Inégalité des chances et agressivité motrice

Il s’agit de vérifier sur le plan expérimental une hypothèse d’Elias [1986] selon laquelle, dans les jeux sportifs, l’inégalité des chances serait source de déchaînements agressifs. Pour cela, des adultes volontaires sont soumis en 66 à un jeu sportif inéquitable dépourvu d’équilibre tactique. Le jeu débute par le rendu d’une décision prise secrètement par chaque équipe : le choix d’un ballon sur deux possibles. Le score potentiel des uns est conditionnel au choix de ballon des autres. La matrice des gains est telle qu’à chaque coup l’une des deux équipes ressort frustrée de son choix. L’originalité de la recherche consiste alors à provoquer la résolution du jeu par l’accomplissement moteur. Partant d’un bout à l’autre d’un gymnase, les équipes s’élancent et se croisent. Elles cherchent à plaquer leur ballon dans une zone opposée, condition nécessaire à l’obtention du score annoncé. Chaque équipe a toute liberté d’empêcher l’autre de parvenir à ses fins…The goal of the present work was to experimentally verify Elias's hypothesis [1986], according to which unfair sporting situations lead to aggressive outbursts. To this end, adult volunteers were subjected to an inherently unfair 6-a-side game which lacked a balanced tactical basis. At the start of the game, a decision is taken separately by each team: the choice of one of two possible balls. One team's potential score depends on the choice of the ball made by the other team. The scoring matrix is designed in such a way that every time a point is scored, one of the two teams feels penalized by its opening choice. The originality of the present work consisted in ending the game with a potentially aggressive motor action. Starting from opposite ends of a sports hall, the two teams have to touch their ball down in the opposing end zone in order to definitively acquire the previously scored points. Each team is free to prevent the other one from achieving its objective by any means it sees fit

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialistsLes sports collectifs développent-ils la solidarité ? De façon péremptoire, les textes officiels de l'Education physique prétendent que oui. À partir de l'analyse structurale des duels sportifs enrichie de plusieurs enquêtes sociométriques, Pierre Parlebas (1986), Renaud Laporte (1992) puis Alexandre Oboeuf (2010) rétorquent que non. Le présent travail tente de mettre ce différend à l'épreuve. Nous constituons deux groupes d'étudiants sportifs volontaires âgés d'une vingtaine d'années: 25 spécialistes de sports collectifs; 23 spécialistes de sports psychomoteurs (gymnastique, athlétisme, natation) servant de groupe témoin. Chaque groupe va jouer séparément. Le jeu proposé est inspiré du célèbre Dilemme du prisonnier (Tucker, 1950). Plus précisément, il s'agit du Lepomis macrochirus (Binmore, 1992) un jeu paradoxal à trois équilibres de Nash (deux sous-optimaux en stratégies pures et un optimal en stratégie mixte consistant à jouer solidaire à p=1/2). Ce jeu possède également un équilibre d'Harsanyi (fondé sur le respect constant de la morale, la solidarité tacite par empathie : "ne fais pas aux autres ce que tu ne voudrais pas qu'ils te fassent"). Comment joue-t-on ? On place sur un terrain de handball deux équipes de huit joueurs reconnaissables à leur maillot. On joue quinze minutes, avec un ballon de handball, au pied ou à la main. Après le coup d'envoi et chaque but - qui les obligent à regagner leur camp initial - les joueurs peuvent indifféremment marquer dans un but ou dans l'autre, coopérer ou s'opposer avec qui ils veulent. En cas de but contre l'équipe adverse, le buteur et les membres de son équipe initiale empochent chacun un point. En cas de but contre son camp de départ, seul le buteur remporte un point. On voit le paradoxe. Si les membres d'une équipe sont solidaires pour construire le point, tout le monde est satisfait (solution d'Harsanyi) ; mais la situation n'est pas équilibrée (au sens de Nash) : chacun ayant intérêt à tourner casaque à la moindre opportunité. Mais si tout le monde se met à jouer égoïste, c'est du chacun pour soi et les chances de marquer s'amenuisent. Dans ce contexte où règnent doutes sur l'intégrité des membres de l'équipe et trahisons légales, qui marquera individuellement le plus de buts ? On comptabilise les interactions motrices directes (passes, tirs) "casanières" (solidarité intra-équipe) et "gredines" (égoïstes: tirs et passes contre son camp). Les spécialistes de sports collectifs sont-ils plus casaniers que les autres ? Jouent-ils plus solidaires ? La réponse est non. L'analyse statistique (écart à l'indépendance, régression logistique) permet de tirer deux conclusions: (i) Pour les spécialistes de sports sociomoteurs, l'équilibre de Nash (1950) est plus robuste que l'équilibre d'Harsanyi (1977) : c'est le contraire pour les spécialistes de sports psychomoteurs; (ii) Inappropriés au Lepomis macrochirus, les principes d'équilibre et d'exclusivité sont vite abandonnés par les spécialistes de sports sociomoteurs. Opportunistes, ces derniers n'ont d'yeux que pour la gagne. Comme dans les sports collectifs : 'la coopération n'est qu'un sousproduit de l'opposition' (Parlebas, 1984)

Teoría de los juegos experimentales y acción motriz

Les sports collectifs développent-ils la solidarité ? De façon péremptoire, les textes officiels de l'Education physique prétendent que oui. À partir de l'analyse structurale des duels sportifs enrichie de plusieurs enquêtes sociométriques, Pierre Parlebas (1986), Renaud Laporte (1992) puis Alexandre Oboeuf (2010) rétorquent que non. Le présent travail tente de mettre ce différend à l'épreuve. Nous constituons deux groupes d'étudiants sportifs volontaires âgés d'une vingtaine d'années: 25 spécialistes de sports collectifs; 23 spécialistes de sports psychomoteurs (gymnastique, athlétisme, natation) servant de groupe témoin. Chaque groupe va jouer séparément. Le jeu proposé est inspiré du célèbre Dilemme du prisonnier (Tucker, 1950). Plus précisément, il s'agit du Lepomis macrochirus (Binmore, 1992) un jeu paradoxal à trois équilibres de Nash (deux sous-optimaux en stratégies pures et un optimal en stratégie mixte consistant à jouer solidaire à p=1/2). Ce jeu possède également un équilibre d'Harsanyi (fondé sur le respect constant de la morale, la solidarité tacite par empathie : « ne fais pas aux autres ce que tu ne voudrais pas qu’ils te fassent »). Comment joue-t-on ? On place sur un terrain de handball deux équipes de huit joueurs reconnaissables à leur maillot. On joue quinze minutes, avec un ballon de handball, au pied ou à la main. Après le coup d'envoi et chaque but – qui les obligent à regagner leur camp initial – les joueurs peuvent indifféremment marquer dans un but ou dans l'autre, coopérer ou s'opposer avec qui ils veulent. En cas de but contre l’équipe adverse, le buteur et les membres de son équipe initiale empochent chacun un point. En cas de but contre son camp de départ, seul le buteur remporte un point. On voit le paradoxe. Si les membres d’une équipe sont solidaires pour construire le point, tout le monde est satisfait (solution d’Harsanyi) ; mais la situation n’est pas équilibrée (au sens de Nash) : chacun ayant intérêt à tourner casaque à la moindre opportunité. Mais si tout le monde se met à jouer égoïste, c’est du chacun pour soi et les chances de marquer s’amenuisent. Dans ce contexte où règnent doutes sur l’intégrité des membres de l’équipe et trahisons légales, qui marquera individuellement le plus de buts ? On comptabilise les interactions motrices directes (passes, tirs) « casanières » (solidarité intra-équipe) et « gredines » (égoïstes: tirs et passes contre son camp). Les spécialistes de sports collectifs sont-ils plus casaniers que les autres ? Jouent-ils plus solidaires ? La réponse est non. L'analyse statistique (écart à l'indépendance, régression logistique) permet de tirer deux conclusions: (i) Pour les spécialistes de sports sociomoteurs, l'équilibre de Nash (1950) est plus robuste que l'équilibre d'Harsanyi (1977) : c'est le contraire pour les spécialistes de sports psychomoteurs; (ii) Inappropriés au Lepomis macrochirus, les principes d'équilibre et d'exclusivité sont vite abandonnés par les spécialistes de sports sociomoteurs. Opportunistes, ces derniers n'ont d'yeux que pour la gagne. Comme dans les sports collectifs : 'la coopération n'est qu'un sousproduit de l'opposition' (Parlebas, 1984).How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) – the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point – hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ●For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ●The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ●The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists.Departamento de Educación Físic

Teoría de los juegos experimentales y acción motriz

Les sports collectifs développent-ils la solidarité ? De façon péremptoire, les textes officiels de l'Education physique prétendent que oui. À partir de l'analyse structurale des duels sportifs enrichie de plusieurs enquêtes sociométriques, Pierre Parlebas (1986), Renaud Laporte (1992) puis Alexandre Oboeuf (2010) rétorquent que non. Le présent travail tente de mettre ce différend à l'épreuve. Nous constituons deux groupes d'étudiants sportifs volontaires âgés d'une vingtaine d'années: 25 spécialistes de sports collectifs; 23 spécialistes de sports psychomoteurs (gymnastique, athlétisme, natation) servant de groupe témoin. Chaque groupe va jouer séparément. Le jeu proposé est inspiré du célèbre Dilemme du prisonnier (Tucker, 1950). Plus précisément, il s'agit du Lepomis macrochirus (Binmore, 1992) un jeu paradoxal à trois équilibres de Nash (deux sous-optimaux en stratégies pures et un optimal en stratégie mixte consistant à jouer solidaire à p=1/2). Ce jeu possède également un équilibre d'Harsanyi (fondé sur le respect constant de la morale, la solidarité tacite par empathie : « ne fais pas aux autres ce que tu ne voudrais pas qu’ils te fassent »). Comment joue-t-on ? On place sur un terrain de handball deux équipes de huit joueurs reconnaissables à leur maillot. On joue quinze minutes, avec un ballon de handball, au pied ou à la main. Après le coup d'envoi et chaque but – qui les obligent à regagner leur camp initial – les joueurs peuvent indifféremment marquer dans un but ou dans l'autre, coopérer ou s'opposer avec qui ils veulent. En cas de but contre l’équipe adverse, le buteur et les membres de son équipe initiale empochent chacun un point. En cas de but contre son camp de départ, seul le buteur remporte un point. On voit le paradoxe. Si les membres d’une équipe sont solidaires pour construire le point, tout le monde est satisfait (solution d’Harsanyi) ; mais la situation n’est pas équilibrée (au sens de Nash) : chacun ayant intérêt à tourner casaque à la moindre opportunité. Mais si tout le monde se met à jouer égoïste, c’est du chacun pour soi et les chances de marquer s’amenuisent. Dans ce contexte où règnent doutes sur l’intégrité des membres de l’équipe et trahisons légales, qui marquera individuellement le plus de buts ? On comptabilise les interactions motrices directes (passes, tirs) « casanières » (solidarité intra-équipe) et « gredines » (égoïstes: tirs et passes contre son camp). Les spécialistes de sports collectifs sont-ils plus casaniers que les autres ? Jouent-ils plus solidaires ? La réponse est non. L'analyse statistique (écart à l'indépendance, régression logistique) permet de tirer deux conclusions: (i) Pour les spécialistes de sports sociomoteurs, l'équilibre de Nash (1950) est plus robuste que l'équilibre d'Harsanyi (1977) : c'est le contraire pour les spécialistes de sports psychomoteurs; (ii) Inappropriés au Lepomis macrochirus, les principes d'équilibre et d'exclusivité sont vite abandonnés par les spécialistes de sports sociomoteurs. Opportunistes, ces derniers n'ont d'yeux que pour la gagne. Comme dans les sports collectifs : 'la coopération n'est qu'un sousproduit de l'opposition' (Parlebas, 1984).How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) – the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point – hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ●For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ●The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ●The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists.Departamento de Educación Físic

Evolution des nages et théorie des jeux

Nous nous servons de la Théorie des jeux pour formaliser une situation problématique observée en natation sportive lors de Championnats d’Europe espacés de trente ans. Dans les épreuves de 100 m de Dos, Papillon et Nage libre, les nageurs de haut niveau nagent plus vite en immersion qu’en émersion. En petits bassins (25m), la règle des 15m permet aux nageurs de rester sous l'eau sur des distances supérieures aux distances nagées en surface. Pourtant, les experts n'utilisent pas cette option et nagent plus en surface qu'en immersion. La modélisation de ce dilemme opposant tactique de surface (Surface+) à tactique d’immersion (Coulée+) permet de pronostiquer l’évolution des techniques de nage. Six cas de figures se profilent, résolus par l’équilibre de Nash, le Maximin et la Stratégie Évolutionnairement Stable (Evolutionary Stable Strategy). Dans les épreuves courtes, la technique sous-marine du dauphin – la cinquième nage – est l’intrus amené à prendre la place du réplicateur dominant, malgré les efforts de l’institution sportive qui dresse artificiellement les nageurs à garder la surface.We used game theory to formalize a situation observed in competitive swimming, with a focus on European Championships thirty years apart. High-level swimmers move faster underwater than at the surface. In short-course (25 m pool) events, the 15-metre rule authorizes swimmers to swim further underwater than they do at the surface. However, competitive swimmers in 100 m backstroke, butterfly and freestyle events in short-course pools do not take advantage of this option and spend more time at the surface than underwater. By modelling a dilemma opposing a surface tactic (Surface+) and an underwater tactic (Underwater+), it was possible to predict the evolution of swimming techniques. Six situations appeared and were resolved by Nash equilibrium, a Maximin strategy and an Evolutionary Stable Strategy. In short-course events, underwater dolphin kicking (the “fifth stroke”) is a new “intruder” and is likely to become the dominant replicator – despite efforts from swimming institutions, which artificially trains swimmers to stay at the surface

Essai sur les sports de course

Race sports with a player-coalition structure (motorcycle scramble, cycling on roads…) are a stain in the world of sports because they are the only ones in which interpersonal relations can be ambivalent. To testify this: here is an analysis through the 3-player strategy games theory. The solution of theses different situations can take advantage of the exclusive cooperative interplay but only if ways and codes of communications are mastered; which is far from being obvious when we have a look at the multi-faceted answers of a dozen of motorcyclists who were interviewed. The mathematical analysis is fighting for a training based on semiology of motor functions.Les sports de course à structure de coalitions de joueurs (moto-cross, cyclisme sur route, etc.) font tache dans l’univers des sports car ce sont les seuls où les relations interpersonnelles peuvent être ambivalentes. En témoigne une analyse à l’aide de la Théorie des jeux des stratégies à trois joueurs. La réussite du pilote peut cependant profiter d’interactions de coopération exclusive, mais à condition que canal et codes de communication soient maîtrisés ; ce qui ne semble pas évident au regard des réponses bigarrées de quelques dizaines de motards interrogés. L’analyse mathématique milite en faveur d’un entraînement fondé sur une sémiologie de la motricité

« La bataille des nageurs ». Illustration d’un conflit entre préférences individuelles et intérêt collectif

Comment se comportent « en chair et en os » des personnes mises en demeure de choisir entre : la prudence insatisfaisante d’une décision égoïste, et la satisfaction risquée d’une décision altruiste ? Nous proposons à 64 sportifs adultes de se livrer à un jeu type dilemme des prisonniers dans la piscine. La « bataille des nageurs » montre que, dressés à la combativité systématique, les spécialistes de sport de combat sont les plus égoïstes. Leur espérance de gain est supérieure à celle des joueurs altruistes pourtant guidés par une conscience morale respectable (p<0,05 au T de Student). In vivo, l’équilibre de Nash [1950] est plus solide que l’équilibre d’Harsanyi [1977].How do persons behave “in the flesh” when they are instructed to choose between the unsatisfactory caution of a selfish decision, and the risky satisfaction of an altruistic decision? We ask 64 adult sportsmen to play a typical game “the prisoner's dilemna” in the swimming pool. The "battle between the swimmers" shows that, the specialists of combat sport who are the most selfish used to the systematic fighting spirit. Their expected gain is greater than that of the altruistic players who are nevertheless driven by a respectable moral sense (p<0,05 in T of Student). In vivo, Nash equilibrium [1950] is stronger than Harsanyi equilibrium [1977]

BIOFRAG: A new database for analysing BIOdiversity responses to forest FRAGmentation

Habitat fragmentation studies are producing inconsistent and complex results across which it is nearly impossible to synthesise. Consistent analytical techniques can be applied to primary datasets, if stored in a flexible database that allows simple data retrieval for subsequent analyses. Method: We developed a relational database linking data collected in the field to taxonomic nomenclature, spatial and temporal plot attributes and further environmental variables (e.g. information on biogeographic region. Typical field assessments include measures of biological variables (e.g. presence, abundance, ground cover) of one species or a set of species linked to a set of plots in fragments of a forested landscape. Conclusion: The database currently holds records of 5792 unique species sampled in 52 landscapes in six of eight biogeographic regions: mammals 173, birds 1101, herpetofauna 284, insects 2317, other arthropods: 48, plants 1804, snails 65. Most species are found in one or two landscapes, but some are found in four. Using the huge amount of primary data on biodiversity response to fragmentation becomes increasingly important as anthropogenic pressures from high population growth and land demands are increasing. This database can be queried to extract data for subsequent analyses of the biological response to forest fragmentation with new metrics that can integrate across the components of fragmented landscapes. Meta-analyses of findings based on consistent methods and metrics will be able to generalise over studies allowing inter-comparisons for unified answers. The database can thus help researchers in providing findings for analyses of trade-offs between land use benefits and impacts on biodiversity and to track performance of management for biodiversity conservation in human-modified landscapes.Fil: Pfeifer, Marion. Imperial College London; Reino UnidoFil: Lefebvre, Veronique. Imperial College London; Reino UnidoFil: Gardner, Toby A.. Stockholm Environment Institute; SueciaFil: Arroyo Rodríguez, Víctor. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; MéxicoFil: Baeten, Lander. University of Ghent; BélgicaFil: Banks Leite, Cristina. Imperial College London; Reino UnidoFil: Barlow, Jos. Lancaster University; Reino UnidoFil: Betts, Matthew G.. State University of Oregon; Estados UnidosFil: Brunet, Joerg. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences; SueciaFil: Cerezo Blandón, Alexis Mauricio. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Agronomía. Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Sistemas de Información; ArgentinaFil: Cisneros, Laura M.. University of Connecticut; Estados UnidosFil: Collard, Stuart. Nature Conservation Society of South Australia; AustraliaFil: D´Cruze, Neil. The World Society for the Protection of Animals; Reino UnidoFil: Da Silva Motta, Catarina. Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia, Inovações. Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia; BrasilFil: Duguay, Stephanie. Carleton University; CanadáFil: Eggermont, Hilde. University of Ghent; BélgicaFil: Eigenbrod, Félix. University of Southampton; Reino UnidoFil: Hadley, Adam S.. State University of Oregon; Estados UnidosFil: Hanson, Thor R.. No especifíca;Fil: Hawes, Joseph E.. University of East Anglia; Reino UnidoFil: Heartsill Scalley, Tamara. United State Department of Agriculture. Forestry Service; Puerto RicoFil: Klingbeil, Brian T.. University of Connecticut; Estados UnidosFil: Kolb, Annette. Universitat Bremen; AlemaniaFil: Kormann, Urs. Universität Göttingen; AlemaniaFil: Kumar, Sunil. State University of Colorado - Fort Collins; Estados UnidosFil: Lachat, Thibault. Swiss Federal Institute for Forest; SuizaFil: Lakeman Fraser, Poppy. Imperial College London; Reino UnidoFil: Lantschner, María Victoria. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. 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Differential cross section measurements for the production of a W boson in association with jets in proton–proton collisions at √s = 7 TeV

Measurements are reported of differential cross sections for the production of a W boson, which decays into a muon and a neutrino, in association with jets, as a function of several variables, including the transverse momenta (pT) and pseudorapidities of the four leading jets, the scalar sum of jet transverse momenta (HT), and the difference in azimuthal angle between the directions of each jet and the muon. The data sample of pp collisions at a centre-of-mass energy of 7 TeV was collected with the CMS detector at the LHC and corresponds to an integrated luminosity of 5.0 fb[superscript −1]. The measured cross sections are compared to predictions from Monte Carlo generators, MadGraph + pythia and sherpa, and to next-to-leading-order calculations from BlackHat + sherpa. The differential cross sections are found to be in agreement with the predictions, apart from the pT distributions of the leading jets at high pT values, the distributions of the HT at high-HT and low jet multiplicity, and the distribution of the difference in azimuthal angle between the leading jet and the muon at low values.United States. Dept. of EnergyNational Science Foundation (U.S.)Alfred P. Sloan Foundatio

Juxtaposing BTE and ATE – on the role of the European insurance industry in funding civil litigation

One of the ways in which legal services are financed, and indeed shaped, is through private insurance arrangement. Two contrasting types of legal expenses insurance contracts (LEI) seem to dominate in Europe: before the event (BTE) and after the event (ATE) legal expenses insurance. Notwithstanding institutional differences between different legal systems, BTE and ATE insurance arrangements may be instrumental if government policy is geared towards strengthening a market-oriented system of financing access to justice for individuals and business. At the same time, emphasizing the role of a private industry as a keeper of the gates to justice raises issues of accountability and transparency, not readily reconcilable with demands of competition. Moreover, multiple actors (clients, lawyers, courts, insurers) are involved, causing behavioural dynamics which are not easily predicted or influenced. Against this background, this paper looks into BTE and ATE arrangements by analysing the particularities of BTE and ATE arrangements currently available in some European jurisdictions and by painting a picture of their respective markets and legal contexts. This allows for some reflection on the performance of BTE and ATE providers as both financiers and keepers. Two issues emerge from the analysis that are worthy of some further reflection. Firstly, there is the problematic long-term sustainability of some ATE products. Secondly, the challenges faced by policymakers that would like to nudge consumers into voluntarily taking out BTE LEI