Unseen and Unheard: Exploring the Mental Health of Mostly Heterosexual College Students

College years have long been understood to be a difficult yet important developmental period in an individual’s life, which may be particularly challenging for sexual minority students who tend to face discrimination on campus, which can undermine their mental health. Research in both college student and non-college student samples has shown that mostly heterosexual is a distinct sexual orientation. However, little is known about the wellbeing of individuals, including college students, who identify as mostly heterosexual. Moreover, among college students, little is known about the intersections between a mostly heterosexual identity and mental health. This study examined the association between sexual orientation and anxiety, depression, and risk for alcohol abuse. Specifically, it compared outcomes between students who identify as mostly heterosexual and students who identify as completely heterosexual. This study also compared outcomes between mostly heterosexual participants and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and queer (LGB+) students (as one group) to investigate potential differences among sexual minority students. In order to attempt to explain why differences exist, the mediating role of discrimination, namely incivility and hostility, were investigated. Several key findings emerged showing that mostly heterosexuals differ significantly from their completely heterosexual and LGB+ peers, in terms of their mental health and the role that forms of discrimination play in explaining disparities. Implications for the field of social work and other allied health professionals are discussed

No. 30: Regionalizing Xenophobia? Citizen Attitudes to Immgration and Refugee Policy in Southern Africa

The negative attitudes of South Africans towards non-citizens, migrants and refugees have been documented in several recent studies. Xenophobia has been officially recognized as a major problem by the state and steps have been taken by government and the South African Human Rights Commission to “roll back xenophobia.” Since anti-immigrant intolerance is a global phenomenon, should South Africans be singled out in this regard? This paper seeks to contextualize the South African situation by comparing the attitudes of South Africans with citizens from several other countries in the SADC; namely, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In practical policy terms, xenophobia undermines social cohesion, peaceful co-existence, good governance and human rights observance. In addition, SADC is a region composed of 14 states committed to greater integration and cooperation. To encourage or allow citizens of one member state to think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of another, is ultimately extremely destructive of regional cooperation and harmony. This study therefore aims to show (for the states studied) which are the “rogue states” in which citizens have not yet come to terms with a basic requirement of regional cooperation: tolerance and acceptance of people from neighbouring SADC countries. This, in turn, should help identify those governments who have an actual or potential problem on their hands and which therefore need to take the task of “rolling back xenophobia” far more seriously than they do at present. The paper is based on a SAMP Project implemented in 2001-2 called the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS). The survey, of a representative sample of urban residents, was implemented simultaneously in 5 SADC states. A comparable data set was extracted from a 1999 SAMP survey in South Africa. The survey was designed to measure citizen knowledge of migration, attitudes towards non-citizens, and immigration and refugee policy preferences. The survey found that citizens across the region consistently tend to exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their countries, to view the migration of people within the region as a “problem” rather than an opportunity, and to scapegoat non-citizens. The intensity of these feelings varies significantly from country to country. The harshest sentiments are expressed by the citizens of South Africa, Namibia and, to a lesser extent, Botswana. The citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are considerably more relaxed about the presence of noncitizens in their countries. Negative attitudes in the anti-foreign “troika” (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana) are so pervasive and widespread that it is actually impossible to identify any kind of “xenophobe profile.” In other words, the poor and the rich, the employed and the unemployed, the male and the female, the black and the white, the conservative and the radical, all express remarkably similar attitudes. This poses a significant problem of explanation because it runs counter to the more general belief that certain groups in a population (usually those who are or who perceive themselves to be threatened by outsiders) are more prone to xenophobic attitudes than others. It also provides a massive public education challenge not only of knowing where to begin but deciding who to target. Within countries where there is greater tolerance, a more classic pattern pertains. That is, those with the most to lose from the presence of non-citizens – the unskilled and the unemployed – exhibit much more negative attitudes than other groups. One of the more interesting results is the apparent absence of any sense of solidarity with other countries in the SADC. Given the longevity of the SADC as a formal institution, this is a significant finding. The absence of any real sense of “regional consciousness” (of participation in a regional grouping whose interests are greater than the sum of its parts) has very direct implications for migration issues. Citizens of these SADC countries make very little distinction between migrants from other SADC countries and those from elsewhere in Africa and even Europe and North America. Where attitudes are negative, they are uniformly negative; where positive, uniformly positive. An urgent challenge confronting the SADC and migration-related initiatives such as the Migration Dialogue in Southern Africa (MIDSA) is therefore to develop strategies to build a new regional consciousness amongst citizens and policy-makers. Most citizens would prefer national governments to “get tough” with migrants and refugees. There is widespread suspicion that refugees are not genuine and there is significant fear that migrants are an economic threat. Perhaps the most significant and consistent finding is the fear – certainly not confined to Southern Africa – that migrants steal rather than create jobs. Although the majority of people in all countries see immigrants as a threat to jobs, very few have personal knowledge or experience of such an occurrence. Over 60% of respondents in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have never heard of anyone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner; in Swaziland and Botswana the percentage drops to 34% and 50%, respectively. Even fewer people know from their own experience of someone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. Almost 90% of respondents in all six countries have no personal experience of being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. When migration is viewed as a “threat” (as it clearly is amongst significant portions of the population and amongst virtually everyone in some countries) it is not unusual for citizens to prefer harsh policy measures. Rather shocking is the degree of support for border electrification. But citizens also want to see armies at the borders, tough internal enforcement and curtailment of basic rights. There is clearly a massive job of education confronting government if policy-makers are to turn around the obsession with control and exclusion and encourage a countervailing sense of the potential positive aspects of migration and immigration. Here, the NIPS survey is particularly relevant. It shows that across the region, citizens are prepared to accept and welcome non-citizens if their economic impact is demonstrably positive. Hence, skillsand investor-friendly immigration policies would not be a difficult sell to citizens. Since such policies are inevitable if countries are to be and remain globally competitive, it is important that policy and opinion-makers begin to build a broad public consensus on this issue. There is nothing more off-putting to a new immigrant who wants to put their skills to work in and for a new country to find that they are the object of scorn and vilification simply because of their accent or the colour of their skin

Do investments in human capital lead to employee share ownership? Evidence from French establishments.

Investments in human capital can create a hold-up problem whereby both employers and employees exploit the bargaining weaknesses of the other. Employee share ownership (ESO) can mitigate this hold-up problem because it can align interests, develop loyalty, signal good-will and lock in employees. Previous studies have shown positive relationships between company investments in human capital and the use of ESO consistent with this argument but have been unable to identify the direction of causality. Using panel data from the French REPONSE survey, the findings indicate that significant and continuous investments in human capital take place prior to the implementation of ESO

Synthesis and characterization of model polymers for use in the investigation of char forming heat shields status report no. 1

Model polymer synthesis for use in char forming heat shield

No. 20: The State of Food Insecurity in Maputo, Mozambique

Food insecurity is a fact of life for the vast majority of households across Maputo’s poverty belt. The Maputo urban food security survey done by AFSUN as part of its baseline survey of 11 Southern African cities found that households exist in a constant state of food insecurity manifested in a lack of access to sufficient affordable food, poor dietary quality and undernutrition. Income is meagre and only those households with access to wage income have any chance of holding food insecurity at bay. With a vibrant informal food economy, Maputo’s poor are surrounded by fresh and processed food. Food availability is therefore not the primary determinant of food insecurity in Maputo. Certainly large-scale food import from South Africa and further afield makes the market price of food inherently volatile. But prices for the consumer are also driven down by the fact that there is intense competition among vendors on the streets and in the marketplaces. The real cause of food insecurity is high urban unemployment and a lack of regular and decent-paying work. Among its recommendations, AFSUN urges the city of Maputo to set up a food security strategy that is multisectoral and policy-oriented and based on a better understanding of food flows into and within the city, the operation of the city’s informal food economy and the likely impacts of formal retailing for the food security of the urban poor

Employee Share Ownership Plans: A Review

This paper reviews the main strands of research on employee share ownership over the last forty years. It considers research findings in the literature on types of share ownership, the incidence of share ownership plans, the ‘determinants’ of the use of share plans by companies, influences upon employee participation in share plans, the effect of share ownership on employee attitudes and behaviour, the effect on company performance, and the relationship between share ownership plans and other forms of employee participation. The paper does not provide a comprehensive review of the literature on these topics: instead it highlights the main findings that have emerged in the literature to date, and suggests some avenues for future research. It is suggested that majority worker ownership is different in character and effects from ‘mainstream’ minority employee share plans in large companies but the literature has tended to conflate the two. It is argued that future research needs to distinguish the various forms of employee share ownership if the impact of share ownership is to be more precisely calibrated

No. 14: The State of Food Insecurity in Windhoek, Namibia

AFSUN recently conducted a survey of poor urban households in eleven major cities in Southern Africa to better understand the seriousness of the urban food insecurity situation. This report looks in detail at the results for Windhoek and seeks to answer one central question, that is, why do the urban poor in Namibia’s capital generally appear to be better off than the urban poor in most of the other ten cities where the survey was conducted and why, at the same time, does Windhoek contain some of the most food insecure households in the region? As a city of migrants, Windhoek’s case also presents the opportunity to examine the relationship between migration and urban food security in more depth. Among the key findings is that access to food, which depends on incomes and food pricing, is critical in Windhoek, where food availability is not an issue. What is required is a systematic national and city strategy for reducing the high levels of food insecurity amongst the urban poor in general and in informal settlements in particular

No. 20: The State of Food Insecurity in Maputo, Mozambique

Food insecurity is a fact of life for the vast majority of households across Maputo’s poverty belt. The Maputo urban food security survey done by AFSUN as part of its baseline survey of 11 Southern African cities found that households exist in a constant state of food insecurity manifested in a lack of access to sufficient affordable food, poor dietary quality and undernutrition. Income is meagre and only those households with access to wage income have any chance of holding food insecurity at bay. With a vibrant informal food economy, Maputo’s poor are surrounded by fresh and processed food. Food availability is therefore not the primary determinant of food insecurity in Maputo. Certainly large-scale food import from South Africa and further afield makes the market price of food inherently volatile. But prices for the consumer are also driven down by the fact that there is intense competition among vendors on the streets and in the marketplaces. The real cause of food insecurity is high urban unemployment and a lack of regular and decent-paying work. Among its recommendations, AFSUN urges the city of Maputo to set up a food security strategy that is multisectoral and policy-oriented and based on a better understanding of food flows into and within the city, the operation of the city’s informal food economy and the likely impacts of formal retailing for the food security of the urban poor