Análisis desde el modelo deductivo de la fragilidad del relleno sanitario ‘Doña Juana’ y la resistencia de sus habitantes

Artículo de InvestigaciónEl denominado Relleno Sanitario ‘Doña Juana’ cuya ubicación es en la localidad de Usme de la ciudad de Bogotá, ha ocasionado graves impactos ambientales y en la salud de los habitantes de la Vereda Mochuelo Alto, que afecta en gran medida la calidad de vida y la garantía de sus derechos. El inadecuado uso de los residuos sólidos y la ausencia de vertederos que sean impermeabilizados, convierte a este relleno sanitario en una amenaza de contaminación. El objetivo del presente artículo es demostrar la ausencia de inclusión y participación de la ciudadanía en la toma de decisiones, adoptadas para mitigar los impactos, así como la poca interacción entre los actores involucrados.INTRODUCCIÓN I. Panorama y manejo de los Rellenos Sanitarios. II. Implicaciones del derecho internacional ambiental en los rellenos sanitarios. III. Contextualización del Relleno. IV. Impacto del Relleno Sanitario ‘Doña Juana’ en la comunidad de Mochuelo Alto. V. Visión prospectiva del Plan de Gestión Integral de Residuos Sólidos 2016-2027. VI. Conclusiones. VII. BibliografíaPregradoAbogad

No caminho para o urbanismo. Saturnino de Brito e Édouard Imbeaux, trajetórias profissionais entre Brasil e França

The aim of this work is to establish a dialogue between the professional trajectories of two engineers: Saturnino de Brito (1864-1929) and Édouard Imbeaux (1861-1943). They both focussed on the city as object of action and reflection based on an innovative knowledge of hygiene and sanitation issues. The specificity of these trajectories is the association of practice, theoretical reflection and dissemination: these two professionals respectively contributed, in their countries, to the construction of Town planning as a discipline, in particular in relation to its technical approach. The international scene is an important dimension of their activity as it made possible the circulation / comparison of technical knowledge between Europe and Brazil and it contributed to find a specific and appropriate response to the problems of the city. The interaction of local, national and international scene allows another perspective of the professional trajectories of Saturnino de Brito and Edouard Imbeaux.O objetivo deste trabalho é estabelecer um diálogo entre duas trajetórias profissionais, a de Saturnino de Brito (1864-1929) e a de Édouard Imbeaux (1861-1943), que privilegiaram a cidade como objeto de ação e de reflexão, as quais são construídas a partir de um conhecimento inovador sobre as questões de higiene e saneamento. A especificidade desses percursos é a associação da prática com a reflexão teórica e sua difusão: estes dois profissionais contribuíram, assim, cada um em seu país, para a construção da disciplina urbanística, especialmente em sua abordagem técnica. O cenário internacional constitui uma dimensão importante de sua ação, que tornou possível a circulação/confronto de saberes técnicos entre Europa e Brasil e contribuiu com a pesquisa de uma resposta concreta e adaptada aos problemas da cidade. A interação do cenário local, nacional e internacional permite trazer um outro olhar sobre as trajetórias profissionais de Saturnino de Brito e Édouard Imbeaux

Global Boundary Stratotype Section and Point (GSSP) for the Anthropocene Series: Where and how to look for potential candidates

International audienc

The Pearl Harbor controversy, 1941-1946

Largely ignored by students of wartime America, the Pearl Harbor disaster became the basis for a political controversy which perpetuated the pre-war isolationist-interventionist debate and challenged the authority of the powerful New Deal government. Faced with continual pressure from critics to release all information pertaining to the December 7 debacle, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration attempted to quell the issue for the duration of the war to avoid a potentially volatile political battle and to keep national attention fixed on the war effort. To the extent that the President and the high administration officials succeeded or failed in controlling the Pearl Harbor issue--and avoiding political disaster--is the focus of this study. Since the President and the Secretaries of War and the Navy were convinced of the correctness of their own actions prior to the air attack, they assumed that accountability for the disaster resided at the lowest echelons of authority --namely the Hawaiian Command. In trying to avert a wave of recriminations the administration sought a middle course between full disclosure of Pearl Harbor data and punitive action against the local commanders, General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel. This compromise backfired--unwittingly creating scapegoats and initiating a major debate over the question of responsibility --when the President's Commission on Pearl Harbor (the Roberts Commission) openly blamed Kimmel and Short for the disaster in early 1942. The Executive branch's careful monitoring of the inquiry and the prohibition against examining questions of Washington's role in the disaster made the administration's motives suspect and opened the way for a lingering suspicion of conspiracy festering in high official circles. When Kimmel and Short were ordered to retire soon after the disclosure of the Roberts report, critics quickly assumed that Roosevelt had something to hide. Throughout the remainder of the war, the controversy over responsibility raged. Confronted with constant opposition to its scenario on Pearl Harbor, the administration became more defensive and less willing to reevaluate its interpretation. The most serious wartime challenge to the official position came in the form of new Army and Navy investigations of Pearl Harbor ordered by Congress in 1944. Both the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry placed more emphasis upon lapses in Washington than derelictions in Hawaii. Most significantly, the publication of the Army/Navy reports, in conjunction with the end of the war, forced an open congressional investigation of the disaster--something the administration sought vigorously to avoid. The congressional investigation, far from expectations, was not the panacea for years of uncertainty and recrimination. The Democratic-controlled hearings, despite the publication of a plethora of data, became a partisan circus. The sides were too polarized for any other course of action. Like the other Pearl Harbor inquiries, the congressional hearings did not resolve the perplexing issue of personal culpability. Consensus was impossible, and blame proliferated rather than narrowed. Although the original intent of the Roosevelt administration's policy was to keep Pearl Harbor from interfering with national unity and the war effort, it mutated into a destructive cover-up, prohibitive of a dispassionate analysis of the disaster. In the end, the controversy: 1) perpetuated the debate over the direction United States foreign policy should take; 2) provided an issue to inflame partisanism between Democrats and Republicans; 3) confused rather than enlightened the public about the reasons for American entry into the war; and 4) reinforced the notion that individuals, not institutions or systems, were responsible for the breakdown in vigilance. The Pearl Harbor controversy, therefore, produced much heat but very little light.Histor