804 research outputs found
Corporate Governance, Measurement of
The increased focus on good governance and the development of best practice guidelines, often supported by legislation, has been in response to corporate scandals, such as Enron and Worldcom in the early 2000s, and the 2008 banking crisis. Good governance is increasingly recognised as a process where the ‘best practices\u27 of yesterday become the standard practices of today. This increased focus has also coincided with a worldwide movement for corporate reporting on sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues and a growing demand within the investment industry for investment products that are socially responsible (Benn and Dunphy 2013). Sustainable development is now part of the best practice model of corporate governance. There is a more equal recognition of stakeholders’ interests and the role of not only economic, but also social and environmental issues in laying the foundations for a new long-term model of economic growth. This is in contrast to the historic governing model that focused on the creation of shareholder value. However, despite increased attention and interest by policymakers and academics alike, a challenge that has not been unanimously resolved is the definition and measurement of ‘good corporate governance’. This chapter evaluates the main approaches to the measurement of corporate governance
Equal opportunity rule vs. market rule in transfer of control: How can private benefits help to provide an answer?
CEO Compensation
This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a competitive market for managerial talent. We describe and discuss the empirical evidence on the evolution of CEO pay and on the relationship between pay and firm performance since the 1930s. Our review suggests that both managerial power and competitive market forces are important determinants of CEO pay, but that neither approach is fully consistent with the available evidence. We briefly discuss promising directions for future research
Recent developments in German corporate governance.
This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product-market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely-held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability
Company ‘Emigration’ and EC Freedom of Establishment: Daily Mail Revisited
Following the ECJ’s recent case law on EC freedom of establishment (the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art cases), regulatory competition for corporate law within the European Union takes place at an early stage of the incorporation of new companies. In contrast, as regards the ‘moving out’ of companies from the country of incorporation, the ECJ once considered a tax law restriction against the transfer abroad of a company’s administrative seat as compatible with EC freedom of establishment (the Daily Mail case). For years, this decision has been regarded as applicable to all restrictions imposed by countries of incorporation, even the forced liquidation of the ‘emigrating’ company. This paper addresses the question whether EC freedom of establishment really allows Member States to place any limit on the ‘emigration’ of nationally registered companies. It argues that EC freedom of establishment covers the transfer of the administrative seat as well as the transfer of the registered office and, therefore, that the country of incorporation cannot liquidate ‘emigrating’ companies. In addition, it addresses the question whether a new Directive is needed to allow the transfer of a com- pany’s registered office and the identity-preserving company law changes. It argues that such a Directive is necessary to avoid legal uncertainty and to protect the interests of employees, creditors and minority shareholders, among others, who could be detrimentally affected by the ‘emigration’ of national companies
The Diffusion of Equity Incentive Plans in Italian Listed Companies: What is the Trigger?
Recent dynamics in the institutional and market environment have facilitated the propagation of equity incentive plans outside the US and the UK. This study sheds light on the reasons behind the diffusion of these plans in a country, Italy, where companies are usually controlled by a blockholder and where these instruments were almost absent until the end of the \u201890s.
To gain a deep understanding of the phenomenon, we collected data and information on both the diffusion and the technical aspects of equity incentive plans adopted by Italian listed companies in 1999 and 2005. The results show that (i) the determinant of their adoption is the firm size rather than the absence of a controlling shareholder; (ii) these plans are not extensively used to extract company value, although few cases suggest this possibility; and (iii) plans\u2019 characteristics generally comply with the requirements in tax law so that fiscal benefits can be accessed. Our findings contribute to expand the traditional knowledge on reasons behind the adoption of equity incentive plans outside Anglo-Saxon countries, and support a symbolic perspective of corporate governance, according to which the introduction of new governance practices may not imply substantive governance reforms.
Practitioner/Policy implications: Our study recommends policymakers to improve the disclosure rules about these plans and to avoid the introduction of fiscal benefits that incentive the diffusion of some compensation schemes respect to others. Moreover, our results encourage members of remuneration committees to pay attention to the specific characteristics of the plans they design
Bonding and the agency risk premium: An analysis of migrations between the AIM and the Official List of the London Stock Exchange
Firms that change their listing from the less regulated AIM to the more regulated main section of the London Stock Exchange exhibit positive abnormal returns on the announcement day. For firms moving in the opposite direction, both announcement and implementation day abnormal returns are negative. Following implementation, the pattern is reversed for both categories of firm. We show that differences in liquidity, conventional risk factors and in medium to long term firm survival rates between the two listing regimes do not explain the observed patterns of returns, suggesting that the answer lies in the different bonding requirements of the two market segments and an agency risk premium.JEL Codes: G12, G14, G15, G30, G32, G3
Corporate ownership and control in Victorian Britain
© Economic History Society 2014. Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article examines the concentration of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century. We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern-day standards. However, this does not necessarily mean that there was a modern-style separation of ownership from control in Victorian Britain. One major implication of our findings is that diffuse ownership was present in the UK much earlier than previously thought, and given that it occurred in an era with weak shareholder protection law, it somewhat undermines the influential law and finance hypothesis. We also find that diffuse ownership is correlated with large boards, a London head office, non-linear voting rights, and shares traded on multiple markets
Directors' remuneration: A comparison of Italian and UK non-financial listed firms' disclosure
Directors' remuneration is a key issue for both academics and policymakers. It has caused enormous controversy in recent years. This study uses a comprehensive index to analyse the disclosure of directors' remuneration in Italian and UK listed firms. It finds that the level of voluntary disclosure is significantly associated with firm-specific incentives, such as the demand for information from investors and the need for legitimacy. It finds that the level of voluntary disclosure is significantly higher in the UK than in Italy and that firm-specific incentives to disclose voluntary information differ according to the institutional setting in which a firm operates. In the UK, firm-specific incentives mostly come from the demand for information, estimated with the level of ownership diffusion, and the need for legitimacy generated by poor market performance and shareholders' dissent. In Italy, firm-specific incentives seem to be represented by the need for legitimacy generated by media coverage. This study also provides evidence that, in both countries, the information disclosed in corporate documents does not allow readers to obtain a comprehensive picture of directors' remuneration. Bonuses are poorly disclosed even though they are a key element of directors' remuneration. This finding is clearly important for policymakers at European and national level
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