The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency

For groups that must make several decisions of similar form, we define a simple and general mechanism that is designed to promote social efficiency. The mechanism links the various decisions by forcing agents to budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems conforms to the underlying distribution of preferences. We show that as the mechanism operates over a growing number decisions, the welfare costs of incentive constraints completely disappear. In addition, as the number of decisions being linked grows, a truthful strategy is increasingly successful and secures the efficient utility level for an agent.linking decisions, mechanism design, incentives, incentive compatibility, bundling

General equilibrium with free entry: A synthetic approach to the theory of perfect competition

The essay is dedicated to the memory of Tjalling Koopmans (1910-1985). Our purpose has been to communicate to the nonspecialist an aspect of mathematical economics that has been developed since Koopman's masterful exposition of general equilibrium theory (1957). It is very difficult to do the job as well as Professor Koopmans, but he urged us all to try

General equilibrium with free entry: A synthetic approach to the theory of perfect competition

The essay is dedicated to the memory of Tjalling Koopmans (1910-1985). Our purpose has been to communicate to the nonspecialist an aspect of mathematical economics that has been developed since Koopman's masterful exposition of general equilibrium theory (1957). It is very difficult to do the job as well as Professor Koopmans, but he urged us all to try

Optimasi Portofolio Resiko Menggunakan Model Markowitz MVO Dikaitkan dengan Keterbatasan Manusia dalam Memprediksi Masa Depan dalam Perspektif Al-Qur`an

Risk portfolio on modern finance has become increasingly technical, requiring the use of sophisticated mathematical tools in both research and practice. Since companies cannot insure themselves completely against risk, as human incompetence in predicting the future precisely that written in Al-Quran surah Luqman verse 34, they have to manage it to yield an optimal portfolio. The objective here is to minimize the variance among all portfolios, or alternatively, to maximize expected return among all portfolios that has at least a certain expected return. Furthermore, this study focuses on optimizing risk portfolio so called Markowitz MVO (Mean-Variance Optimization). Some theoretical frameworks for analysis are arithmetic mean, geometric mean, variance, covariance, linear programming, and quadratic programming. Moreover, finding a minimum variance portfolio produces a convex quadratic programming, that is minimizing the objective function ðð¥with constraintsð ð 𥠥 ðandð´ð¥ = ð. The outcome of this research is the solution of optimal risk portofolio in some investments that could be finished smoothly using MATLAB R2007b software together with its graphic analysis

Search for supersymmetry in events with one lepton and multiple jets in proton-proton collisions at root s=13 TeV

Peer reviewe

Search for anomalous couplings in boosted WW/WZ -> l nu q(q)over-bar production in proton-proton collisions at root s=8TeV

Peer reviewe

Overcoming Incentive Constraints

Consider an arbitrary Bayesian decision problem in which the preferences of each agent are private information. We prove that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints typically decrease when the decision problem is linked with independent copies of itself. This is established by first defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences, and then arguing that agents will satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible. Examples illustrate the disappearance of incentive costs when problems are linked in a rich variety of problems, including public goods allocation, voting, and bargaining