A comparative survey of integrated learning systems

This paper presents the duction framework for unifying the three basic forms of inference - deduction, abduction, and induction - by specifying the possible relationships and influences among them in the context of integrated learning. Special assumptive forms of inference are defined that extend the use of these inference methods, and the properties of these forms are explored. A comparison to a related inference-based learning frame work is made. Finally several existing integrated learning programs are examined in the perspective of the duction framework

Are There Good Mistakes? A Theoretical Analysis of CEGIS

Counterexample-guided inductive synthesis CEGIS is used to synthesize programs from a candidate space of programs. The technique is guaranteed to terminate and synthesize the correct program if the space of candidate programs is finite. But the technique may or may not terminate with the correct program if the candidate space of programs is infinite. In this paper, we perform a theoretical analysis of counterexample-guided inductive synthesis technique. We investigate whether the set of candidate spaces for which the correct program can be synthesized using CEGIS depends on the counterexamples used in inductive synthesis, that is, whether there are good mistakes which would increase the synthesis power. We investigate whether the use of minimal counterexamples instead of arbitrary counterexamples expands the set of candidate spaces of programs for which inductive synthesis can successfully synthesize a correct program. We consider two kinds of counterexamples: minimal counterexamples and history bounded counterexamples. The history bounded counterexample used in any iteration of CEGIS is bounded by the examples used in previous iterations of inductive synthesis. We examine the relative change in power of inductive synthesis in both cases. We show that the synthesis technique using minimal counterexamples MinCEGIS has the same synthesis power as CEGIS but the synthesis technique using history bounded counterexamples HCEGIS has different power than that of CEGIS, but none dominates the other.Comment: In Proceedings SYNT 2014, arXiv:1407.493

A Theory of Formal Synthesis via Inductive Learning

Formal synthesis is the process of generating a program satisfying a high-level formal specification. In recent times, effective formal synthesis methods have been proposed based on the use of inductive learning. We refer to this class of methods that learn programs from examples as formal inductive synthesis. In this paper, we present a theoretical framework for formal inductive synthesis. We discuss how formal inductive synthesis differs from traditional machine learning. We then describe oracle-guided inductive synthesis (OGIS), a framework that captures a family of synthesizers that operate by iteratively querying an oracle. An instance of OGIS that has had much practical impact is counterexample-guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS). We present a theoretical characterization of CEGIS for learning any program that computes a recursive language. In particular, we analyze the relative power of CEGIS variants where the types of counterexamples generated by the oracle varies. We also consider the impact of bounded versus unbounded memory available to the learning algorithm. In the special case where the universe of candidate programs is finite, we relate the speed of convergence to the notion of teaching dimension studied in machine learning theory. Altogether, the results of the paper take a first step towards a theoretical foundation for the emerging field of formal inductive synthesis

kLog: A Language for Logical and Relational Learning with Kernels

We introduce kLog, a novel approach to statistical relational learning. Unlike standard approaches, kLog does not represent a probability distribution directly. It is rather a language to perform kernel-based learning on expressive logical and relational representations. kLog allows users to specify learning problems declaratively. It builds on simple but powerful concepts: learning from interpretations, entity/relationship data modeling, logic programming, and deductive databases. Access by the kernel to the rich representation is mediated by a technique we call graphicalization: the relational representation is first transformed into a graph --- in particular, a grounded entity/relationship diagram. Subsequently, a choice of graph kernel defines the feature space. kLog supports mixed numerical and symbolic data, as well as background knowledge in the form of Prolog or Datalog programs as in inductive logic programming systems. The kLog framework can be applied to tackle the same range of tasks that has made statistical relational learning so popular, including classification, regression, multitask learning, and collective classification. We also report about empirical comparisons, showing that kLog can be either more accurate, or much faster at the same level of accuracy, than Tilde and Alchemy. kLog is GPLv3 licensed and is available at http://klog.dinfo.unifi.it along with tutorials

Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics

A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We argue that the most successful forms of Bayesian statistics do not actually support that particular philosophy but rather accord much better with sophisticated forms of hypothetico-deductivism. We examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory. We draw on the literature on the consistency of Bayesian updating and also on our experience of applied work in social science. Clarity about these matters should benefit not just philosophy of science, but also statistical practice. At best, the inductivist view has encouraged researchers to fit and compare models without checking them; at worst, theorists have actively discouraged practitioners from performing model checking because it does not fit into their framework.Comment: 36 pages, 5 figures. v2: Fixed typo in caption of figure 1. v3: Further typo fixes. v4: Revised in response to referee

Metaphysical Explanation and the Inference to the Best Explanation (BA thesis)

Inference to the Best Explanation, roughly put, appeals to the explanatory power of a theory or hypothesis (relative to some data set) as constituting epistemic justification for it. Inference to the Best Explanation (henceforth IBE) is a tool widely employed among all reasoners alike, from the empirical sciences to ordinary life. Philosophical discussions do not differ in the usualness of explanatory appeals of this kind during serious argument. Often enough, the appeal is dialectically blocked, as many of our epistemic peers in philosophy offer reasons to be skeptical of IBE. Our aim with this monograph is to assess one worry that have been raised about this mode of inference: That explanatory power is not truth-conducive. We begin by discussing general features of inferences and then formulating IBE in detail. Afterward, we explicate and apply a canonical understanding of what an explanation is. This will lead to a certain understanding of explanatory power. We undergo a case study to defend the thesis that this kind of explanatory power is indeed epistemically irrelevant – unless, perhaps, when combined with other theoretical virtues. Our conclusion is that the measure what explanations are best requires taking other theoretical virtues into account, such as simplicity and unification. In this case, a complete assessment of IBE requires examining if, when, and how these alleged theoretical virtues are indeed truth-conducive

Combining Models of Approximation with Partial Learning

In Gold's framework of inductive inference, the model of partial learning requires the learner to output exactly one correct index for the target object and only the target object infinitely often. Since infinitely many of the learner's hypotheses may be incorrect, it is not obvious whether a partial learner can be modifed to "approximate" the target object. Fulk and Jain (Approximate inference and scientific method. Information and Computation 114(2):179--191, 1994) introduced a model of approximate learning of recursive functions. The present work extends their research and solves an open problem of Fulk and Jain by showing that there is a learner which approximates and partially identifies every recursive function by outputting a sequence of hypotheses which, in addition, are also almost all finite variants of the target function. The subsequent study is dedicated to the question how these findings generalise to the learning of r.e. languages from positive data. Here three variants of approximate learning will be introduced and investigated with respect to the question whether they can be combined with partial learning. Following the line of Fulk and Jain's research, further investigations provide conditions under which partial language learners can eventually output only finite variants of the target language. The combinabilities of other partial learning criteria will also be briefly studied.Comment: 28 page