Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp and paper industry : the case of Quebec

Since the early 1970s, industrial countries have enacted (or amended) many environmental laws and regulations to control and improve air and water quality. Developing countries are increasingly enacting similar legislation. But imposing a ceiling on a plant's emissions does not guarantee reduced emissions or an improved environment. Ensuring the attainment of the regulation's objectives requires monitoring the behavior of the regulated facility and enforcing environmental standards. Most of the literature in environmental economics is theoretical and simply assumes that polluters comply with regulations. Although monitoring and enforcement problems are clearly a pitfall of environmental regulation, little empirical work has been done about the effect of current monitoring strategies on pollution emissions. The authors supply an empirical framework for measuring the impact of environmental inspections on plant emissions. They apply it to pulp and paper plants in Quebec for which reliable data were available. The results suggest that both inspection and the threat of inspections reduce pollution emissions. They also show that a plant's decision whether to report its emissions levels to the regulator is not random. Inspections improve the frequency of reporting.Sanitation and Sewerage,Water and Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Conservation,Wetlands,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Water and Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies,Sanitation and Sewerage,TF030632-DANISH CTF - FY05 (DAC PART COUNTRIES GNP PER CAPITA BELOW USD 2,500/AL

The quantum adversary method and classical formula size lower bounds

We introduce two new complexity measures for Boolean functions, or more generally for functions of the form f:S->T. We call these measures sumPI and maxPI. The quantity sumPI has been emerging through a line of research on quantum query complexity lower bounds via the so-called quantum adversary method [Amb02, Amb03, BSS03, Zha04, LM04], culminating in [SS04] with the realization that these many different formulations are in fact equivalent. Given that sumPI turns out to be such a robust invariant of a function, we begin to investigate this quantity in its own right and see that it also has applications to classical complexity theory. As a surprising application we show that sumPI^2(f) is a lower bound on the formula size, and even, up to a constant multiplicative factor, the probabilistic formula size of f. We show that several formula size lower bounds in the literature, specifically Khrapchenko and its extensions [Khr71, Kou93], including a key lemma of [Has98], are in fact special cases of our method. The second quantity we introduce, maxPI(f), is always at least as large as sumPI(f), and is derived from sumPI in such a way that maxPI^2(f) remains a lower bound on formula size. While sumPI(f) is always a lower bound on the quantum query complexity of f, this is not the case in general for maxPI(f). A strong advantage of sumPI(f) is that it has both primal and dual characterizations, and thus it is relatively easy to give both upper and lower bounds on the sumPI complexity of functions. To demonstrate this, we look at a few concrete examples, for three functions: recursive majority of three, a function defined by Ambainis, and the collision problem.Comment: Appears in Conference on Computational Complexity 200

Environmental policy and time consistency - emissions taxes and emissions trading

The authors examine policy problems related to the use of emissions taxes, and emissions trading, two market-based instruments for controlling pollution by getting regulated firms to adopt cleaner technologies. By attaching an explicit price to emissions, these instruments give firms an incentive to continually reduce their volume of emissions. Command, and-control emissions standards create incentives to adopt cleaner technologies only up to the point where the standards are no longer binding (at which point the shadow price on emissions falls to zero). But the ongoing incentives created by the market-based instruments are not necessarily right, either. Time-consistency constraints on the setting of these instruments limit the regulator's ability toset policies that lead to efficiency in adopting technology options. After examining the time-consistency properties of a Pigouvian emissions tax, and of the emissions trading, the authors find that: 1) If damage is linear, efficiency in adopting technologies involves either universal adoption of the new technology, or universal retention of the old technology, depending on the cost of adoption. The first best tax policy, and the first-best permit-supply policy are both time-consistent under these conditions. 2) If damage is strictly convex, efficiency may require partial adoption of the new technology. In this case, the first-best tax policy is not time-consistent, and the tax rate must be adjusted after adoption has taken place (ratcheting). Ratcheting will induce an efficient equilibrium if there is a large number of firms. If there are relatively few firms, ratcheting creates too many incentives to adopt the new technology. 3) The first-best supply policy is time-consistent if there is a large number of firms. If there are relatively few firms, the first-best supply policy may not be time-consistent, and the regulator must ratchet the supply of permits. With this policy, there are not enough incentives for firms to adopt the new technology. The results do not strongly favor one policy instrument over the other, but if the point of an emissions trading program is to increase technological efficiency, it is necessary to continually adjust the supply of permits in response to technological change, even when the damage is linear. This continual adjustment is not needed for an emissions tax when damage is linear, which may give emissions taxes an advantage over emissions trading.General Technology,Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Technology Industry,ICT Policy and Strategies,Environmental Economics&Policies,General Technology,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Carbon Policy and Trading,Energy and Environment

Environment as cultural heritage: the Armenian diaspora's willingness-to-pay to protect Armenia's Lake Sevan

This paper presents a study of willingness-to-pay of the Armenian Diaspora in the United States to protect Armenia's Lake Sevan, a unique and precious symbol of the Armenian cultural heritage. Dichotomous choice contingent valuation questions were asked by mail surveys to elicit respondents'willingness to pay for the protection of Lake Sevan. The results show that on average, each household of the Armenian Diaspora in the United States would be willing to provide a one-time donation of approximately US$80 to prevent a further degradation of Lake Sevan, and approximately US$280 to restore the quality of the lake by increasing its water level by 3 meters.Water Conservation,Cultural Heritage&Preservation,Public Health Promotion,Environmental Economics&Policies,Decentralization,Health Economics&Finance,Water Use,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Conservation

Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation or (and?) Information

An increasing number of regulators have adopted public disclosure programs to create incentives for pollution control. In this paper, we study the impact of British Columbia's list of polluters whereby the province's environmental regulator reveals the name of plants which are either not complying with the regulation or are of concern to the regulator. Simultaneously however, the regulator continues to undertake legal action for those violating the regulation. Previous analyses have focused on studying either the impact of the traditional monitoring and enforcement practices or the impact of information programs. In this paper, we perform an empirical analysis of the impact of both traditional enforcement and information strategies within the context of a single program. We thus provide insights on the relative impact of the traditional (fines and penalties) and emerging (information) enforcement strategies. Our results suggest that British Columbia's list of polluters has a larger impact on both emissions levels and compliance status than orders, fines and penalties traditionally imposed by the Ministry and courts. Our results also demonstrate that the adoption of stricter standards and penalties had a significant impact on emissions levels. De plus en plus de décideurs publics dans le domaine de l'environnement ont adopté des politiques de diffusion de l'information pour créer des incitations à une meilleure performance environnementale. Dans cette étude, nous examinons l'impact d'une liste noire de pollueurs publiée à tous les six mois, depuis 1990, par le Ministère de l'environnement en Colombie-Britannique qui, parallèlement à cela, poursuit une stratégie traditionnelle de contrôle et de mise en application de la réglementation. Les recherches précédentes ont examiné de façon isolée l'impact des mesures traditionnelles de réglementation et l'impact des programmes d'information, alors que nous proposons d'étudier simultanément les effets de ces deux types de mesures. Ce faisant, nous pourrons avoir une idée de l'impact relatif des mesures traditionnelles et émergentes. Nos résultats suggèrent que la liste des pollueurs de Colombie-Britannique a eu un impact plus important que les poursuites et les amendes traditionnellement émises par les autorités gouvernementales. Nos résultats montrent également que l'adoption de normes environnementales plus strictes a eu un effet important sur la performance environnementale des usines étudiées.Regulation, information, Information, réglementation