The Effect of Commission Bans on Household Wealth: Evidence from OECD Countries

Abstract In most OECD countries, financial advisors are primarily paid through commissions. This entails a principal agent problem in which the financial advisor has the incentive to sell financial products that maximize his income, not however the return of the investor seeking financial advice. To combat this conflict of interest, countries such as Denmark, Finland or Great Britain introduced commission bans. Our research finds an annual return difference of household wealth between 1.5% to 2% with a sample period from 1997 to 2020 for OECD countries with commission ban versus OECD countries without. This implies that households in commission ban countries can have close to double the amount of wealth compared to household in non-commission ban countries after 40 years. The results support the introduction of commission bans to foster private household wealth formation. Zusammenfassung In den meisten OECD-Ländern werden Finanzberater über Provisionen vergütet. Dieses System führt zu einem Principal-Agenten-Problem, bei dem der Finanzberater einen Anreiz hat, Finanzprodukte zu verkaufen, die sein Einkommen maximieren, nicht jedoch die Rendite des Anlegers. Um diesen Interessenskonflikt aufzulösen, haben Länder wie Dänemark, Finnland oder Großbritannien Provisionsverbote eingeführt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass zwischen 1997 und 2020 OECD-Länder mit Provisionsverbot eine 1,5% bis 2% höhere jährliche Rendite auf ihr Vermögen erreicht haben. Dies kann nahezu zu einer Verdopplung des Haushaltvermögens nach 40 Jahren führen. Somit sprechen die Ergebnisse für die Einführung von Provisionsverboten zur Förderung der Vermögensbildung privater Haushalte

The Effect of Commission Bans on Household Wealth: Evidence from OECD Countries

Abstract In most OECD countries, financial advisors are primarily paid through commissions. This entails a principal agent problem in which the financial advisor has the incentive to sell financial products that maximize his income, not however the return of the investor seeking financial advice. To combat this conflict of interest, countries such as Denmark, Finland or Great Britain introduced commission bans. Our research finds an annual return difference of household wealth between 1.5% to 2% with a sample period from 1997 to 2020 for OECD countries with commission ban versus OECD countries without. This implies that households in commission ban countries can have close to double the amount of wealth compared to household in non-commission ban countries after 40 years. The results support the introduction of commission bans to foster private household wealth formation. Zusammenfassung In den meisten OECD-Ländern werden Finanzberater über Provisionen vergütet. Dieses System führt zu einem Principal-Agenten-Problem, bei dem der Finanzberater einen Anreiz hat, Finanzprodukte zu verkaufen, die sein Einkommen maximieren, nicht jedoch die Rendite des Anlegers. Um diesen Interessenskonflikt aufzulösen, haben Länder wie Dänemark, Finnland oder Großbritannien Provisionsverbote eingeführt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass zwischen 1997 und 2020 OECD-Länder mit Provisionsverbot eine 1,5% bis 2% höhere jährliche Rendite auf ihr Vermögen erreicht haben. Dies kann nahezu zu einer Verdopplung des Haushaltvermögens nach 40 Jahren führen. Somit sprechen die Ergebnisse für die Einführung von Provisionsverboten zur Förderung der Vermögensbildung privater Haushalte

The Effect of Commission Bans on Household Wealth: Evidence from OECD Countries

Abstract In most OECD countries, financial advisors are primarily paid through commissions. This entails a principal agent problem in which the financial advisor has the incentive to sell financial products that maximize his income, not however the return of the investor seeking financial advice. To combat this conflict of interest, countries such as Denmark, Finland or Great Britain introduced commission bans. Our research finds an annual return difference of household wealth between 1.5% to 2% with a sample period from 1997 to 2020 for OECD countries with commission ban versus OECD countries without. This implies that households in commission ban countries can have close to double the amount of wealth compared to household in non-commission ban countries after 40 years. The results support the introduction of commission bans to foster private household wealth formation. Zusammenfassung In den meisten OECD-Ländern werden Finanzberater über Provisionen vergütet. Dieses System führt zu einem Principal-Agenten-Problem, bei dem der Finanzberater einen Anreiz hat, Finanzprodukte zu verkaufen, die sein Einkommen maximieren, nicht jedoch die Rendite des Anlegers. Um diesen Interessenskonflikt aufzulösen, haben Länder wie Dänemark, Finnland oder Großbritannien Provisionsverbote eingeführt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass zwischen 1997 und 2020 OECD-Länder mit Provisionsverbot eine 1,5% bis 2% höhere jährliche Rendite auf ihr Vermögen erreicht haben. Dies kann nahezu zu einer Verdopplung des Haushaltvermögens nach 40 Jahren führen. Somit sprechen die Ergebnisse für die Einführung von Provisionsverboten zur Förderung der Vermögensbildung privater Haushalte

Quite a few reasons for calling carnivores "the most wonderful plants in the world"

A plant is considered carnivorous if it receives any noticeable benefit from catching small animals. The morphological and physiological adaptations to carnivorous existence is most complex in plants, thanks to which carnivorous plants have been cited by Darwin as ‘the most wonderful plants in the world’. When considering the range of these adaptations, one realizes that the carnivory is a result of a multitude of different features. Scope: This review discusses a selection of relevant articles, culled from a wide array of research topics on plant carnivory, and focuses in particular on physiological processes associated with active trapping and digestion of prey. Carnivory offers the plants special advantages in habitats where nutrient supply is scarce. Counterbalancing costs are the investments in synthesis and the maintenance of trapping organs and hydrolysing enzymes. With the progress in genetic, molecular and microscopic techniques, we are well on the way to a full appreciation of various aspects of plant carnivory. Conclusions: Sufficiently complex to be of scientific interest and finite enough to allow conclusive appraisal, carnivorous plants can be viewed as unique models for the examination of rapid organ movements, plant excitability, enzyme secretion, nutrient absorption, food-web relationships, phylogenetic and intergeneric relationships or structural and mineral investment in carnivory

Bone Material Properties in Osteogenesis Imperfecta

Osteogenesis imperfecta entrains changes at every level in bone tissue, from the disorganisation of the collagen molecules and mineral platelets within and between collagen fibrils, to the macro-architecture of the whole skeleton. Investigations using an array of sophisticated instruments at multiple scale levels have now determined many aspects of the effect of the disease on the material properties of bone tissue. The brittle nature of bone in osteogenesis imperfecta reflects both increased bone mineralisation density – the quantity of mineral in relation to the quantity of matrix within a specific bone volume – and altered matrix-matrix and matrix mineral interactions. Contributions to fracture resistance at multiple scale lengths are discussed, comparing normal and brittle bone. Integrating the available information provides both a better understanding of the effect of current approaches to treatment – largely improved architecture and possibly some macro-scale toughening - and indicates potential opportunities for alternative strategies that can influence fracture resistance at longer length scales

Documentation for LinTim 2021.12

LinTim is a scientific software toolbox that has been under development since 2007, giving the possibility to solve the various planning steps in public transportation. Although the name originally derives from "Lineplanning and Timetabling", the available functions have grown far beyond this scope. This document is the documentation for version 2021.12. For more information, see https://www.lintim.ne

Documentation for LinTim 2021.12

LinTim is a scientific software toolbox that has been under development since 2007, giving the possibility to solve the various planning steps in public transportation. Although the name originally derives from "Lineplanning and Timetabling", the available functions have grown far beyond this scope. This document is the documentation for version 2021.12. For more information, see https://www.lintim.ne

LinTim: An integrated environment for mathematical public transport optimization

LinTim is a scientific algorithm and dataset library that has been under development since 2007 and offers the possibility to carry out the various planning steps in public transportation. Although the name originally derives from "Line planning and Timetabling", the available functions have grown far beyond this scope. This is the documentation for version 2024.08. For more information, see https://www.lintim.net

Documentation for LinTim 2023.12

LinTim is a scientific algorithm and dataset library that has been under development since 2007 and offers the possibility to carry out the various planning steps in public transportation. Although the name originally derives from "Line planning and Timetabling", the available functions have grown far beyond this scope. This is the documentation for version 2023.12. For more information, see https://www.lintim.net