Supervisory Control System Architecture for Advanced Small Modular Reactors

This technical report was generated as a product of the Supervisory Control for Multi-Modular SMR Plants project within the Instrumentation, Control and Human-Machine Interface technology area under the Advanced Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Research and Development Program of the U.S. Department of Energy. The report documents the definition of strategies, functional elements, and the structural architecture of a supervisory control system for multi-modular advanced SMR (AdvSMR) plants. This research activity advances the state-of-the art by incorporating decision making into the supervisory control system architectural layers through the introduction of a tiered-plant system approach. The report provides a brief history of hierarchical functional architectures and the current state-of-the-art, describes a reference AdvSMR to show the dependencies between systems, presents a hierarchical structure for supervisory control, indicates the importance of understanding trip setpoints, applies a new theoretic approach for comparing architectures, identifies cyber security controls that should be addressed early in system design, and describes ongoing work to develop system requirements and hardware/software configurations

Safety and Nonsafety Communications and Interactions in International Nuclear Power Plants

Current industry and NRC guidance documents such as IEEE 7-4.3.2, Reg. Guide 1.152, and IEEE 603 do not sufficiently define a level of detail for evaluating interdivisional communications independence. The NRC seeks to establish criteria for safety systems communications that can be uniformly applied in evaluation of a variety of safety system designs. This report focuses strictly on communication issues related to data sent between safety systems and between safety and nonsafety systems. Further, the report does not provide design guidance for communication systems nor present detailed failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) results for existing designs. This letter report describes communications between safety and nonsafety systems in nuclear power plants outside the United States. A limited study of international nuclear power plants was conducted to ascertain important communication implementations that might have bearing on systems proposed for licensing in the United States. This report provides that following information: 1.communications types and structures used in a representative set of international nuclear power reactors, and 2.communications issues derived from standards and other source documents relevant to safety and nonsafety communications. Topics that are discussed include the following: communication among redundant safety divisions, communications between safety divisions and nonsafety systems, control of safety equipment from a nonsafety workstation, and connection of nonsafety programming, maintenance, and test equipment to redundant safety divisions during operation. Information for this report was obtained through publicly available sources such as published papers and presentations. No proprietary information is represented

Diversity Strategies for Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems

This report presents the technical basis for establishing acceptable mitigating strategies that resolve diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) assessment findings and conform to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. The research approach employed to establish appropriate diversity strategies involves investigation of available documentation on D3 methods and experience from nuclear power and nonnuclear industries, capture of expert knowledge and lessons learned, determination of best practices, and assessment of the nature of common-cause failures (CCFs) and compensating diversity attributes. The research described in this report does not provide guidance on how to determine the need for diversity in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs. Rather, the scope of this report provides guidance to the staff and nuclear industry after a licensee or applicant has performed a D3 assessment per NUREG/CR-6303 and determined that diversity in a safety system is needed for mitigating the consequences of potential CCFs identified in the evaluation of the safety system design features. Succinctly, the purpose of the research described in this report was to answer the question, 'If diversity is required in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs, how much diversity is enough?' The principal results of this research effort have identified and developed diversity strategies, which consist of combinations of diversity attributes and their associated criteria. Technology, which corresponds to design diversity, is chosen as the principal system characteristic by which diversity criteria are grouped to form strategies. The rationale for this classification framework involves consideration of the profound impact that technology-focused design diversity provides. Consequently, the diversity usage classification scheme involves three families of strategies: (1) different technologies, (2) different approaches within the same technology, and (3) different architectures within the same technology. Using this convention, the first diversity usage family, designated Strategy A, is characterized by fundamentally diverse technologies. Strategy A at the system or platform level is illustrated by the example of analog and digital implementations. The second diversity usage family, designated Strategy B, is achieved through the use of distinctly different technologies. Strategy B can be described in terms of different digital technologies, such as the distinct approaches represented by general-purpose microprocessors and field-programmable gate arrays. The third diversity usage family, designated Strategy C, involves the use of variations within a technology. An example of Strategy C involves different digital architectures within the same technology, such as that provided by different microprocessors (e.g., Pentium and Power PC). The grouping of diversity criteria combinations according to Strategies A, B, and C establishes baseline diversity usage and facilitates a systematic organization of strategic approaches for coping with CCF vulnerabilities. Effectively, these baseline sets of diversity criteria constitute appropriate CCF mitigating strategies for digital safety systems. The strategies represent guidance on acceptable diversity usage and can be applied directly to ensure that CCF vulnerabilities identified through a D3 assessment have been adequately resolved. Additionally, a framework has been generated for capturing practices regarding diversity usage and a tool has been developed for the systematic assessment of the comparative effect of proposed diversity strategies (see Appendix A)

Production of He-4 and (4) in Pb-Pb collisions at root(NN)-N-S=2.76 TeV at the LHC

Results on the production of He-4 and (4) nuclei in Pb-Pb collisions at root(NN)-N-S = 2.76 TeV in the rapidity range vertical bar y vertical bar <1, using the ALICE detector, are presented in this paper. The rapidity densities corresponding to 0-10% central events are found to be dN/dy4(He) = (0.8 +/- 0.4 (stat) +/- 0.3 (syst)) x 10(-6) and dN/dy4 = (1.1 +/- 0.4 (stat) +/- 0.2 (syst)) x 10(-6), respectively. This is in agreement with the statistical thermal model expectation assuming the same chemical freeze-out temperature (T-chem = 156 MeV) as for light hadrons. The measured ratio of (4)/He-4 is 1.4 +/- 0.8 (stat) +/- 0.5 (syst). (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.Peer reviewe

Azimuthal anisotropy of charged jet production in root s(NN)=2.76 TeV Pb-Pb collisions

We present measurements of the azimuthal dependence of charged jet production in central and semi-central root s(NN) = 2.76 TeV Pb-Pb collisions with respect to the second harmonic event plane, quantified as nu(ch)(2) (jet). Jet finding is performed employing the anti-k(T) algorithm with a resolution parameter R = 0.2 using charged tracks from the ALICE tracking system. The contribution of the azimuthal anisotropy of the underlying event is taken into account event-by-event. The remaining (statistical) region-to-region fluctuations are removed on an ensemble basis by unfolding the jet spectra for different event plane orientations independently. Significant non-zero nu(ch)(2) (jet) is observed in semi-central collisions (30-50% centrality) for 20 <p(T)(ch) (jet) <90 GeV/c. The azimuthal dependence of the charged jet production is similar to the dependence observed for jets comprising both charged and neutral fragments, and compatible with measurements of the nu(2) of single charged particles at high p(T). Good agreement between the data and predictions from JEWEL, an event generator simulating parton shower evolution in the presence of a dense QCD medium, is found in semi-central collisions. (C) 2015 CERN for the benefit of the ALICE Collaboration. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Peer reviewe

Forward-central two-particle correlations in p-Pb collisions at root s(NN)=5.02 TeV

Two-particle angular correlations between trigger particles in the forward pseudorapidity range (2.5 2GeV/c. (C) 2015 CERN for the benefit of the ALICE Collaboration. Published by Elsevier B. V.Peer reviewe

Event-shape engineering for inclusive spectra and elliptic flow in Pb-Pb collisions at root(NN)-N-S=2.76 TeV

Peer reviewe

Pseudorapidity and transverse-momentum distributions of charged particles in proton-proton collisions at root s=13 TeV

The pseudorapidity (eta) and transverse-momentum (p(T)) distributions of charged particles produced in proton-proton collisions are measured at the centre-of-mass energy root s = 13 TeV. The pseudorapidity distribution in vertical bar eta vertical bar <1.8 is reported for inelastic events and for events with at least one charged particle in vertical bar eta vertical bar <1. The pseudorapidity density of charged particles produced in the pseudorapidity region vertical bar eta vertical bar <0.5 is 5.31 +/- 0.18 and 6.46 +/- 0.19 for the two event classes, respectively. The transverse-momentum distribution of charged particles is measured in the range 0.15 <p(T) <20 GeV/c and vertical bar eta vertical bar <0.8 for events with at least one charged particle in vertical bar eta vertical bar <1. The evolution of the transverse momentum spectra of charged particles is also investigated as a function of event multiplicity. The results are compared with calculations from PYTHIA and EPOS Monte Carlo generators. (C) 2015 CERN for the benefit of the ALICE Collaboration. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Peer reviewe

Elliptic flow of muons from heavy-flavour hadron decays at forward rapidity in Pb-Pb collisions at root s(NN)=2.76TeV

The elliptic flow, v(2), of muons from heavy-flavour hadron decays at forward rapidity (2.5 <y <4) is measured in Pb-Pb collisions at root s(NN)= 2.76TeVwith the ALICE detector at the LHC. The scalar product, two- and four-particle Q cumulants and Lee-Yang zeros methods are used. The dependence of the v(2) of muons from heavy-flavour hadron decays on the collision centrality, in the range 0-40%, and on transverse momentum, p(T), is studied in the interval 3 <p(T)<10 GeV/c. A positive v(2) is observed with the scalar product and two-particle Q cumulants in semi-central collisions (10-20% and 20-40% centrality classes) for the p(T) interval from 3 to about 5GeV/c with a significance larger than 3 sigma, based on the combination of statistical and systematic uncertainties. The v(2) magnitude tends to decrease towards more central collisions and with increasing pT. It becomes compatible with zero in the interval 6 <p(T)<10 GeV/c. The results are compared to models describing the interaction of heavy quarks and open heavy-flavour hadrons with the high-density medium formed in high-energy heavy-ion collisions. (C) 2015 CERN for the benefit of the ALICE Collaboration. Published by Elsevier B.V.Peer reviewe

Diversity Strategies for Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems

This report presents the technical basis for establishing acceptable mitigating strategies that resolve diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) assessment findings and conform to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. The research approach employed to establish appropriate diversity strategies involves investigation of available documentation on D3 methods and experience from nuclear power and nonnuclear industries, capture of expert knowledge and lessons learned, determination of best practices, and assessment of the nature of common-cause failures (CCFs) and compensating diversity attributes. The research described in this report does not provide guidance on how to determine the need for diversity in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs. Rather, the scope of this report provides guidance to the staff and nuclear industry after a licensee or applicant has performed a D3 assessment per NUREG/CR-6303 and determined that diversity in a safety system is needed for mitigating the consequences of potential CCFs identified in the evaluation of the safety system design features. Succinctly, the purpose of the research described in this report was to answer the question, 'If diversity is required in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs, how much diversity is enough?' The principal results of this research effort have identified and developed diversity strategies, which consist of combinations of diversity attributes and their associated criteria. Technology, which corresponds to design diversity, is chosen as the principal system characteristic by which diversity criteria are grouped to form strategies. The rationale for this classification framework involves consideration of the profound impact that technology-focused design diversity provides. Consequently, the diversity usage classification scheme involves three families of strategies: (1) different technologies, (2) different approaches within the same technology, and (3) different architectures within the same technology. Using this convention, the first diversity usage family, designated Strategy A, is characterized by fundamentally diverse technologies. Strategy A at the system or platform level is illustrated by the example of analog and digital implementations. The second diversity usage family, designated Strategy B, is achieved through the use of distinctly different technologies. Strategy B can be described in terms of different digital technologies, such as the distinct approaches represented by general-purpose microprocessors and field-programmable gate arrays. The third diversity usage family, designated Strategy C, involves the use of variations within a technology. An example of Strategy C involves different digital architectures within the same technology, such as that provided by different microprocessors (e.g., Pentium and Power PC). The grouping of diversity criteria combinations according to Strategies A, B, and C establishes baseline diversity usage and facilitates a systematic organization of strategic approaches for coping with CCF vulnerabilities. Effectively, these baseline sets of diversity criteria constitute appropriate CCF mitigating strategies for digital safety systems. The strategies represent guidance on acceptable diversity usage and can be applied directly to ensure that CCF vulnerabilities identified through a D3 assessment have been adequately resolved. Additionally, a framework has been generated for capturing practices regarding diversity usage and a tool has been developed for the systematic assessment of the comparative effect of proposed diversity strategies (see Appendix A)