2D supergravity in p+1 dimensions

We describe new $N$-extended 2D supergravities on a $(p+1)$-dimensional (bosonic) space. The fundamental objects are moving frame densities that equip each $(p+1)$-dimensional point with a 2D ``tangent space''. The theory is presented in a $[p+1, 2]$ superspace. For the special case of $p=1$ we recover the 2D supergravities in an unusual form. The formalism has been developed with applications to the string-parton picture of $D$-branes at strong coupling in mind.Comment: 16 pages, Late

A Picture of D-branes at Strong Coupling II. Spinning Partons

We study the Born-Infeld D-brane action in the limit when the string coupling goes to infinity. The resulting actions is presented in an arbitrary background and shown to describe a foliation of the world-volume by strings. Using a recently developed ``degenerate'' supergravity the parton picture is shown to be applicable also to supersymmetric D-branes.Comment: 14 pages, Late

N = 2 world-sheet approach to D-branes on generalized Kaehler geometries: I. General formalism

We present an N = 2 world-sheet superspace description of D-branes on bihermitian or generalized Kaehler manifolds. To accomplish this, D-branes are considered as boundary conditions for a nonlinear sigma-model in what we call N = 2 boundary superspace. In this note the general formalism for such an approach is presented and the resulting classification sketched. This includes some remarks regarding target spaces whose parameterization includes semi-chiral superfields which have not appeared in the literature yet. In an accompanying note we turn to some examples and applications of the general setup presented here.Comment: 7 pages, contribution to the proceedings of the Fourth Workshop of the RTN project 'Constituents, Fundamental Forces and Symmetries of the Universe', Varna, September 11 - 17, 200

Thinking Impossible Things

“There is no use in trying,” said Alice; “one can’t believe impossible things.” “I dare say you haven’t had much practice,” said the Queen. “When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast”. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass. It is a rather common view among philosophers that one cannot, properly speaking, be said to believe, conceive, imagine, hope for, or seek what is impossible. Some philosophers, for instance George Berkeley and the early Wittgenstein, thought that logically contradictory propositions lack cognitive meaning (informational content) and cannot, therefore, be thought or believed. Philosophers who do not go as far as Berkeley and Wittgenstein in denying that impossible propositions or states of affairs are thinkable, may still claim that it is impossible to rationally believe an impossible proposition. On a classical “Cartesian” view of belief, belief is a purely mental state of the agent holding true a proposition p that she “grasps” and is directly acquainted with. But if the agent is directly acquainted with an impossible proposition, then, presumably, she must know that it is impossible. But surely no rational agent can hold true a proposition that she knows is impossible. Hence, no rational agent can believe an impossible proposition. Thus it seems that on the Cartesian view of propositional attitudes as inner mental states in which proposition are immediately apprehended by the mind, it is impossible for a rational agent to believe, imagine or conceive an impossible proposition. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1983) has suggested that a belief attribution is defeated once it is discovered that the proposition, or state of affairs that is believed is impossible. According to her intuition, just as knowledge implies truth, belief implies possibility. It is commonplace that people claim to believe propositions that later turn out to be impossible. According to Barcan Marcus, the correct thing to say in such a situation is not: I once believed that A but I don’t believe it any longer since I have come to realize that it is impossible that A. What one should say is instead: It once appeared to me that I believed that A, but I did not, since it is impossible that A. Thus, Barcan Marcus defends what we might call Alice’s thesis: Necessarily, for any proposition p and any subject x, if x believes p, then p is possible. Alice’s thesis that it is impossible to hold impossible beliefs, seems to come into conflict with our ordinary practices of attributing beliefs. Consider a mathematical example. Some mathematicians believe that CH (the continuum hypothesis) is true and others believe that it is false. But if CH is true, then it is necessarily true; and if it is false, then it is necessarily false. Regardless of whether CH is true or false, the conclusion seems to be that there are mathematicians who believe impossible propositions. Examples of apparent beliefs in impossible propositions outside of mathematics are also easy to come by. Consider, for example, Kripke’s (1999) story of the Frenchman Pierre who without realizing it has two different names ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ for the same city, London. After having arrived in London, Pierre may assent to ‘Londres is beautiful and London is not beautiful’ without being in any way irrational. It seems reasonably to infer from this that Pierre believes that Londres is beautiful and London is not beautiful. But since ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ are rigid designators for the same city, it seems to follow from this that Pierre believes the inconsistent proposition that we may express as ‘London is both beautiful and not beautiful’

A Picture of D-branes at Strong Coupling

We use a phase space description to (re)derive a first order form of the Born-Infeld action for D-branes. This derivation also makes it possible to consider the limit where the tension of the D-brane goes to zero. We find that in this limit, which can be considered to be the strong coupling limit of the fundamental string theory, the world-volume of the D-brane generically splits into a collection of tensile strings.Comment: 14 pages, LaTe

Supersymmetry, a Biased Review

This set of lectures contain a brief review of some basic supersymmetry and its representations, with emphasis on superspace and superfields. Starting from the Poincar\'e group, the supersymmetric extensions allowed by the Coleman-Mandula theorem and its generalisation to superalgebras, the Haag, Lopuszanski and Sohnius theorem, are discussed. Minkowski space is introduced as a quotient space and Superspace is presented as a direct generalization of this. The focus is then shifted from a general presentation to the relation between supersymmetry and complex geometry as manifested in the possible target space geometries for N=1 and N=2 supersymmetric nonlinear sigma models in four dimensions. Gauging of isometries in nonlinear sigma models is discussed for these cases, and the quotient construction is described.Comment: Latex, 28 pages, Invited Lectures at ``The 22nd Winter School Geometry and Physics, Srni, Czech Republic, January 12-19, 2002. V2: Misprints correcte

A brief review of supersymmetric non-linear sigma models and generalized complex geometry

This is a review of the relation between supersymmetric non-linear sigma models and target space geometry. In particular, we report on the derivation of generalized K\"ahler geometry from sigma models with additional spinorial superfields. Some of the results reviewed are: Generalized complex geometry from sigma models in the Lagrangian formulation; Coordinatization of generalized K\"ahler geometry in terms of chiral, twisted chiral and semi-chiral superfields; Generalized K\"ahler geometry from sigma models in the Hamiltonian formulation.Comment: 16 pages, Latex. Contribution to The 26th Winter School GEOMETRY AND PHYSICS, Czech Republic, Srni, January 14 - 21, 200