30 research outputs found
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Gender effects on consumers’ symbolic and hedonic preferences and actual clothing consumption in the Czech Republic
During the last decade or so consumer products have become more divided by gender than ever before. These changes in marketing practices are likely to introduce, alter or increase any existing gender differences regarding consumers’ product preferences and actual consumption. This is a very timely study examining how gender relates to consumers’ interest in clothing artefacts and their preferences for the self- and social-symbolic and hedonic meanings of clothing. The influence of gender on actual purchase behaviour towards clothing is also explored. The proposed hypotheses are tested on a large-scale sample of some 1,000+ respondents drawn in the Czech Republic. Using analysis of variance tests, gender differences were found with regard to all but one consumer behaviour phenomenon. No gender effect was found only regarding consumer preference for clothing affiliation symbolism. The study contributes to the theoretical development and empirical evidence in the field of gendered symbolic and hedonic consumption of clothing artefacts. Its findings also suggest possible actions by fashion marketers, as well as some interesting venues for future research
Information aggregation with costly information and random ordering: Experimental evidence
Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation
We study the framing effects of communication on payoffs in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving parties on a path toward or away from equal-division agreements. These endogenous framing effects may outweigh any overall social utility effects due to the mere presence of communication. In two studies, we find that non-binding talk about fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on Competitive Reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions. Our two studies allow us to demonstrate that manipulated pre-game talk and spontaneous within-game dialogue lead to the same results