2,482 research outputs found

    The Natural Logic of Morals and Laws

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    Alternative theories of morphology in the Parallel Architecture : a reply to Benavides 2022

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    The Slot and Structure Model of morphology (SSM: Benavides 2022) presents itself as an extension of the Parallel Architecture (PA: Jackendoff 1997, 2002). The present article compares SSM to Relational Morphology (Jackendoff and Audring 2020) and Construction Morphology (Booij 2010), which also claim allegiance to the Parallel Architecture. It is shown that (a) SSM does not segregate semantic structure from syntactic structure, violating the fundamental premise of the PA; (b) SSM is concerned primarily with deriving productive morphology, while the PA is stated in terms of declarative schemas that license nonproductive as well as productive morphology; (c) SSM enforces a strict division between morphology and syntax, while the PA allows a degree of interpenetration. Finally, Benavides accuses RM of lacking a direct connection between semantics and syntax. It is shown that this is based on a misunderstanding of the RA formalism

    On the relevance of the neurobiological analogue of the finite-state architecture

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    We present two simple arguments for the potential relevance of a neurobiological analogue of the finite-state architecture. The first assumes the classical cognitive framework, is well-known, and is based on the assumption that the brain is finite with respect to its memory organization. The second is formulated within a general dynamical systems framework and is based on the assumption that the brain sustains some level of noise and/or does not utilize infinite precision processing. We briefly review the classical cognitive framework based on Church-Turing computability and non-classical approaches based on analog processing in dynamical systems. We conclude that the dynamical neurobiological analogue of the finite-state architecture appears to be relevant, at least at an implementational level, for cognitive brain systems

    Ease of predication does not account for imageability effects in performance: a reply to [Jones, 2002]

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    In this paper we defend our views against [Jones, 2002] claim that the criticism of the ease of predication hypothesis ( [Jones, 1985]) made by [de Mornay Davies and Funnell, 2000] is “fundamentally flawed.” Jones raises five issues concerning the content of the text, the reliability of effects of ease of predication, the generation of predicates, semantic features, and memory retrieval. We address each of these issues in turn and show that either a critical point raised is not made, or the point is mistaken. More importantly we show that our empirical findings, which are entirely overlooked by Jones, unequivocally support the view that ease of predication does not account for imageability effects in performance

    Alternative minimalist visions of language

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    X-Bar Semantics

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    Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society (1987), pp. 355-36

    Language as an instrument of thought

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    I show that there are good arguments and evidence to boot that support the language as an instrument of thought hypothesis. The underlying mechanisms of language, comprising of expressions structured hierarchically and recursively, provide a perspective (in the form of a conceptual structure) on the world, for it is only via language that certain perspectives are avail- able to us and to our thought processes. These mechanisms provide us with a uniquely human way of thinking and talking about the world that is different to the sort of thinking we share with other animals. If the primary function of language were communication then one would expect that the underlying mechanisms of language will be structured in a way that favours successful communication. I show that not only is this not the case, but that the underlying mechanisms of language are in fact structured in a way to maximise computational efficiency, even if it means causing communicative problems. Moreover, I discuss evidence from comparative, neuropatho- logical, developmental, and neuroscientific evidence that supports the claim that language is an instrument of thought

    Scottish Common Sense and Nineteenth-Century American Law: A Critical Appraisal

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    One overriding concern I have with Susanna Blumenthal\u27s insightful and stimulating article, The Mind of a Moral Agent: Scottish Common Sense and the Problem of Responsibility in Nineteenth-Century American Law, is whether there is anything sufficiently distinctive about Scottish Common Sense philosophy that justifies the role Blumenthal ascribes to it. One could probably replace Common Sense philosophy in Blumenthal\u27s formulation with something as diffuse as The Enlightenment, or even Western jurisprudence, without significantly altering its import, because the assumption that rational and moral faculties are innate and universal is common to most writers in these traditions. There are subtle differences among individual authors, of course, but most embrace the notion in one form or another, and their differences often trace to questions of nomenclature

    The parallel architecture

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    Theoretical and Experimental Linguistic
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