Another Missed Opportunity to Adopt a Universally Accepted Maritime Treaty

In March 2023, an intergovernmental conference adopted the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement). Inspired by a resurgence of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), the BBNJ Agreement contains numerous provisions that will have the practical effect of making ratification of the agreement untenable for the industrialized nations. Similar provisions were included in the original Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). As a result, industrialized nations refused to sign or ratify UNCLOS when it was opened for signature in 1982. UNCLOS did not enter into force until Part XI was amended by an implementing agreement in 1994 to eliminate the NIEO-inspired provisions that were objectionable to the developed nations. Unfortunately, the international community is seeing history repeat itself with the negotiation and adoption of the BBNJ Agreement. In its current form, the BBNJ Agreement repeats many of the mistakes of Part XI and will never receive the required votes for advice and consent in the U.S. Senate. Unless these provisions are amended, the result will be that genetic resources, like deep seabed minerals, will not be exploited for the benefit of mankind

Episode 1: Words Matter: Irregular Warfare Definitions and Constructs

Guests Robert S. Burrell, Richard Tilley, and David H. Ucko join host Col. Dave Brown to discuss the definition of Irregular Warfare (IW), its changing construct in DoD, and its overall utility. The group touches on the broader dimensions of the “competition” space indirectly affecting both IW and the larger international security environment. Article: A Full Spectrum of Conflict Design: How Doctrine Should Embrace Irregular Warfare, Robert S. Burrell, March 14, 2023 Article: JP 1 Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, 27 August 2023 Article: Redefining Irregular Warfare: Legitimacy, Coercion, And Power, David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks, Oct 18, 2022 ------------------------ Guests:Robert S. Burrell, PhD is an Assistant Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies at Joint Special Operations University with several years of adult learning and teaching experience at the graduate and undergraduate level. My area of expertise and scholarship includes international diplomacy and human intelligence, as well as military history, theory, and doctrine. Previously, I taught history at U.S. Naval Academy. I am also the former editor-in-chief of special operations doctrine. A retired Marine with combat experience, I am an Asia-Pacific expert with 12 years living and working in Japan, Korea, Philippines, and Thailand, as well as a diplomatic tour at the U.S. Embassy in Australia. Richard Tilley serves at the J7 office of IW & Competition. Formerly the principal advisor to Chairman Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff concerning ability to wage IW sustain campaigns of strategic competition against our adversaries. Directed CJCS’ Joint Irregular Warfare Assessment. Led efforts to institutionalize and integrate IW and strategic competition capabilities and activities across the Joint Force and in coordination with interagency, multinational, and other domestic and foreign interorganizational partners. Prior to joining the Joint Staff in 2021, Richard served as a strategist in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security analyzing adversarial competitive strategies and orienting the Department’s sensitive activities and special operations. Previously served as the national security advisor to a senior member of the HASC, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. David H. Ucko, PhD is a Professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) of the National Defense University, Washington DC, where he teaches irregular warfare and strategy to international military and civilian practitioners. From 2019-2023, he was the chair of CISA\u27s Department of War & Conflict Studies (WACS) and, from 2018-2022, the Director of the Regional Defense Fellowship Program, whereby he led the College\u27s international deployment of mobile education teams. Dr. Ucko is an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University and a senior visiting fellow at the Department of War Studies, King\u27s College London.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/the-trident/1000/thumbnail.jp

International Law and Acoustic Antagonism in East Asian Waters

This article analyzes a 2023 maritime incident in which the Chinese Navy Ship (CNS) Ningbo employed active sonar in the vicinity of His Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) Toowoomba, while knowing that Toowoomba had divers in the water. The Chinese sonar caused injuries to the Australian divers. The article discusses the employment of acoustic devices to cause harm during peacetime and analyzes whether CNS Ningbo’s actions constituted a failure of due regard and other applicable legal regimes and norms. The article concludes that CNS Ningbo’s actions were an unlawful use of force and failed to demonstrate due regard, and that HMAS Toowoomba could have lawfully employed necessary and proportionate measures in self-defense

CMSI Note #3: “Choose the Right Person, Choose the Right Path”: Taiwan’s Cross-Strait, National Security, and Defense Policies Under a Lai/Hsiao Administration

CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways: The incoming William Lai/Bi-khim Hsiao administration almost certainly intends to continue to execute and deepen President Tsai’s defense reforms. Lai has also stated his support for the implementation of an Indo-Pacific Strategy concept. Lai has an opportunity to leverage the national security experience of President Tsai’s outgoing advisors, who may potentially help his administration calibrate Taiwan’s responses to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military provocations in and around the Taiwan Strait. The Lai administration likely would prove receptive to U.S. and partner overtures that contribute to Taiwan’s ability to strengthen its maritime domain awareness and security; enhance maritime law enforcement and search and rescue capabilities; conduct maritime patrols; and improve information sharing. Lai intends to maintain the cross-Strait status quo, and has stated that he is willing to conduct dialogue with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the basis of mutual respect and equality. Lai almost certainly will seek to continue President Tsai Ing-wen’s policy of diversifying Taiwan’s economy and expanding sustainable trade partnerships with democratic nations. He has stated that overdependence on the PRC leaves Taiwan vulnerable to economic coercion, and thus opposes pursuing further economic agreements with China under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) or a potential Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (CSTSA).https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/1002/thumbnail.jp

Recent Developments in the Jurisprudence Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Analysis of the Mauritius/Maldives and Nicaragua v. Colombia Cases

This article examines recent developments in the jurisprudence related to the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles by analyzing the Mauritius/Maldives and Nicaragua v. Colombia cases. The ITLOS Special Chamber in Mauritius/Maldives did not delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles due to applying the standard of “significant uncertainty.” In this regard, the scope of and criterion for the standard of “significant uncertainty” merit discussion. The ICJ, in Nicaragua v. Colombia, identified a rule of customary international law that the continental shelf of a State beyond 200 nautical miles may not extend within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State. While the holding is crucial, its reasoning needs further consideration. After an examination of the two cases, this article will conclude that despite the difference in the approaches taken by the ICJ and ITLOS Special Chamber, the legal consequence will remain the same: no effect shall be given to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles that extends into the 200 nautical mile EEZ of another State

China Maritime Report No. 35: Beyond Chinese Ferry Tales: The Rise of Deck Cargo Ships in China\u27s Military Activities, 2023

This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities in 2023. As of 2023 and probably through at least 2030, the PLA’s reserve fleet of civilian ships is probably unable to provide the amphibious landing capabilities or the over-the-shore logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, 2023 activity has demonstrated significant progress toward that end. In addition to the extensive use of civilian ferries, this report identifies the first use of large deck cargo ships to support PLA exercises. While not as capable as large, ocean-going ferries, China’s civil fleet boasts dozens of large deck cargo ships and may provide the PLA with the lift capacity necessary to eventually support a large crossstrait operation. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities including “surge lift events,” coordination and synchronization of multi-theater events, floating causeway developments, and the dedicated use of civilian ships for intra-theater military logistics.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1034/thumbnail.jp

China Maritime Report No. 34: PLAN Submarine Training in the New Era

Since 2018, there have been significant changes to People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force training, and these changes have been driven by important revisions to strategic guidance and subsequent directives that focused PLA efforts to enhance its capabilities to operate in the maritime domain. While this guidance is applicable to all services, improving PLAN submarine force capabilities appears to have been of particular interest to senior Chinese leadership. This guidance expanded the PLA’s maritime domain requirements, which demanded that China’s submarine force improve its capabilities to operate independently or along with other PLAN assets at greater distances from coast and in the far seas. This has resulted in submarine training that is more realistic, rigorous, and standardized across the fleet. Though stressful on submarine equipment and crews, these changes to training may ultimately yield a more combat-capable submarine fleet operating throughout the western Pacific.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1033/thumbnail.jp

CMSI Note #2: Admiral Dong Jun Engages Friends and Foes: China’s First Naval Defense Minister Brings Joint Operational Experience

On 29 December 2023, Admiral Dong Jun (董军) was appointed China’s 14th Minister of National Defense (国防部部长) at the seventh meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress. He replaced the previously deposed Army General Li Shangfu, ending a four-month leadership gap. Admiral Dong is the first PLA Navy (PLAN) officer to head China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Previously the 9th People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Commander, he was likewise exceptional in achieving this position from a background in theater joint operations.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/1001/thumbnail.jp

CMSI Note #4: Deck Cargo Ships: Another Option for a Cross-Strait Invasion

CMSI Perspectives and Key Take-Aways: In addition to RO-RO ferries, the PLA also uses another class of RO-RO ship, the deck cargo ship, in sea transport training exercises. Deck cargo ships are widely used in China’s ocean engineering and construction industry, constituting an existing and large-scale volume of lift capacity. The simple design and relative ease of construction of deck cargo ships means they can quickly be built in large numbers. These vessels may be tasked to bring in large columns of logistics and follow-on forces to consolidate landing areas, possibly in waves not far behind landing assault forces. Deck cargo ships can distribute the risk for many units making transits and force an adversary to find suitable kill solutions to strike numerous lower value targets.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/1003/thumbnail.jp