Order Information and Distributed Memory Models

Current versions of distributed models have difficulty in accounting for the representation of order information in matching tasks. In this article, experiments are presented that allow discrimination between physical and ordinal representations of ordinal information, discrimination between position-dependent codes and context-sensitive codes, and generalization of the results of matching tasks from strings of letters to long-term memory for triples of words. Data from these experiments constrain the kinds of models that can be developed to account for matching and order, and present problems for several current memory models. Including connectionist models. Suggestions are made for modifications of these models to account for the results from matching tasks

Spreading activation versus compound cue accounts of priming: Mediated priming revisited

Spreading activation theories and compound cue theories have both been proposed as accounts of priming phenomena. According to spreading activation theories, the amount of activation that spreads between a prime and a target should be a function of the number of mediating links between the prime and target in a semantic network and the strengths of those links. The amount of activation should determine the amount of facilitation given by a prime to a target in lexical decision. To predict the amount of facilitation, it is necessary to measure the associative links between prime and target in memory. Free-association production probability has been the variable chosen in previous research for this measurement. However, in 3 experiments, the authors show priming effects that free-association production probabilities cannot easily predict. Instead, they argue that amount of priming depends on the familiarity of the prime and target as a compound, where the compound is formed by the simultaneous presence of the prime and target in short-term memory as a test item. An important function of memory is to provide the information necessary for an integrated understanding of the various objects that we encounter. People, words, and objects d

Psychology and neurobiology of simple decisions

Patterns of neural firing linked to eye movement decisions show that behavioral decisions are predicted by the differential firing rates of cells coding selected and nonselected stimulus alternatives. These results can be interpreted using models developed in mathematical psychology to model behavioral decisions. Current models assume that decisions are made by accumulating noisy stimulus information until sufficient information for a response is obtained. Here, the models, and the techniques used to test them against response-time distribution and accuracy data, are described. Such models provide a quantitative link between the time-course of behavioral decisions and the growth of stimulus information in neural firing data. The question of how two-alternative decisions are made i

Making the connection: Generalized knowledge structures in story understanding

Six experiments examined the connections in memory between two stories describing the same action sequence. The action sequences represented script-like MOP structures such as eating at a restaurant, like those proposed by Schank (1982. Dynamic memory: A theory of reminding and learning in computers and people. New York: Cambridge University Press). In the experimental procedure, subjects read a long list of stories, and then, after reading all the stories, they were presented with a list of phrases for which they were required to make old/new recognition judgments. Connections among the stories in memory were examined with pairs of phrases placed in the test list such that a priming phrase immediately preceded a target phrase. When a priming phrase was from the same story as its target phrase, responses to the target were facilitated. When a priming phrase was from another story of the same MOP as the target, responses were facilitated only if the test phrases were related to the MOP; there was no significant facilitation if the test phrases were not related to the MOP. In the case where the phrases were related to the MOP, there was as much facilitation when the phrases were from different stories as when they were from the same story. These results are shown to contradict previously proposed models of memory for script-like sequences, and a new, limited encoding, model is proposed.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/27673/1/0000056.pd

Revisiting the Evidence for Collapsing Boundaries and Urgency Signals in Perceptual Decision-Making

For nearly 50 years, the dominant account of decision-making holds that noisy information is accumulated until a fixed threshold is crossed. This account has been tested extensively against behavioral and neurophysiological data for decisions about consumer goods, perceptual stimuli, eyewitness testimony, memories, and dozens of other paradigms, with no systematic misfit between model and data. Recently, the standard model has been challenged by alternative accounts that assume that less evidence is required to trigger a decision as time passes. Such "collapsing boundaries" or "urgency signals" have gained popularity in some theoretical accounts of neurophysiology. Nevertheless, evidence in favor of these models is mixed, with support coming from only a narrow range of decision paradigms compared with a long history of support from dozens of paradigms for the standard theory. We conducted the first large-scale analysis of data from humans and nonhuman primates across three distinct paradigms using powerful model-selection methods to compare evidence for fixed versus collapsing bounds. Overall, we identified evidence in favor of the standard model with fixed decision boundaries. We further found that evidence for static or dynamic response boundaries may depend on specific paradigms or procedures, such as the extent of task practice. We conclude that the difficulty of selecting between collapsing and fixed bounds models has received insufficient attention in previous research, calling into question some previous results

How do violations of Gricean maxims affect reading?

Four eye-tracking experiments examined how violations of the Gricean maxim of quantity affect reading. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that first-pass reading times for size-modified definite nouns (the small towel) were longer when the modifier was redundant, as the context contained one rather than two possible referents, whereas first-pass times for bare nouns (the towel) were unaffected by whether the context contained multiple referents that resulted in ambiguity. Experiment 3 showed that unlike redundant size modifiers, redundant color modifiers did not increase first-pass times. Experiment 4 confirmed this finding, demonstrating that the effect of redundancy was dependent on the meaning of the modifier. We propose that initial referential processing is led by the lexico-semantic representation of the referring expression rather than Gricean expectations about optimal informativeness: Redundancy of a size-modifier immediately disrupts comprehension because the processor fails to activate the referential contrast implied by the meaning of the modifier, whereas referential ambiguity has no immediate effect, as it allows the activation of at least one semantically-compatible referent

Multicentric assessment of the efficacy and tolerability of dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine compared to artemether-lumefantrine in the treatment of uncomplicated Plasmodium falciparum malaria in sub-Saharan Africa

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The choice of appropriate artemisinin-based combination therapy depends on several factors (cost, efficacy, safety, reinfection rate and simplicity of administration). To assess whether the combination dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine (DP) could be an alternative to artemether-lumefantrine (AL), the efficacy and the tolerability of the two products for the treatment of uncomplicated falciparum malaria in sub-Saharan Africa have been compared.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>A multicentric open randomized controlled clinical trial of three-day treatment of DP against AL for the treatment of two parallel groups of patients aged two years and above and suffering from uncomplicated falciparum malaria was carried out in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. Within each group, patients were randomly assigned supervised treatment. DP was given once a day for three days and AL twice a day for three days. Follow-up visits were performed on day 1 to 4 and on day 7, 14, 21, 28 to evaluate clinical and parasitological results. The primary endpoint was the recovery rate by day 28.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Of 384 patients enrolled, 197 were assigned DP and 187 AL. The recovery rates adjusted by genotyping, 99.5% in the DP group and 98.9% in the AL group, were not statistically different (p = 0.538). No Early Therapeutic Failure (ETF) was observed. At day 28, two patients in the DP group and five in AL group had recurrent parasitaemia with <it>Plasmodium falciparum</it>. In the DP group, after PCR genotyping, one of the two recurrences was classified as a new infection and the other as recrudescence. In AL group, two recurrences were classified after correction by PCR as recrudescence. All cases of recrudescence were classified as Late Parasitological Failure (LPF). In each group, a rapid recovery from fever and parasitaemia was noticed. More than 90% of patients did no longer present fever or parasitaemia 48 hours after treatment. Both drugs were well tolerated. Indeed, no serious adverse events were reported during the follow-up period. Most of the adverse events which developed were moderate and did not result in the treatment being stopped in either treatment group.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine was as effective and well-tolerated as artemether-lumefantrine in the treatment of uncomplicated falciparum malaria. In addition, dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine, a single daily dose, could be an advantage over artemether-lumefantrine in Africa because of better treatment observance.</p

A perspective on neural and cognitive mechanisms of error commission

Behavioral adaptation and cognitive control are crucial for goal-reaching behaviors. Every creature is ubiquitously faced with choices between behavioral alternatives. Common sense suggests that errors are an important source of information in the regulation of such processes. Several theories exist regarding cognitive control and the processing of undesired outcomes. However, most of these models focus on the consequences of an error, and less attention has been paid to the mechanisms that underlie the commissioning of an error. In this article, we present an integrative review of neuro-cognitive models that detail the determinants of the occurrence of response errors. The factors that may determine the likelihood of committing errors are likely related to the stability of task-representations in prefrontal networks, attentional selection mechanisms and mechanisms of action selection in basal ganglia circuits. An important conclusion is that the likelihood of committing an error is not stable over time but rather changes depending on the interplay of different functional neuro-anatomical and neuro-biological systems. We describe factors that might determine the time-course of cognitive control and the need to adapt behavior following response errors. Finally, we outline the mechanisms that may proof useful for predicting the outcomes of cognitive control and the emergence of response errors in future research

Detecting and correcting partial errors: Evidence for efficient control without conscious access

Appropriate reactions to erroneous actions are essential to keeping behavior adaptive. Erring, however, is not an all-or-none process: electromyographic (EMG) recordings of the responding muscles have revealed that covert incorrect response activations (termed "partial errors") occur on a proportion of overtly correct trials. The occurrence of such "partial errors" shows that incorrect response activations could be corrected online, before turning into overt errors. In the present study, we showed that, unlike overt errors, such "partial errors" are poorly consciously detected by participants, who could report only one third of their partial errors. Two parameters of the partial errors were found to predict detection: the surface of the incorrect EMG burst (larger for detected) and the correction time (between the incorrect and correct EMG onsets; longer for detected). These two parameters provided independent information. The correct(ive) responses associated with detected partial errors were larger than the "pure-correct" ones, and this increase was likely a consequence, rather than a cause, of the detection. The respective impacts of the two parameters predicting detection (incorrect surface and correction time), along with the underlying physiological processes subtending partial-error detection, are discussed