning highly effective missile defense systems. In response, missile defense officials commissioned Sparta, Inc. to conduct secret research casting doubt on the validity of such findings. The substantial diplomatic issues at stake and the interesting rhetorical dynamics involved in this dispute warrant close scholarly analysis. Attention to the iterative relationship between the interpenetrating spheres of public argument and scientific practice in this case yields novel insight about the processes in which technical knowledge of defense systems is forged and raises fresh issues for the “closure project” in science and technology controversy studies