Keeping track of objects while exploring an informationally impoverished environment: Local deictic versus global spatial strategies

This study investigates a new experimental paradigm called the Modified Traveling Salesman Problem (Bullot & Droulez, submitted). This task requires subjects to visit once and only once n invisible targets in a 2D display, using a virtual vehicle controlled by the subject. Subjects can only see the directions of the targets from the current location of the vehicle, displayed by a set of oriented segments that can be viewed inside a circular window surrounding the vehicle. Two conditions were compared. In the “allocentric” condition, subjects see the vehicle move across the screen and change orientation under their command. The “egocentric” condition is similar except for how the information is provided: the position and orientation of the vehicle icon remains fixed at the center of the screen and only target directions, as indicated by the oriented segments, change as the subject “moves” the vehicle. The unexpected finding was that this task can be performed, in either condition, for up to 10 targets. We consider two possible strategies that might be used, a location-based strategy and a segment strategy. The location-based strategy relies on spatial memory and attempts to infer the locations of all the targets. The segment strategy is more local and focuses on the directional segments themselves, keeping track of the ones that represent already-visited targets. A number of observations suggest that the segment strategy was used, at least for larger numbers of targets. According to our hypothesis, keeping track of the segments requires one to use indexical reference for associating the segments with their status in the task - given by current status predicates Visited(x) or Not-visited(x) -, perhaps using visual indexes (Pylyshyn, 2001), deictic pointers (Ballard et al., 1997), or object files (Kahneman et al, 1992)

Model-based Cognitive Neuroscience: Multifield Mechanistic Integration in Practice

Autonomist accounts of cognitive science suggest that cognitive model building and theory construction (can or should) proceed independently of findings in neuroscience. Common functionalist justifications of autonomy rely on there being relatively few constraints between neural structure and cognitive function (e.g., Weiskopf, 2011). In contrast, an integrative mechanistic perspective stresses the mutual constraining of structure and function (e.g., Piccinini & Craver, 2011; Povich, 2015). In this paper, I show how model-based cognitive neuroscience (MBCN) epitomizes the integrative mechanistic perspective and concentrates the most revolutionary elements of the cognitive neuroscience revolution (Boone & Piccinini, 2016). I also show how the prominent subset account of functional realization supports the integrative mechanistic perspective I take on MBCN and use it to clarify the intralevel and interlevel components of integration

Oscillatory activity in the infant brain reflects object maintenance

The apparent failure of infants to understand "object permanence" by reaching for hidden objects is perhaps the most striking and debated phenomenon in cognitive development. Of particular interest is the extent to which infants perceive and remember objects in a similar way to that of adults. Here we report two findings that clarify infant object processing. The first is that 6-mo-old infants are sensitive to visual cues to occlusion, particularly gradual deletion. The second finding is that oscillatory electroencephalogram activity recorded over right temporal channels is involved in object maintenance. This effect occurs only after disappearance in a manner consistent with occlusion and the object's continued existence

On Picturing a Candle: The Prehistory of Imagery Science

The past 25 years have seen a rapid growth of knowledge about brain mechanisms involved in visual mental imagery. These advances have largely been made independently of the long history of philosophical – and even psychological – reckoning with imagery and its parent concept ‘imagination’. We suggest that the view from these empirical findings can be widened by an appreciation of imagination’s intellectual history, and we seek to show how that history both created the conditions for – and presents challenges to – the scientific endeavor. We focus on the neuroscientific literature’s most commonly used task – imagining a concrete object – and, after sketching what is known of the neurobiological mechanisms involved, we examine the same basic act of imagining from the perspective of several key positions in the history of philosophy and psychology. We present positions that, firstly, contextualize and inform the neuroscientific account, and secondly, pose conceptual and methodological challenges to the scientific analysis of imagery. We conclude by reflecting on the intellectual history of visualization in the light of contemporary science, and the extent to which such science may resolve long-standing theoretical debates

Do objects in working memory compete with objects in perception?

It is generally assumed that "perceptual object" is the basic unit for processing visual information and that only a small number of objects can be either perceptually selected or encoded in working memory (WM) at one time. This raises the question whether the same resource is used when objects are selected and tracked as when they are held in WM. In two experiments, we measured dual-task interference between a memory task and a Multiple Object Tracking task. The WM tasks involve explicit, implicit, or no spatial processing. Our results suggest there is no resource competition between working memory and perceptual selection except when the WM task requires encoding spatial properties

Thirty years after Marr’s vision: levels of analysis in cognitive science

Thirty years after the publication of Marr’s seminal book Vision (Marr, 1982) the papers in this topic consider the contemporary status of his influential conception of three distinct levels of analysis for information processing systems, and in particular the role of the algorithmic and representational level with its cognitive-level concepts. This level has (either implicitly or explicitly) been downplayed or eliminated both by reductionist neuroscience approaches (from below) that seek to account for behaviour from the implementation level and by Bayesian approaches (from above) that seek to account for behaviour in purely computational-level terms

Perceptual Pluralism

Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper rejects both approaches in favor of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perception delivers a multiplicity of representational formats, some proprietary and some shared with cognition. The argument for perceptual pluralism marshals a wide array of empirical evidence in favor of iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations in perception as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) perceptual object representations

Actions travel with their objects: evidence for dynamic event files

Moving a visual object is known to lead to an update of its cognitive representation. Given that object representations have also been shown to include codes describing the actions they were accompanied by, we investigated whether these action codes “move” along with their object. We replicated earlier findings that repeating stimulus and action features enhances performance if other features are repeated, but attenuates performance if they alternate. However, moving the objects in which the stimuli appeared in between two stimulus presentations had a strong impact on the feature bindings that involved location. Taken together, our findings provide evidence that changing the location of an object leaves two memory traces, one referring to its original location (an episodic record) and another referring to the new location (a working-memory trace)

A computer vision model for visual-object-based attention and eye movements

This is the post-print version of the final paper published in Computer Vision and Image Understanding. The published article is available from the link below. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. Copyright @ 2008 Elsevier B.V.This paper presents a new computational framework for modelling visual-object-based attention and attention-driven eye movements within an integrated system in a biologically inspired approach. Attention operates at multiple levels of visual selection by space, feature, object and group depending on the nature of targets and visual tasks. Attentional shifts and gaze shifts are constructed upon their common process circuits and control mechanisms but also separated from their different function roles, working together to fulfil flexible visual selection tasks in complicated visual environments. The framework integrates the important aspects of human visual attention and eye movements resulting in sophisticated performance in complicated natural scenes. The proposed approach aims at exploring a useful visual selection system for computer vision, especially for usage in cluttered natural visual environments.National Natural Science of Founda- tion of Chin

Influence of sports expertise level on attention in multiple object tracking

Background This study aimed to investigate whether performance in a multiple object tracking (MOT) task could be improved incrementally with sports expertise, and whether differences between experienced and less experienced athletes, or non-athletes, were modulated by load. Methods We asked 22 elite and 20 intermediate basketball players, and 23 non-athletes, to perform an MOT task under three attentional load conditions (two, three, and four targets). Accuracies were analyzed to examine whether different levels of sports expertise influence MOT task performance. Results The elite athletes displayed better tracking performance compared with the intermediate or non-athletes when tracking three or four targets. However, no significant difference was found between the intermediate athletes and the non-athletes. Further, no differences were observed among the three groups when tracking two targets. Discussion The results suggest that the effects of expertise in team ball sports could transfer to a non-sports-specific attention task. These transfer effects to general cognitive functions occur only in elite athletes with extensive training under higher attentional load