Conceptualiser les troubles mentaux chez les enfants et les adolescents

J’explore de façon critique la supposition du DSM et de théoriciens tels que Wakefield et Gert selon laquelle les troubles mentaux doivent être attribués à un individu plutôt qu’à un groupe de personnes. Cette supposition est particulièrement problématique en pédopsychiatrie où le système familial est très souvent au centre de l’attention clinique. Il y a bien sûr des éléments de preuve substantiels indiquant que certains troubles mentaux des individus sont causés par leurs relations avec les autres et que leur guérison est grandement facilitée en traitant le groupe, tel que la famille, comme un tout. Malgré cela, il y a eu beaucoup moins de travail conceptuel visant à définir ce que cela pourrait être pour un couple, une famille ou un autre groupe que de se voir attribuer un trouble mental. Pour traiter de cette question, j’utilise un débat entre Wakefield (2000) et Murphy et Woolfolk (2000) sur la question de savoir s’il fait partie du concept de trouble mental que celui-ci soit causé par une dysfonction interne de la personne. Je discute aussi de la proposition faite par Bolton (2000) d’abandonner complètement le concept de trouble mental et d’utiliser plutôt le concept, plus large, de problème de santé mentale. Je soutiens qu’en fin de compte le caractère individuel des troubles mentaux ne constitue pas une vérité conceptuelle a priori, et qu’il faut faire intervenir des considérations pragmatiques pour décider s’il est utile de nous limiter à une telle définition ou si nous pourrions être mieux servis par une définition plus extensive. Je fais le lien avec le pragmatisme et je soutiens qu’une approche pluraliste non réductive est particulièrement appropriée en pédopsychiatrie.I critically explore the assumption of the DSM and theorists such as Wakefield and Gert that mental disorder must be attributed to an individual rather than a group of people. This assumption is especially problematic in child and adolescent psychiatry where very often the focus of clinical attention is the family system. There is of course substantial evidence that some mental disorders of individuals are caused by their relationships with other people and that their recovery is greatly facilitated by treating the group, such as a family, as a whole. However, there has been much less conceptual work on defining what it might be for a couple, family or other group to itself be attributed a mental disorder. To address this issue, I employ a debate between Wakefield (2000), Murphy and Woolfolk (2000) on whether it is part of the concept of a mental disorder that it is caused by an internal malfunction of a person. I also discuss the proposal of Bolton (2000) that we do away with the concept of mental disorder altogether and instead use a broader concept of mental health problem. I argue that ultimately it is not an a priori conceptual truth that mental disorders are individual, and we need to bring in pragmatic considerations to decide whether it is helpful to restrict ourselves to such a definition or whether we could be better served by a more expansive definition. I link this to the philosophical view of pragmatism and argue that a pluralistic nonreductive approach is especially appropriate in child and adolescent psychiatry

Contributions of a global network of tree diversity experiments to sustainable forest plantations

status: publishe

For the sake of resilience and multifunctionality, let's diversify planted forests!

As of 2020, the world has an estimated 290 million ha of planted forests and this number is continuously increasing. Of these, 131 million ha are monospecific planted forests under intensive management. Although monospecific planted forests are important in providing timber, they harbor less biodiversity and are potentially more susceptible to disturbances than natural or diverse planted forests. Here, we point out the increasing scientific evidence for increased resilience and ecosystem service provision of functionally and species diverse planted forests (hereafter referred to as diverse planted forests) compared to monospecific ones. Furthermore, we propose five concrete steps to foster the adoption of diverse planted forests: (1) improve awareness of benefits and practical options of diverse planted forests among land-owners, managers, and investors; (2) incentivize tree species diversity in public funding of afforestation and programs to diversify current maladapted planted forests of low diversity; (3) develop new wood-based products that can be derived from many different tree species not yet in use; (4) invest in research to assess landscape benefits of diverse planted forests for functional connectivity and resilience to global-change threats; and (5) improve the evidence base on diverse planted forests, in particular in currently under-represented regions, where new options could be tested

Towards an integrative, eco-evolutionary understanding of ecological novelty: studying and communicating interlinked effects of global change

Global change has complex eco-evolutionary consequences for organisms and ecosystems, but related concepts (e.g., novel ecosystems) do not cover their full range. Here we propose an umbrella concept of “ecological novelty” comprising (1) a site-specific and (2) an organism-centered, eco-evolutionary perspective. Under this umbrella, complementary options for studying and communicating effects of global change on organisms, ecosystems, and landscapes can be included in a toolbox. This allows researchers to address ecological novelty from different perspectives, e.g., by defining it based on (a) categorical or continuous measures, (b) reference conditions related to sites or organisms, and (c) types of human activities. We suggest striving for a descriptive, non-normative usage of the term “ecological novelty” in science. Normative evaluations and decisions about conservation policies or management are important, but require additional societal processes and engagement with multiple stakeholders

Bridging the Gap between Philosophers of Mind and Brain Researchers: The Example of Addiction **

Philosophers and psychologists have long tried to understand people’s irrational behaviour through concepts such as weakness of will, compulsion and addiction. The scientific basis of the project has been greatly enhanced by advances in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. However, some philosophers have also been critical of the more general conclusions drawn by the scientists. This is especially true when scientific researchers start making claims that go to philosophical issues, such as free will and responsibility. Conversely, some scientists have been critical of philosophical approaches for not understanding the results of recent research. I examined some of the recent history of scientific claims about addiction, and the rise of the claims from scientists to have shown that addiction is a brain disease and that addictive behaviour is compulsive. Given the well-confirmed evidence that addicts can modulate their behaviour in response to rewards, punishments and context, it is clear that according to normal definitions of compulsivity the behaviour of addicts is not typically compulsive, suggesting that neuroscientists are making an error in their interpretation of data. Since philosophers have expertise in making distinctions between different kinds of action and categorising them as free, weak-willed and compulsive, we will achieve a better interpretation of the neuroscience of addiction when taking this philosophical work into account. Conversely, given the status of science in the modern world, philosophers have to grapple with the latest neuroscientific discoveries and show the compatibility of their philosophical theories with the data for their approaches to maintain credibility