Separate influences in learning: Evidence from artificial grammar learning with traumatic brain injury patients

Artificial grammar learning (AGL) is one of the most extensively employed paradigms for the study of learning. Grammaticality is one of the most common ways to index performance in AGL. However, there is still extensive debate on whether there is a distinct psychological process which can lead to grammaticality knowledge. An application of the COVIS model of categorization in AGL suggests that grammaticality might arise from a hypothesis-testing system (when grammaticality is appropriately balanced with other knowledge influences), so that prefrontal cortex damage should be associated with impaired grammaticality and intact chunk strength performance. This prediction was confirmed in a study of traumatic brain injury (TBI) patients and matched controls. The TBI patient cohort had diffuse prefrontal cortex damage as evidenced by the history of their injury, CT scans, and severe executive functioning problems. Our results allow a novel interpretation of grammaticality and AGL in general

Fluency expresses implicit knowledge of tonal symmetry

The purposes of the present study were twofold. First, we sought to establish whether tonal symmetry produces processing fluency. Second, we sought to explore whether symmetry and chunk strength express themselves differently in fluency, as an indication of different mechanisms being involved for sub- and supra-finite state processing. Across two experiments, participants were asked to listen to and memorize artificial poetry showing a mirror symmetry (an inversion, i.e., a type of cross serial dependency); after this training phase, people completed a four-choice RT task in which they were presented with new artificial poetry. Participants were required to identify the stimulus displayed. We found that symmetry sped up responding to the second half of strings, indicating a fluency effect. Furthermore, there was a dissociation between fluency effects arising from symmetry vs. chunk strength, with stronger fluency effects for symmetry rather than chunks in the second half of strings. Taken together, we conjecture a divide between finite state and supra-finite state mechanisms in learning grammatical sequences

Is there a conjunction fallacy in legal probabilistic decision making?

Classical probability theory (CPT) has represented the rational standard for decision making in human cognition. Even though CPT has provided many descriptively excellent decision models, there have also been some empirical results persistently problematic for CPT accounts. The tension between the normative prescription of CPT and human behavior is particularly acute in cases where we have higher expectations for rational decisions. One such case concerns legal decision making from legal experts, such as attorneys and prosecutors and, more so, judges. In the present research we explore one of the most influential CPT decision fallacies, the conjunction fallacy (CF), in a legal decision making task, involving assessing evidence that the same suspect had committed two separate crimes. The information for the two crimes was presented consecutively. Each participant was asked to provide individual ratings for the two crimes in some cases and conjunctive probability rating for both crimes in other cases, after all information had been presented. Overall, 360 probability ratings for guilt were collected from 120 participants, comprised of 40 judges, 40 attorneys and prosecutors, and 40 individuals without legal education. Our results provide evidence for a double conjunction fallacy (in this case, a higher probability of committing both crimes than the probability of committing either crime individually), in the group of individuals without legal education. These results are discussed in terms of their applied implications and in relation to a recent framework for understanding such results, quantum probability theory (QPT)

Rationality and the experimental study of reasoning

A survey of the results obtained during the past three decades in some of the most widely used tasks and paradigms in the experimental study of reasoning is presented. It is shown that, at first sight, human performance suffers from serious shortcomings. However, after the problems of communication between experimenter and subject are taken into account, which leads to clarify the subject's representation of the tasks, one observes a better performance, although still far from perfect. Current theories of reasoning, of which the two most prominent are very briefly outlined, agree in identifying the load in working memory as the main source of limitation in performance. Finally, a recent view on human rationality prompted by the foregoing results is described

Can evolution get us off the hook? Evaluating the ecological defence of human rationality

AbstractThis paper discusses the ecological case for epistemic innocence: does biased cognition have evolutionary benefits, and if so, does that exculpate human reasoners from irrationality? Proponents of ‘ecological rationality’ have challenged the bleak view of human reasoning emerging from research on biases and fallacies. If we approach the human mind as an adaptive toolbox, tailored to the structure of the environment, many alleged biases and fallacies turn out to be artefacts of narrow norms and artificial set-ups. However, we argue that putative demonstrations of ecological rationality involve subtle locus shifts in attributions of rationality, conflating the adaptive rationale of heuristics with our own epistemic credentials. By contrast, other cases also involve an ecological reframing of human reason, but do not involve such problematic locus shifts. We discuss the difference between these cases, bringing clarity to the rationality debate

Contingency awareness and evaluative conditioning: when will it be enough?

The role of contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning has been a contentious issue for quite some time now. Several papers provide a review of the relevant evidence (De Houwer, Baeyens, & Hendrickx, 1997a; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, in press; Field, 2000; Lovibond & Shanks, in press; Shanks & St. John, 1994), but the conclusions that are reached differ markedly. For instance, whereas De Houwer et al. (in press) concluded that evaluative conditioning is largely independent of contingency awareness, Field (2000, p. 32) argued that there is little unequivocal evidence that evaluative conditioning without contingency awareness is a robust finding. The results of Fulcher and Hammerl provide another interesting contribution to the debate. The aim of this commentary is to illustrate how even a single series of studies such as those of Fulcher and Hammerl can be interpreted in different ways depending on one’s perspective. I will first adopt a sceptical point of view and will try to argue that the evidence presented by Fulcher and Hammerl does not provide conclusive evidence for unconscious evaluative conditioning. Afterward, I will look at the same studies from a more open, broader point of view and argue that the reported results are important and that they are in line with the results of many previous results which also support the hypothesis that, in comparison to other forms of Pavlovian conditioning, evaluative conditioning is largely independent of contingency awarenes

Using temporal information to construct, update, and retrieve situation models of narratives

Item does not contain fulltextFour experiments explored how readers use temporal information to construct and update situation models and retrieve them from memory. In Experiment 1, readers spontaneously constructed temporal and spatial situation models of single sentences. In Experiment 2, temporal inconsistencies caused problems in updating situation models similar to those observed previously for other dimensions of situation models. In Experiment 3, merely implied temporal order information was inferred from narratives, affecting comprehension of later sentences like explicitly stated order information. Moreover, inconsistent temporal order information prevented the creation and storage in memory of an integrated situation model. In Experiment 4, a temporal inconsistency increased processing time even if readers were unable to report the inconsistency. These results confirm the significance of the temporal dimension of situation models.14 p