Der Streit um heiße Luft: Der Einfluss von Interessengruppen auf den EU-Emissionshandel und seine Umsetzung in Deutschland und dem Vereinigten Königreich

In der ersten Handelsphase nach Einführung des Europäischen Emissionshandelssystems (EU-ETS) kam es zu einer Überallokation von Gratiszertifikaten, so dass es seine ökologische Lenkungswirkung nicht entfalten konnte. Die beiden größten Emittenten der EU, Deutschland und das Vereinigte Königreich, weisen in dieser Hinsicht erhebliche Unterschiede auf. In der vorliegenden Studie werden die Erklärungsfaktoren für diese nationalen Unterschiede ausgearbeitet. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass es weniger Anpassungs- und Problemdruck sind, als vielmehr der institutionell strukturierte Einfluss von Interessengruppen, der die unterschiedliche umweltpolitische Ambitioniertheit der Nationalen Allokationspläne erklärt. Insbesondere die Rolle des Bundesrates als Vetopunkt und Unterschiede bei der Institutionalisierung von Verhandlungen zwischen gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Akteuren stellen hier wichtige Erklärungsfaktoren dar.During its first phase, the European Emission Trading System failed to bring about any reductions in European CO2 emissions. The National Allocation Plans of Europe’s biggest emitters, Germany and the UK, vary significantly in regard to the relative amount of certificates granted to domestic industries. Our study assesses explanatory factors for these differences in accordance with the literature on European policies’ implementation. It reveals that it is the institutional opportunity structure for interest groups' influence rather than adaptation and/or problem pressure that accounts for the differences in the environmental ambitiousness of National Allocation Plans. In particular, the German Bundesrat as a veto point and differences in institutionalised relations between societal and state actors serve as important explanatory factors for the national differences observed

Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multiparty systems

Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se from the distribution of key government pay-offs, such as cabinet portfolios, between members of the resulting government. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, taking into account knowledge of the identity of some government ‘formateur’ or even of the composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations – Gamson’s Law. This article resolves this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution that, for example, predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post. It concludes that canonical models of legislative bargaining do increase the ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process

Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se from the distribution of key government pay-offs, such as cabinet portfolios, between members of the resulting government. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, taking into account knowledge of the identity of some government ‘formateur’ or even of the composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations – Gamson’s Law. This article resolves this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution that, for example, predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post. It concludes that canonical models of legislative bargaining do increase the ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process.Peer Reviewe

Vermessen und Teilen - Praktiken und Diskurse des Teilens digitaler Selbstvermessungsdaten

Dieser Lehrforschungsbericht untersucht die Praktiken und Diskurse beim Umgang mit persönlichen Körperdaten, die mittels digitaler Selbstvermessung erfasst werden. Werden Körpderdaten wie Puls, Gewicht, Laufstrecke, Essverhalten etc geteilt und wenn ja, wie? Die Forschungsgruppe führte dazu Interviews mit Nutzern solcher Selbstvermessungsgeräte und machte Diskursanalysen zu Fitness, Gesundheit und Datennutzung. Die Forschungsdaten wurden sowohl praxistheoretisch interpretiert als auch mit den Techniken der Situationsanalyse strukturiert. Dieses Vorgehen bettete sich in den Forschungsstil der Grounded Theory ein

Illuminating hydrological processes at the soil-vegetation-atmosphere interface with water stable isotopes

Funded by DFG research project “From Catchments as Organised Systems to Models based on Functional Units” (FOR 1Peer reviewedPublisher PDFPublisher PD

The Resource Curse and Rentier States in the Caspian Region : A Need for Context Analysis

Although much attention is paid to the Caspian region with regard to energy issues, the domestic consequences of the region’s resource production have so far constituted a neglected field of research. A systematic survey of the latest research trends in the economic and political causalities of the resource curse and of rentier states reveals that there is a need for context analysis. In reference to this, the paper traces any shortcomings and promising approaches in the existent body of literature on the Caspian region. Following on from this, the paper then proposes a new approach; specifically, one in which any differences and similarities in the context conditions are captured. This enables a more precise exploration of the exact ways in which they form contemporary post-Soviet Caspian rentier states.Obwohl der Region am Kaspischen Meer im Zuge von Energiediskursen große Aufmerksamkeit zuteil wird, stellen die innerstaatlichen Folgen der Ressourcenproduktion in der Region ein bislang vernachlässigtes Forschungsfeld dar. Ein systematischer Überblick über die jüngsten Forschungstrends zu wirtschaftlichen und politischen Kausalzusammenhängen des Ressourcenfluchs und zu Rentierstaaten offenbart die Notwendigkeit von Kontextanalysen. Hierauf Bezug nehmend, analysiert der Aufsatz sowohl die Mängel als auch viel versprechende Ansätze in der betreffenden Literatur zur Region am Kaspischen Meer. Der Aufsatz stellt letztendlich einen neuen Ansatz vor, der Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten in den Kontextbedingungen erfasst, um zu erforschen, wie diese die gegenwärtigen post-sowjetischen Rentierstaaten in der Region am Kaspischen Meer tatsächlich prägen