A Tale of Two Markets: How Lower-end Borrowers Are Punished for Bank Regulatory Failures in Nigeria

In 2009, the Nigerian banking system witnessed a financial crisis caused by elite borrowers in the financial market. Regulatory response to the Nigerian crisis closely mirrored the international response with increased capital and liquidity thresholds for commercial banks. While the rise of consumer protection on the agenda of prudential supervisors internationally was logical in that consumer debt was the main cause of the global recession, the Nigerian banking reforms of 2009 disproportionately affected access by poorer consumers, who ironically had little to do with the underlying causes of the crisis. As lending criteria become more stringent, poorer consumers of credit products are pushed into informal markets because of liquidity-induced credit rationing. Overall, consumer protection is compromised because stronger consumer protection rules for the formal sector benefits borrowers from formal institutions who constitute the minority of borrowers in all markets. While the passage of regulation establishing credit bureaux and the National Collateral Registry will, in theory, ease access to credit especially by lower-end borrowers, the vast size of the informal market continues to compound the information asymmetry problem, fiscal policies to tackle structural economic issues such as unemployment and illiteracy remain to be initiated, and bank regulators continue to pander to elite customers with policy responses that endorse too big to fail but deems lower-end consumers too irrelevant to save. The essay concluded that addressing the wide disparity in access to credit between the rich and poor through property rights reforms to capture the capital of the informal class, promoting regulation to check loan concentration, and stimulating competition by allowing Telecommunication Companies (TELCOs) and fintech companies to carry on lending activities because of their superior knowledge of lower-end markets will facilitate greater access. The risk of systemic failure deriving from consumer credit in Nigeria is insignificant compared to the consumer vulnerabilities resulting from the exposure of consumers to unregulated products in the informal market

Atrasentan and renal events in patients with type 2 diabetes and chronic kidney disease (SONAR): a double-blind, randomised, placebo-controlled trial

Background: Short-term treatment for people with type 2 diabetes using a low dose of the selective endothelin A receptor antagonist atrasentan reduces albuminuria without causing significant sodium retention. We report the long-term effects of treatment with atrasentan on major renal outcomes. Methods: We did this double-blind, randomised, placebo-controlled trial at 689 sites in 41 countries. We enrolled adults aged 18–85 years with type 2 diabetes, estimated glomerular filtration rate (eGFR)25–75 mL/min per 1·73 m 2 of body surface area, and a urine albumin-to-creatinine ratio (UACR)of 300–5000 mg/g who had received maximum labelled or tolerated renin–angiotensin system inhibition for at least 4 weeks. Participants were given atrasentan 0·75 mg orally daily during an enrichment period before random group assignment. Those with a UACR decrease of at least 30% with no substantial fluid retention during the enrichment period (responders)were included in the double-blind treatment period. Responders were randomly assigned to receive either atrasentan 0·75 mg orally daily or placebo. All patients and investigators were masked to treatment assignment. The primary endpoint was a composite of doubling of serum creatinine (sustained for ≥30 days)or end-stage kidney disease (eGFR <15 mL/min per 1·73 m 2 sustained for ≥90 days, chronic dialysis for ≥90 days, kidney transplantation, or death from kidney failure)in the intention-to-treat population of all responders. Safety was assessed in all patients who received at least one dose of their assigned study treatment. The study is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT01858532. Findings: Between May 17, 2013, and July 13, 2017, 11 087 patients were screened; 5117 entered the enrichment period, and 4711 completed the enrichment period. Of these, 2648 patients were responders and were randomly assigned to the atrasentan group (n=1325)or placebo group (n=1323). Median follow-up was 2·2 years (IQR 1·4–2·9). 79 (6·0%)of 1325 patients in the atrasentan group and 105 (7·9%)of 1323 in the placebo group had a primary composite renal endpoint event (hazard ratio [HR]0·65 [95% CI 0·49–0·88]; p=0·0047). Fluid retention and anaemia adverse events, which have been previously attributed to endothelin receptor antagonists, were more frequent in the atrasentan group than in the placebo group. Hospital admission for heart failure occurred in 47 (3·5%)of 1325 patients in the atrasentan group and 34 (2·6%)of 1323 patients in the placebo group (HR 1·33 [95% CI 0·85–2·07]; p=0·208). 58 (4·4%)patients in the atrasentan group and 52 (3·9%)in the placebo group died (HR 1·09 [95% CI 0·75–1·59]; p=0·65). Interpretation: Atrasentan reduced the risk of renal events in patients with diabetes and chronic kidney disease who were selected to optimise efficacy and safety. These data support a potential role for selective endothelin receptor antagonists in protecting renal function in patients with type 2 diabetes at high risk of developing end-stage kidney disease. Funding: AbbVie

Das Verhältnis der Handschriften des Girart de Viane ... /

Attributed to Bertrand de Bar-sur-Aube, fl. ca. 1220.Vita.Cover title.Thesis--Halle--Wittenberg.Mode of access: Internet