Emergent global patterns of ecosystem structure and function from a mechanistic general ecosystem model

Anthropogenic activities are causing widespread degradation of ecosystems worldwide, threatening the ecosystem services upon which all human life depends. Improved understanding of this degradation is urgently needed to improve avoidance and mitigation measures. One tool to assist these efforts is predictive models of ecosystem structure and function that are mechanistic: based on fundamental ecological principles. Here we present the first mechanistic General Ecosystem Model (GEM) of ecosystem structure and function that is both global and applies in all terrestrial and marine environments. Functional forms and parameter values were derived from the theoretical and empirical literature where possible. Simulations of the fate of all organisms with body masses between 10 µg and 150,000 kg (a range of 14 orders of magnitude) across the globe led to emergent properties at individual (e.g., growth rate), community (e.g., biomass turnover rates), ecosystem (e.g., trophic pyramids), and macroecological scales (e.g., global patterns of trophic structure) that are in general agreement with current data and theory. These properties emerged from our encoding of the biology of, and interactions among, individual organisms without any direct constraints on the properties themselves. Our results indicate that ecologists have gathered sufficient information to begin to build realistic, global, and mechanistic models of ecosystems, capable of predicting a diverse range of ecosystem properties and their response to human pressures

Global Patterns of Guild Composition and Functional Diversity of Spiders

The objectives of this work are: (1) to define spider guilds for all extant families worldwide; (2) test if guilds defined at family level are good surrogates of species guilds; (3) compare the taxonomic and guild composition of spider assemblages from different parts of the world; (4) compare the taxonomic and functional diversity of spider assemblages and; (5) relate functional diversity with habitat structure. Data on foraging strategy, prey range, vertical stratification and circadian activity was collected for 108 families. Spider guilds were defined by hierarchical clustering. We searched for inconsistencies between family guild placement and the known guild of each species. Richness and abundance per guild before and after correcting guild placement were compared, as were the proportions of each guild and family between all possible pairs of sites. Functional diversity per site was calculated based on hierarchical clustering. Eight guilds were discriminated: (1) sensing, (2) sheet, (3) space, and (4) orb web weavers; (5) specialists; (6) ambush, (7) ground, and (8) other hunters. Sixteen percent of the species richness corresponding to 11% of all captured individuals was incorrectly attributed to a guild by family surrogacy; however, the correlation of uncorrected vs. corrected guilds was invariably high. The correlation of guild richness or abundances was generally higher than the correlation of family richness or abundances. Functional diversity was not always higher in the tropics than in temperate regions. Families may potentially serve as ecological surrogates for species. Different families may present similar roles in the ecosystems, with replacement of some taxa by other within the same guild. Spiders in tropical regions seem to have higher redundancy of functional roles and/or finer resource partitioning than in temperate regions. Although species and family diversity were higher in the tropics, functional diversity seems to be also influenced by altitude and habitat structure

Vegetation Type Dominates the Spatial Variability in CH<inf>4</inf> Emissions Across Multiple Arctic Tundra Landscapes

Methane (CH4) emissions from Arctic tundra are an important feedback to global climate. Currently, modelling and predicting CH4 fluxes at broader scales are limited by the challenge of upscaling plot-scale measurements in spatially heterogeneous landscapes, and by uncertainties regarding key controls of CH4 emissions. In this study, CH4 and CO2 fluxes were measured together with a range of environmental variables and detailed vegetation analysis at four sites spanning 300 km latitude from Barrow to Ivotuk (Alaska). We used multiple regression modelling to identify drivers of CH4 flux, and to examine relationships between gross primary productivity (GPP), dissolved organic carbon (DOC) and CH4 fluxes. We found that a highly simplified vegetation classification consisting of just three vegetation types (wet sedge, tussock sedge and other) explained 54% of the variation in CH4 fluxes across the entire transect, performing almost as well as a more complex model including water table, sedge height and soil moisture (explaining 58% of the variation in CH4 fluxes). Substantial CH4 emissions were recorded from tussock sedges in locations even when the water table was lower than 40 cm below the surface, demonstrating the importance of plant-mediated transport. We also found no relationship between instantaneous GPP and CH4 fluxes, suggesting that models should be cautious in assuming a direct relationship between primary production and CH4 emissions. Our findings demonstrate the importance of vegetation as an integrator of processes controlling CH4 emissions in Arctic ecosystems, and provide a simplified framework for upscaling plot scale CH4 flux measurements from Arctic ecosystems

Ragweed as an Example of Worldwide Allergen Expansion

<p/> <p>Multiple factors are contributing to the expansion of ragweed on a worldwide scale. This review seeks to examine factors that may contribute to allergen expansion with reference to ragweed as a well-studied example. It is our hope that increased surveillance for new pollens in areas not previously affected and awareness of the influence the changing environment plays in allergic disease will lead to better outcomes in susceptible patients.</p

Probabilistic downscaling of remote sensing data with applications for multi-scale biogeochemical flux modeling

Upscaling ecological information to larger scales in space and downscaling remote sensing observations or model simulations to finer scales remain grand challenges in Earth system science. Downscaling often involves inferring subgrid information from coarse-scale data, and such ill-posed problems are classically addressed using regularization. Here, we apply two-dimensional Tikhonov Regularization (2DTR) to simulate subgrid surface patterns for ecological applications. Specifically, we test the ability of 2DTR to simulate the spatial statistics of high-resolution (4 m) remote sensing observations of the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) in a tundra landscape. We find that the 2DTR approach as applied here can capture the major mode of spatial variability of the high-resolution information, but not multiple modes of spatial variability, and that the Lagrange multiplier (γ) used to impose the condition of smoothness across space is related to the range of the experimental semivariogram. We used observed and 2DTR-simulated maps of NDVI to estimate landscape-level leaf area index (LAI) and gross primary productivity (GPP). NDVI maps simulated using a γ value that approximates the range of observed NDVI result in a landscape-level GPP estimate that differs by ca 2% from those created using observed NDVI. Following findings that GPP per unit LAI is lower near vegetation patch edges, we simulated vegetation patch edges using multiple approaches and found that simulated GPP declined by up to 12% as a result. 2DTR can generate random landscapes rapidly and can be applied to disaggregate ecological information and compare of spatial observations against simulated landscapes

Summer warming explains widespread but not uniform greening in the Arctic tundra biome

Arctic warming can influence tundra ecosystem function with consequences for climate feedbacks, wildlife and human communities. Yet ecological change across the Arctic tundra biome remains poorly quantified due to field measurement limitations and reliance on coarse-resolution satellite data. Here, we assess decadal changes in Arctic tundra greenness using time series from the 30 m resolution Landsat satellites. From 1985 to 2016 tundra greenness increased (greening) at ~37.3% of sampling sites and decreased (browning) at ~4.7% of sampling sites. Greening occurred most often at warm sampling sites with increased summer air temperature, soil temperature, and soil moisture, while browning occurred most often at cold sampling sites that cooled and dried. Tundra greenness was positively correlated with graminoid, shrub, and ecosystem productivity measured at field sites. Our results support the hypothesis that summer warming stimulated plant productivity across much, but not all, of the Arctic tundra biome during recent decades

Extracting key information from historical data to quantify the transmission dynamics of smallpox

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Quantification of the transmission dynamics of smallpox is crucial for optimizing intervention strategies in the event of a bioterrorist attack. This article reviews basic methods and findings in mathematical and statistical studies of smallpox which estimate key transmission parameters from historical data.</p> <p>Main findings</p> <p>First, critically important aspects in extracting key information from historical data are briefly summarized. We mention different sources of heterogeneity and potential pitfalls in utilizing historical records. Second, we discuss how smallpox spreads in the absence of interventions and how the optimal timing of quarantine and isolation measures can be determined. Case studies demonstrate the following. (1) The upper confidence limit of the 99th percentile of the incubation period is 22.2 days, suggesting that quarantine should last 23 days. (2) The highest frequency (61.8%) of secondary transmissions occurs 3–5 days after onset of fever so that infected individuals should be isolated before the appearance of rash. (3) The U-shaped age-specific case fatality implies a vulnerability of infants and elderly among non-immune individuals. Estimates of the transmission potential are subsequently reviewed, followed by an assessment of vaccination effects and of the expected effectiveness of interventions.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Current debates on bio-terrorism preparedness indicate that public health decision making must account for the complex interplay and balance between vaccination strategies and other public health measures (e.g. case isolation and contact tracing) taking into account the frequency of adverse events to vaccination. In this review, we summarize what has already been clarified and point out needs to analyze previous smallpox outbreaks systematically.</p

Past, present, and future of global health financing: a review of development assistance, government, out-of-pocket, and other private spending on health for 195 countries, 1995–2050

© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY 4.0 license Background: Comprehensive and comparable estimates of health spending in each country are a key input for health policy and planning, and are necessary to support the achievement of national and international health goals. Previous studies have tracked past and projected future health spending until 2040 and shown that, with economic development, countries tend to spend more on health per capita, with a decreasing share of spending from development assistance and out-of-pocket sources. We aimed to characterise the past, present, and predicted future of global health spending, with an emphasis on equity in spending across countries. Methods: We estimated domestic health spending for 195 countries and territories from 1995 to 2016, split into three categories—government, out-of-pocket, and prepaid private health spending—and estimated development assistance for health (DAH) from 1990 to 2018. We estimated future scenarios of health spending using an ensemble of linear mixed-effects models with time series specifications to project domestic health spending from 2017 through 2050 and DAH from 2019 through 2050. Data were extracted from a broad set of sources tracking health spending and revenue, and were standardised and converted to inflation-adjusted 2018 US dollars. Incomplete or low-quality data were modelled and uncertainty was estimated, leading to a complete data series of total, government, prepaid private, and out-of-pocket health spending, and DAH. Estimates are reported in 2018 US dollars, 2018 purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars, and as a percentage of gross domestic product. We used demographic decomposition methods to assess a set of factors associated with changes in government health spending between 1995 and 2016 and to examine evidence to support the theory of the health financing transition. We projected two alternative future scenarios based on higher government health spending to assess the potential ability of governments to generate more resources for health. Findings: Between 1995 and 2016, health spending grew at a rate of 4·00% (95% uncertainty interval 3·89–4·12) annually, although it grew slower in per capita terms (2·72% [2·61–2·84]) and increased by less than $1 per capita over this period in 22 of 195 countries. The highest annual growth rates in per capita health spending were observed in upper-middle-income countries (5·55$8·0 trillion (7·8–8·1) in 2016 (comprising 8·6% [8·4–8·7] of the global economy and $10·3 trillion [10·1–10·6] in purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars), with a per capita spending of US$5252 (5184–5319) in high-income countries, $491 (461–524) in upper-middle-income countries,$81 (74–89) in lower-middle-income countries, and $40 (38–43) in low-income countries. In 2016, 0·4$9·5 billion, 24·3% of total DAH), although spending on other infectious diseases (excluding tuberculosis and malaria) grew fastest from 2010 to 2018 (6·27% per year). The leading sources of DAH were the USA and private philanthropy (excluding corporate donations and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). For the first time, we included estimates of China's contribution to DAH ($644·7 million in 2018). Globally, health spending is projected to increase to$15·0 trillion (14·0–16·0) by 2050 (reaching 9·4% [7·6–11·3] of the global economy and $21·3 trillion [19·8–23·1] in purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars), but at a lower growth rate of 1·84% (1·68–2·02) annually, and with continuing disparities in spending between countries. In 2050, we estimate that 0·6% (0·6–0·7) of health spending will occur in currently low-income countries, despite these countries comprising an estimated 15·7% of the global population by 2050. The ratio between per capita health spending in high-income and low-income countries was 130·2 (122·9–136·9) in 2016 and is projected to remain at similar levels in 2050 (125·9 [113·7–138·1]). The decomposition analysis identified governments’ increased prioritisation of the health sector and economic development as the strongest factors associated with increases in government health spending globally. Future government health spending scenarios suggest that, with greater prioritisation of the health sector and increased government spending, health spending per capita could more than double, with greater impacts in countries that currently have the lowest levels of government health spending. Interpretation: Financing for global health has increased steadily over the past two decades and is projected to continue increasing in the future, although at a slower pace of growth and with persistent disparities in per-capita health spending between countries. Out-of-pocket spending is projected to remain substantial outside of high-income countries. Many low-income countries are expected to remain dependent on development assistance, although with greater government spending, larger investments in health are feasible. In the absence of sustained new investments in health, increasing efficiency in health spending is essential to meet global health targets. Funding: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

Health sector spending and spending on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and development assistance for health: progress towards Sustainable Development Goal 3

Background: Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 aims to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”. While a substantial effort has been made to quantify progress towards SDG3, less research has focused on tracking spending towards this goal. We used spending estimates to measure progress in financing the priority areas of SDG3, examine the association between outcomes and financing, and identify where resource gains are most needed to achieve the SDG3 indicators for which data are available. Methods: We estimated domestic health spending, disaggregated by source (government, out-of-pocket, and prepaid private) from 1995 to 2017 for 195 countries and territories. For disease-specific health spending, we estimated spending for HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis for 135 low-income and middle-income countries, and malaria in 106 malaria-endemic countries, from 2000 to 2017. We also estimated development assistance for health (DAH) from 1990 to 2019, by source, disbursing development agency, recipient, and health focus area, including DAH for pandemic preparedness. Finally, we estimated future health spending for 195 countries and territories from 2018 until 2030. We report all spending estimates in inflation-adjusted 2019 US$, unless otherwise stated. Findings: Since the development and implementation of the SDGs in 2015, global health spending has increased, reaching$7·9 trillion (95% uncertainty interval 7·8–8·0) in 2017 and is expected to increase to $11·0 trillion (10·7–11·2) by 2030. In 2017, in low-income and middle-income countries spending on HIV/AIDS was$20·2 billion (17·0–25·0) and on tuberculosis it was $10·9 billion (10·3–11·8), and in malaria-endemic countries spending on malaria was$5·1 billion (4·9–5·4). Development assistance for health was $40·6 billion in 2019 and HIV/AIDS has been the health focus area to receive the highest contribution since 2004. In 2019,$374 million of DAH was provided for pandemic preparedness, less than 1% of DAH. Although spending has increased across HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria since 2015, spending has not increased in all countries, and outcomes in terms of prevalence, incidence, and per-capita spending have been mixed. The proportion of health spending from pooled sources is expected to increase from 81·6% (81·6–81·7) in 2015 to 83·1% (82·8–83·3) in 2030. Interpretation: Health spending on SDG3 priority areas has increased, but not in all countries, and progress towards meeting the SDG3 targets has been mixed and has varied by country and by target. The evidence on the scale-up of spending and improvements in health outcomes suggest a nuanced relationship, such that increases in spending do not always results in improvements in outcomes. Although countries will probably need more resources to achieve SDG3, other constraints in the broader health system such as inefficient allocation of resources across interventions and populations, weak governance systems, human resource shortages, and drug shortages, will also need to be addressed. Funding: The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundatio

Past, present, and future of global health financing : a review of development assistance, government, out-of-pocket, and other private spending on health for 195 countries, 1995-2050

Background Comprehensive and comparable estimates of health spending in each country are a key input for health policy and planning, and are necessary to support the achievement of national and international health goals. Previous studies have tracked past and projected future health spending until 2040 and shown that, with economic development, countries tend to spend more on health per capita, with a decreasing share of spending from development assistance and out-of-pocket sources. We aimed to characterise the past, present, and predicted future of global health spending, with an emphasis on equity in spending across countries. Methods We estimated domestic health spending for 195 countries and territories from 1995 to 2016, split into three categories-government, out-of-pocket, and prepaid private health spending-and estimated development assistance for health (DAH) from 1990 to 2018. We estimated future scenarios of health spending using an ensemble of linear mixed-effects models with time series specifications to project domestic health spending from 2017 through 2050 and DAH from 2019 through 2050. Data were extracted from a broad set of sources tracking health spending and revenue, and were standardised and converted to inflation-adjusted 2018 US dollars. Incomplete or low-quality data were modelled and uncertainty was estimated, leading to a complete data series of total, government, prepaid private, and out-of-pocket health spending, and DAH. Estimates are reported in 2018 US dollars, 2018 purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars, and as a percentage of gross domestic product. We used demographic decomposition methods to assess a set of factors associated with changes in government health spending between 1995 and 2016 and to examine evidence to support the theory of the health financing transition. We projected two alternative future scenarios based on higher government health spending to assess the potential ability of governments to generate more resources for health. Findings Between 1995 and 2016, health spending grew at a rate of 4.00% (95% uncertainty interval 3.89-4.12) annually, although it grew slower in per capita terms (2.72% [2.61-2.84]) and increased by less than $1 per capita over this period in 22 of 195 countries. The highest annual growth rates in per capita health spending were observed in upper-middle-income countries (5.55$ 8.0 trillion (7.8-8.1) in 2016 (comprising 8.6% [8.4-8.7] of the global economy and $10.3 trillion [10.1-10.6] in purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars), with a per capita spending of US$ 5252 (5184-5319) in high-income countries, $491 (461-524) in upper-middle-income countries,$ 81 (74-89) in lower-middle-income countries, and $40 (38-43) in low-income countries. In 2016, 0.4$ 9.5 billion, 24.3% of total DAH), although spending on other infectious diseases (excluding tuberculosis and malaria) grew fastest from 2010 to 2018 (6.27% per year). The leading sources of DAH were the USA and private philanthropy (excluding corporate donations and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). For the first time, we included estimates of China's contribution to DAH ($644.7 million in 2018). Globally, health spending is projected to increase to$ 15.0 trillion (14.0-16.0) by 2050 (reaching 9.4% [7.6-11.3] of the global economy and $ 21.3 trillion [19.8-23.1] in purchasing-power parity-adjusted dollars), but at a lower growth rate of 1.84% (1.68-2.02) annually, and with continuing disparities in spending between countries. In 2050, we estimate that 0.6% (0.6-0.7) of health spending will occur in currently low-income countries, despite these countries comprising an estimated 15.7% of the global population by 2050. The ratio between per capita health spending in high-income and low-income countries was 130.2 (122.9-136.9) in 2016 and is projected to remain at similar levels in 2050 (125.9 [113.7-138.1]). The decomposition analysis identified governments' increased prioritisation of the health sector and economic development as the strongest factors associated with increases in government health spending globally. Future government health spending scenarios suggest that, with greater prioritisation of the health sector and increased government spending, health spending per capita could more than double, with greater impacts in countries that currently have the lowest levels of government health spending. Interpretation Financing for global health has increased steadily over the past two decades and is projected to continue increasing in the future, although at a slower pace of growth and with persistent disparities in per-capita health spending between countries. Out-of-pocket spending is projected to remain substantial outside of high-income countries. Many low-income countries are expected to remain dependent on development assistance, although with greater government spending, larger investments in health are feasible. In the absence of sustained new investments in health, increasing efficiency in health spending is essential to meet global health targets.Peer reviewe