Exploring the dynamics of compliance with community penalties

In this paper, we examine how compliance with community penalties has been theorized hitherto and seek to develop a new dynamic model of compliance with community penalties. This new model is developed by exploring some of the interfaces between existing criminological and socio-legal work on compliance. The first part of the paper examines the possible definitions and dimensions of compliance with community supervision. Secondly, we examine existing work on explanations of compliance with community penalties, supplementing this by drawing on recent socio-legal scholarship on private individuals’ compliance with tax regimes. In the third part of the paper, we propose a dynamic model of compliance, based on the integration of these two related analyses. Finally, we consider some of the implications of our model for policy and practice concerning community penalties, suggesting the need to move beyond approaches which, we argue, suffer from compliance myopia; that is, a short-sighted and narrowly focused view of the issues

Illicit deals in cultural objects as crimes of the powerful

Research with dealers at the market end of the global chain of supply of cultural objects leads to the suggestion that the analytical framework associated with the concept of ‘crimes of the powerful’ can be useful in helping us to understand the role of dealers in driving the market, and in focussing our attention on the difficulties of engaging with the illicit trade through a conventional criminal justice approach. This paper explores the nature of the power that is associated with high-level antiquities dealers, and considers its regulatory implications