How experimental procedures influence estimates of metacognitive ability

It is becoming widely appreciated that higher stimulus sensitivity trivially increases estimates of metacognitive sensitivity. Therefore, meaningful comparisons of metacognitive ability across conditions and observers necessitates equating stimulus sensitivity. To achieve this, one common approach is to use a continuous staircase that runs throughout the duration of the experiment under the assumption that this procedure has no influence on the estimated metacognitive ability. Here we critically examine this assumption. Using previously published data, we find that, compared to using a single level of stimulus contrast, staircase techniques lead to inflated estimates of metacognitive ability across a wide variety of measures including area under the type 2 ROC curve, the confidence-accuracy correlation phi, meta-d0 , meta-d0 /d0 , and meta-d0 –d0 . Furthermore, this metacognitive inflation correlates with the degree of stimulus variability experienced by each subject. These results suggest that studies using a staircase approach are likely to report inflated estimates of metacognitive ability. Furthermore, we argue that similar inflation likely occurs in the presence of variability in task difficulty caused by other factors such as fluctuations in alertness or gradual improvement on the task. We offer practical solutions to these issues, both in the design and analysis of metacognition experiments

Action planning and the timescale of evidence accumulation

Perceptual decisions are based on the temporal integration of sensory evidence for different states of the outside world. The timescale of this integration process varies widely across behavioral contexts and individuals, and it is diagnostic for the underlying neural mechanisms. In many situations, the decision-maker knows the required mapping between perceptual evidence and motor response (henceforth termed “sensory-motor contingency”) before decision formation. Here, the integrated evidence can be directly translated into a motor plan and, indeed, neural signatures of the integration process are evident as build-up activity in premotor brain regions. In other situations, however, the sensory-motor contingencies are unknown at the time of decision formation. We used behavioral psychophysics and computational modeling to test if knowledge about sensory-motor contingencies affects the timescale of perceptual evidence integration. We asked human observers to perform the same motion discrimination task, with or without trial-to-trial variations of the mapping between perceptual choice and motor response. When the mapping varied, it was either instructed before or after the stimulus presentation. We quantified the timescale of evidence integration under these different sensory-motor mapping conditions by means of two approaches. First, we analyzed subjects’ discrimination threshold as a function of stimulus duration. Second, we fitted a dynamical decision-making model to subjects’ choice behavior. The results from both approaches indicated that observers (i) integrated motion information for several hundred ms, (ii) used a shorter than optimal integration timescale, and (iii) used the same integration timescale under all sensory-motor mappings. We conclude that the mechanisms limiting the timescale of perceptual decisions are largely independent from long-term learning (under fixed mapping) or rapid acquisition (under variable mapping) of sensory-motor contingencies. This conclusion has implications for neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies of perceptual decision-making

Subliminal stimuli in the near absence of attention influence top-down cognitive control

Recent research has shown that visual stimuli can influence cognitive control functions, even if subjects are unaware of the identity of the stimuli. However, in those previous studies, subjects actively attended to the location of the subliminal stimuli. Here we assessed the role of endogenous spatial attention in such paradigms. We required subjects to quickly prepare for one of two numerical judgment tasks on the basis of the direction of motion in patches of moving dots presented in cued spatial locations. We found that irrelevant motion patches presented in the uncued spatial locations also influenced task performance. Motion in the uncued patches was weak and did not affect the perception of the cued patches. Further analyses suggested that the effect of priming by the uncued stimuli was present even for subjects who could only discriminate such stimuli at chance level. Three additional experiments confirmed that subjects paid minimal attention to the uncued locations, in that the subjects could not perform simple discriminations of conjunctions of features in those locations

Valence-Specific Modulation in the Accumulation of Perceptual Evidence Prior to Visual Scene Recognition

Visual scene recognition is a dynamic process through which incoming sensory information is iteratively compared with predictions regarding the most likely identity of the input stimulus. In this study, we used a novel progressive unfolding task to characterize the accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to scene recognition, and its potential modulation by the emotional valence of these scenes. Our results show that emotional (pleasant and unpleasant) scenes led to slower accumulation of evidence compared to neutral scenes. In addition, when controlling for the potential contribution of non-emotional factors (i.e., familiarity and complexity of the pictures), our results confirm a reliable shift in the accumulation of evidence for pleasant relative to neutral and unpleasant scenes, suggesting a valence-specific effect. These findings indicate that proactive iterations between sensory processing and top-down predictions during scene recognition are reliably influenced by the rapidly extracted (positive) emotional valence of the visual stimuli. We interpret these findings in accordance with the notion of a genuine positivity offset during emotional scene recognition

The Confidence Database

Understanding how people rate their confidence is critical for the characterization of a wide range of perceptual, memory, motor and cognitive processes. To enable the continued exploration of these processes, we created a large database of confidence studies spanning a broad set of paradigms, participant populations and fields of study. The data from each study are structured in a common, easy-to-use format that can be easily imported and analysed using multiple software packages. Each dataset is accompanied by an explanation regarding the nature of the collected data. At the time of publication, the Confidence Database (which is available at https://osf.io/s46pr/) contained 145 datasets with data from more than 8,700 participants and almost 4 million trials. The database will remain open for new submissions indefinitely and is expected to continue to grow. Here we show the usefulness of this large collection of datasets in four different analyses that provide precise estimations of several foundational confidence-related effects

Opportunities and challenges for a maturing science of consciousness

AMSUNY DownstatePhysiology and PharmacologyNeurologyOphthalmologyLaboratory of Translational NeuroscienceN/