Federal aid to common schools in the states.

24 p

Resuming European Détente and European Integration

International audienceFrance and the INF Treaty In 1987, the two superpowers signed the INF Treaty, thus officially ending the Euromissile crisis. Though neither the French President nor any other French representative sat at the negotiation table, France itself was present-for throughout the Euromissile crisis, French diplomacy had played a decisive role. Pursuing his own Ostpolitik, in which he always took a tough line with Moscow, President François Mitterrand had actively encouraged Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev to resume the U. S.-Soviet dialogue on détente and disarmament, which had come to a standstill at the beginning of the 1980s. Mitterrand had held extensive conversations with both Reagan and Gorbachev in 1984/85 and had offered both of them advice on how to get back into meaningful negotiations.1 This was important to Mitterrand's own policy aims. The return to confrontation between the superpowers at the end of the 1970s considerably reduced France's room for maneuver in the field of East-West cooperation. It also hindered progress towards European integration. So, from the French perspective, any improvement in the area of détente and disarmament between the two superpowers and any steps forward towards ending the Euromissile crises would make better conditions for cooperation within Europe-both between the Eas

THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE POLICY COMMUNICATION: THE "THREAT" OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

This paper suggests a technique for evaluating threat assessments when reliable data is unavailable. Previously, scholars have found that political leaders manipulated threat assessments to achieve desired defense policy outcomes. Yet contemporary communication about threats are not easily studied, leading some writers to call for new studies of Clausewitz's so-called "social" dimension of strategy - the efforts by governments to assure domestic support for defense policies. To apply the suggested technique, this paper examines the Reagan Administration's claim that the threats from Soviet strategic defenses justify the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. The Administration's arguments are found to be unclear and internally inconsistent. Despite some fear appeals about Soviet threats, Reagan officials typically noted that American offensive forces will continue to render Soviet defenses impotent and obsolete for the forseeable future. Indeed, vague and inconsistent statements about Soviet forces may have undermined Administration efforts to fulfill SDI funding goals, to codify early deployment plans, and even to establish Manhattan or Apollo-type policy preeminince. Copyright 1989 by The Policy Studies Organization.