Simulating personal future events: Contributions from episodic memory and beyond

Episodic simulation refers to the construction of imagined, hypothetical events that might occur in one's personal future. Damage to our capacity for episodic simulation can produce grave consequences, impairing our ability to anticipate, plan, and prepare for the future. New theoretical approaches have begun to uncover the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying episodic simulation, but much remains to be examined. The purpose of this dissertation is to further investigate the mechanisms supporting episodic simulation as well as the functions it serves. In the first study of the dissertation I examine age-related deficits in imagining the future, remembering the past, and describing the present (Paper 1). These findings replicate known deficits in older adults in episodic simulation and memory, yet provide evidence of non-episodic processes that also shape their expression. I next examine component cognitive and neural processes that are recruited to generate imagined events (Paper 2). Distinct regions of the hippocampus were active when encoding, tracking novelty, or constructing imagined events, suggesting a multifaceted role of the hippocampus in supporting episodic simulation. Finally, I present evidence that episodic simulation and memory can be used to facilitate empathy, that is, intentions to help a person in need (Paper 3). People are more willing to help a person in need after imagining or remembering helping that individual. Furthermore, the episodic vividness of these imagined or remembered events heightened intentions to help. These findings elucidate a previously unconsidered mechanism for facilitating empathy, and, in doing so, open the possibility for a new functional account of episodic simulation. I close by discussing the promise of this line of work that aims to provide new insights into the relationship between episodic simulation, memory, and empathy.Psycholog

Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future in the Elderly

Recent research has demonstrated commonalities between remembering past events and imagining future events. Behavioral studies have revealed that remembering the past and imagining the future depend on shared cognitive processes, whereas neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies have shown that many of the same brain regions are involved in both remembering the past and imagining the future. Here, we review recent cognitive and neuroimaging studies that examine remembering the past and imagining the future in elderly adults. These studies document significant changes in elderly adults’ capacities to imagine future events that are correlated with their memory deficits; most strikingly, older adults tend to remember the past and imagine the future with less episodic detail than younger adults. These findings are in line with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis [Schacter and Addis: Phil Trans R Soc B 2007;362:773-786], which holds that that past and future events draw on similar information and rely on similar underlying processes, and that episodic memory supports the construction of future events by extracting and recombining stored information into a simulation of a novel event. At the same time, however, recent data indicate that non-episodic factors also contribute to age-related changes in remembering the past and imagining the future. We conclude by considering a number questions and challenges concerning the interpretation of age-related changes in remembering and imagining, as well as functional implications of this research for everyday concerns of older adults.Psycholog

Constructive episodic simulation: Dissociable effects of a specificity induction on remembering, imagining, and describing in young and older adults. J Exp Psychol: Learn Mem Cogn

According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis , both remembered past and imagined future events rely heavily on episodic memory. An alternative hypothesis is that observed similarities between remembering and imagining reflect the influence of broader factors such as descriptive ability, narrative style, or inhibitory control. We attempted to distinguish between these 2 hypotheses by examining the impact of an episodic specificity induction on memory, imagination, and picture description in young and older adults. In Experiment 1, participants received the specificity induction or a control induction prior to the memory, imagination, and description tasks. Older adults provided fewer internal (i.e., episodic) and more external (i.e., semantic) details than young adults across the 3 tasks irrespective of induction. Critically, however, the specificity induction selectively increased internal but not external details for memory and imagination in both age groups compared with the control induction. By contrast, the induction did not affect internal (or external) details for picture description. Experiment 2 replicated these results in young adults using a different control induction. Our findings point to a dissociation between episodic processes involved in memory and imagination and nonepisodic processes involved in picture description