Corporate governance compliance and disclosure in the banking sector: using data from Japan

Using regression model this study investigates which characteristics of a bank is associated with the extent of corporate governance disclosure in Japan. The findings suggest that on average 8 banks out of a sample of 46 disclose optimal corporate governance information. The regression model results reveal in general that non-executive directors, cross-ownership, capital adequacy ratio and type of auditors are associated with the extent of corporate governance disclosure. Of these four variables, non-executive directors have a more significant impact on the extent of disclosure contrary to total assets and audit firms of banks in the context of Japan. The findings of this paper are relevant for corporate regulators, professional associations and developers of corporate governance code when designing or updating corporate governance code

With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders

Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogenous shift in power from shareholders to managers affects corporate attention to non-shareholding stakeholders. Two competing hypotheses are entertained. The shareholder view predicts that stronger takeover protection will lead to a decrease in corporate attention to shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders alike, as managers divert resources from shareholders to the pursuit of their private interests. The stakeholder view, in contrast, predicts that stronger takeover protection will increase corporate attention to non-shareholding stakeholders. Because catering to non-shareholding stakeholders contributes to the long-term value of the firm, managers will be more likely to attend to those stakeholders when relieved from short-termism triggered by the threat of hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 878 U.S. firms from 1991 to 2002, the study finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection leads to higher corporate attention to community and the natural environment, but has no impact on corporate attention to employees, minorities, and customers. Additional analyses show that firms that increase their attention to stakeholders experience an increase in long-term shareholder value. These findings provide additional evidence that relief from short-termism is a likely source of the increase in corporate attention to non-shareholding stakeholders following the increase in takeover protection. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/61437/1/733_ftp.pd

A study of the impact of individual thermal control on user comfort in the workplace: Norwegian cellular vs. British open plan offices

In modern offices, user control is being replaced by centrally operated thermal systems, and in Scandinavia, personal offices by open plan layouts. This study examined the impact of user control on thermal comfort and satisfaction. It compared a workplace, which was designed entirely based on individual control over the thermal environment, to an environment that limited thermal control was provided as a secondary option for fine-tuning: Norwegian cellular and British open plan offices. The Norwegian approach provided each user with control over a window, door, blinds, heating and cooling as the main thermal control system. In contrast, the British practice provided a uniform thermal environment with limited openable windows and blinds to refine the thermal environment for occupants seated around the perimeter of the building. Field studies of thermal comfort were applied to measure users’ perception of thermal environment, empirical building performance and thermal control. The results showed a 30% higher satisfaction and 18% higher comfort level in the Norwegian offices compared to the British practices. However, the energy consumption of the Norwegian case studies was much higher compared to the British ones. A balance is required between energy efficiency and user thermal comfort in the workplace

Ownership structure, investment behaviour and firm performance in Japanese manufacturing industries

Abstract Using data spanning the 1996-98 fiscal years of 247 of Japan's largest manufacturers, we empirically evaluate the extent to which a firm's investment behaviour and financial performance are influenced by its ownership structure. To do so, we examine six distinct categories of Japanese shareholders: foreign investors, investment funds, pension funds, banks and insurance companies, affiliated companies and insiders. Our findings strongly indicate that the relationship between the equity stakes of a particular category of investor and a firm's financial performance and investment behaviour is considerably more complex than is depicted in simple principal-agent representations. Such a result emphasizes the importance of making finely grained and contextually relevant distinctions when modelling and evaluating corporate governance relations

Le gouvernement d'entreprise au Royaume Uni

Charkham Jonathan P. Le gouvernement d'entreprise au Royaume Uni. In: Revue d'économie financière, n°31, 1994. Corporate governance : Le gouvernement d’entreprise. pp. 183-224