La partición de un cartel : votaciones nominales y guerra faccional en la Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal

Artículo originalLa teoría del cartel procedimental de Cox y McCubbins predice conflicto mínimo o incluso nulo en el seno del partido mayoritario en votaciones plenarias. Esto es consecuencia del control férreo de la agenda legislativa que ejercen miembros clave del partido. El estudio de las votaciones nominales de la IVa Legislatura de la Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal (2006–09) descubre escisiones frecuentes del partido mayoritario en la sesión plenaria. La estimación de puntos ideales de los diputados a partir de sus votaciones nominales revela dos líneas de segmentación en la Asamblea. Una contrapone izquierda y derecha clásicas en temas socioeconómicos. La otra se asocia con los nombramientos de las autoridades electorales de la ciudad. Si el PRD de centro-izquierda se mostró unido en la primera dimensión, la presencia de dos facciones enfrentadas es manifiesta en la segunda. El trabajo especula sobre la necesidad de teorizar acerca de instrumentos de control de la agenda de las etapas más tardías del proceso legislativ

Partisanship in non-partisan electoral agencies and democratic compliance: Evidence from

Abstract Scholars argue that electoral management bodies staffed by autonomous, non-partisan experts are best for producing credible and fair elections. We inspect the voting record of Mexico's Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), an ostensibly independent bureaucratic agency regarded as extremely successful in organizing clean elections in a political system marred by fraud. We discover that the putative non-partisan experts of ''autonomous'' IFE behave as ''party watchdogs'' that represent the interests of their political party sponsors. To validate this party influence hypothesis, we examine roll-call votes cast by members of IFE's Council-General from 1996 to 2006. Aside from shedding light on IFE's failure to achieve democratic compliance in 2006, our analysis suggests that election arbiters that embrace partisan strife are quite capable of organizing free, fair, and credible elections in new democracies

Partisanship in non-partisan electoral agencies and democratic compliance: Evidence from

Abstract Scholars argue that electoral management bodies staffed by autonomous, non-partisan experts are best for producing credible and fair elections. We inspect the voting record of Mexico's Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), an ostensibly independent bureaucratic agency regarded as extremely successful in organizing clean elections in a political system marred by fraud. We discover that the putative non-partisan experts of ''autonomous'' IFE behave as ''party watchdogs'' that represent the interests of their political party sponsors. To validate this party influence hypothesis, we examine roll-call votes cast by members of IFE's Council-General from 1996 to 2006. Aside from shedding light on IFE's failure to achieve democratic compliance in 2006, our analysis suggests that election arbiters that embrace partisan strife are quite capable of organizing free, fair, and credible elections in new democracies

ARIA 2016 : Care pathways implementing emerging technologies for predictive medicine in rhinitis and asthma across the life cycle

The Allergic Rhinitis and its Impact on Asthma (ARIA) initiative commenced during a World Health Organization workshop in 1999. The initial goals were (1) to propose a new allergic rhinitis classification, (2) to promote the concept of multi-morbidity in asthma and rhinitis and (3) to develop guidelines with all stakeholders that could be used globally for all countries and populations. ARIA-disseminated and implemented in over 70 countries globally-is now focusing on the implementation of emerging technologies for individualized and predictive medicine. MASK [MACVIA (Contre les Maladies Chroniques pour un Vieillissement Actif)-ARIA Sentinel NetworK] uses mobile technology to develop care pathways for the management of rhinitis and asthma by a multi-disciplinary group and by patients themselves. An app (Android and iOS) is available in 20 countries and 15 languages. It uses a visual analogue scale to assess symptom control and work productivity as well as a clinical decision support system. It is associated with an inter-operable tablet for physicians and other health care professionals. The scaling up strategy uses the recommendations of the European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing. The aim of the novel ARIA approach is to provide an active and healthy life to rhinitis sufferers, whatever their age, sex or socio-economic status, in order to reduce health and social inequalities incurred by the disease.Peer reviewe

ARIA 2016: Care pathways implementing emerging technologies for predictive medicine in rhinitis and asthma across the life cycle

The Allergic Rhinitis and its Impact on Asthma (ARIA) initiative commenced during a World Health Organization workshop in 1999. The initial goals were (1) to propose a new allergic rhinitis classification, (2) to promote the concept of multi-morbidity in asthma a

Consecutive reelection institutions and electoral calendars since 1994 in Mexico

The 2014 electoral reform removed the ban for consecutive legislative reelection, in force since 1933 in Mexico. It also opened the possibility to reelect mayors and municipal councilors. The amendments to the Mexican constitution that reformers adopted leave discretion to states in the definition of their reelection institutions, while also establishing general constraints. One is the length in office, of maximum twelve years for legislators and six for elected municipal officers. The other (with nuances) is that incumbents must be renominated by the same party that elected them. We report the sub-national variance in reelection institutions and the relevant constitutional and legal excerpts (in Spanish). To give context to the temporal dimension of the reform, we also report the election calendar since 1994. And, where necessary, we make marginal annotations (especially regarding discrepancies with data published by IMCO http://imco.org.mx/politica_buen_gobierno/reeleccion-legislativa-a-nivel-local/)