Noise and competition in strategic oligopoly

In this paper, we propose a model where N strategic informed traders who are endowed with heterogeneous noisy signals with different precisions compete in a market with a single risky asset. We explicitly describe the unique linear equilibrium that exists in this setup and derive its properties. Moreover, we focus on the effects of noise on the competition between traders. We show that noise softens the competition between traders. In particular, for N exceeding three and for certain sets of noise in traders' signals, each trader's individual profit is greater than the one obtained in the case of perfect information

Financial crises, corporate scandals and blind spots: who is responsible?

According to the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the main causes of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 were failures of corporate governance and policy, including widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision, lack of transparency, poor preparation by the government, and systemic breakdown in accountability

Bullish-Bearish strategies of trading: A non-linear equilibrium.

In this paper, we study a financial market where risk neutral traders are endowed with a signal which is perfectly revealing of the direction (but not the exact amount) of the liquidation value of a normally distributed risky asset. This type of information is known as bullish or bearish. When the signal is positive (negative) the traders buy (sell) the asset. This type of information is different with the type of information which is classically considered in the literature where informed traders are endowed with a perfect or a noisy signal. In this model, since the optimal trading strategy is not linear, the pricing schedule is also a non-linear function of the volumes. The main results are the following i) the price function is a non-linear Sigmo¨ıd-shaped function. ii) A monopolistic bullish-bearish type trader makes nearly thirty six percent of the profits she would have made with a perfect signal in a linear model `a la Kyle (1985). iii) In the presence of competition, the market reveals his private information quicker than in a noisy informed strategic oligopoly. Moreover, liquidity is no longer a monotonic increasing function of the number of competitors

Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive

We examine the pervasive view that “equity is expensive,” which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit markets adversely. We find that arguments made to support this view are either fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak. For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity. It is thus incorrect to assume that the required return on equity remains fixed as capital requirements increase. It is also incorrect to translate higher taxes paid by banks to a social cost. Policies that subsidize debt and indirectly penalize equity through taxes and implicit guarantees are distortive. Any desirable public subsidies to banks’ activities should be given directly and not in ways that encourage leverage. Finally, suggestions that high leverage serves a necessary disciplining role are based on inadequate theory lacking empirical support. We conclude that bank equity is not socially expensive, and that high leverage is not necessary for banks to perform all their socially valuable functions, including lending, taking deposits and issuing money-like securities. To the contrary, better capitalized banks suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and would perform better. The fact that banks choose high leverage does not imply that this is socially optimal, and, viewed from an ex ante perspective, high leverage may not even be privately optimal for banks. Setting equity requirements significantly higher than the levels currently proposed would entail large social benefits and minimal, if any, social costs. Approaches based on equity dominate alternatives, including contingent capital. To achieve better capitalization quickly and efficiently and prevent disruption to lending, regulators must actively control equity payouts and issuance. If remaining challenges are addressed, capital regulation can be a powerful tool for enhancing the role of banks in the economy.capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, too big to fail, systemic risk, bank equity, contingent capital, Basel.

Between house and city

Thesis (M. Arch.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture, 1982.MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH.Includes bibliographical references (p. 160-162).In an attempt to understand the relationships between a residential building type and the city, this thesis explores the quality of the urban context resulting from the assemblage of these buildings. The investigation takes place in North Tel-Aviv and is conducted in three parts: Background and polemic - a discussion of the development of the urban ideas and of the physical form in North Tel-Aviv; The problem - a documentation and analysis of the existing context; and An alternative - a design exploration of a typical neighborhood.by Rachel Admati Kallus.M.Arch

Herding, contrarianism and delay in financial market trading

Herding and contrarian behaviour are often-cited features of real-world financial markets. Theoretical models of continuous trading that study herding and contrarianism, however, usually do not allow traders to choose when to trade or to trade more than once. We present a large-scale experiment to explore these features within a tightly controlled laboratory environment. Herding and contrarianism are more pronounced than in comparable studies that do not allow traders to time their decisions. Traders with extreme information tend to trade earliest, followed by those with information conducive to contrarianism, while those with the theoretical potential to herd delay the most. A sizeable fraction of trades is clustered in time