The association between past and future oriented thinking: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder

A number of recently developed theories (e.g., the constructive episodic simulation, self-projection, and scene construction hypotheses) propose that the ability to simulate possible future events (sometimes referred to as episodic future thinking, prospection, or foresight) depends on the same neurocognitive system that is implicated in the recall of past events (episodic memory). In this paper, we argue that autism spectrum disorder (ASD) offers an ideal test of such theories, given that it is a developmental disorder that is characterized by impairments in episodic memory. Each of these theories would predict concomitant impairments in episodic future thinking among individuals with ASD. We review evidence concerning episodic future thinking in ASD, as well as studies of prospective memory (remembering to do something in the future), planning, navigation, and theory of mind, which some theories suggest also rely on the same mechanism as episodic future thinking

The mismeasure of ape social cognition

In his classic analysis, The Mismeasure of Man, Gould (1981) demolished the idea that intelligence was an inherent, genetic trait of different human groups by emphasizing, among other things, (a) its sensitivity to environmental input, (b) the incommensurate pre-test preparation of different human groups, and (c) the inadequacy of the testing contexts, in many cases. According to Gould, the root cause of these oversights was confirmation bias by psychometricians, an unwarranted commitment to the idea that intelligence was a fixed, immutable quality of people. By virtue of a similar, systemic interpretive bias, in the last two decades, numerous contemporary researchers in comparative psychology have claimed human superiority over apes in social intelligence, based on two-group comparisons between postindustrial, Western Europeans and captive apes, where the apes have been isolated from European styles of social interaction, and tested with radically different procedures. Moreover, direct comparisons of humans with apes suffer from pervasive lapses in argumentation: Research designs in wide contemporary use are inherently mute about the underlying psychological causes of overt behavior. Here we analyze these problems and offer a more fruitful approach to the comparative study of social intelligence, which focuses on specific individual learning histories in specific ecological circumstances

Teaching: Natural or Cultural?

In this chapter I argue that teaching, as we now understand the term, is historically and cross-culturally very rare. It appears to be unnecessary to transmit culture or to socialize children. Children are, on the other hand, primed by evolution to be avid observers, imitators, players and helpers—roles that reveal the profoundly autonomous and self-directed nature of culture acquisition (Lancy in press a). And yet, teaching is ubiquitous throughout the modern world—at least among the middle to upper class segment of the population. This ubiquity has led numerous scholars to argue for the universality and uniqueness of teaching as a characteristically human behavior. The theme of this chapter is that this proposition is unsustainable. Teaching is largely a result of recent cultural changes and the emergence of modern economies, not evolution

Rate differential reinforcement in monkey manipulation

A set of four manipulanda were presented to four Cebus monkeys, individually, and later in pairs. Step 1 provided an estimate of each S's probability of operating each item, while Step 2 determined whether pairing the items would disturb the ordinal relations among individual response probabilities. Both procedures provided information necessary for testing the assumption that a reinforcer is simply a contingent response whose independent probability of occurrence is greater than that of the associated instrumental response. Step 3 tested this assumption by again presenting pairs of items, but with one locked and its operation made contingent upon operation of the free item of the pair. The four Ss differed markedly in the extent to which the items produced different independent response probabilities, and correspondingly, in the extent to which the contingent pairs subsequently produced reinforcement. Confirmation of the present assumptions came primarily from one S, which differed substantially on the individual items, and showed five cases of reinforcement, all in the predicted direction. Further, reinforcement was shown by an increase in both contingency and extinction sessions. Finally, the response of intermediate probability reinforced the response of least, but not the one of greatest, probability, indicating that a reinforcer cannot be identified absolutely, but only relative to the base response

Distributional properties of operant-level locomotion in the rat

Four rats had continuous access to activity wheels first, then access for 1 hr per day, and, subsequently, continuous access. Limiting S's access to the wheel substantially increased the total frequency of running. A distributional analysis of response duration, burst duration, and interburst interval showed that the increased frequency arose almost entirely from a shortening of the interval between successive bursts. In contrast, speed of the individual response and number of responses per burst changed only negligibly. If S were running, the probability that it would either stop or continue did not differ appreciably for the conditions of continuous or limited access to the wheel. But if S were not running, the probability that it would start running was appreciably greater for limited than for continuous access

Increased eating in rats deprived of running

Daily food intake in rats was temporarily reduced by the introduction of an activity wheel and temporarily increased by the subsequent removal of the wheel. When this outcome is coupled with the positive relation between food deprivation and running—and food deprivation is seen as a loss of eating rather than as a physiological state—there is the suggestion that the total behavior output of the organism may be regulated as such. Specifically, when the rat is deprived of a behavior that recurrently comprises a large part of its total daily activity, an increase may occur in some other behavior