Tax Aspects of Corporate Pension Funding Policy

This paper explores four models of firms' pension liabilities. All of the models yield the result that if it is the stockholders who gain or lose from a change in the market value of pension fund assets, a pension fund invested entirely in bonds will maximize that gain. If a firm's pension liabilities are considered to be no more than the present value of accrued benefits, then most plans for salaried employees would maximize the pension's value by having their assets entirely in bonds. However, for less well funded plans such as most union plans, holding both stocks and bonds or even all stocks may maximize the value of the firm.. Implicit contracts on the liability side of the pension balance sheet can encourage holding some stock, but implicit contracts on the asset side are likely to encourage increased bond holdings.

Present challenges of research and technology politics

Research and technology in Germany are discussed. The rapid transfer of scientific knowledge and techniques from the laboratory to the manufacturing and industrial communities is identified as a priority. It is recommended that the government give maximum support to the aviation and space flight industries

Early Retirement Pension Benefits

Early retirement options alter the accrual of pension benefits, increasing the fraction of total benefits accrued in the early years of work. This is true regardless of whether de facto no worker exercises the early retirement option. No currently used actuarial method correctly calculates the cost of an early retirement option. Early retirement options must be considered in calculating age/compensation profiles. Furthermore, the early retirement option can effectively be used to encourage less productive older workers to retire, without the firm having to reduce the nominal salary of such workers.

When are Auctions Best?

We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete. The sequential process is more efficient because entrants base their decisions on superior information. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue.auctions, jump bidding, sequential sales, procurement, entry.

The Tobacco Deal

[Forthcoming in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity] We analyse the major economic issues raised by the 1997 Tobacco Resolution and the ensuing proposed legislation that were intended to settle tobacco litigation in the United States. By settling litigation largely in return for tax increases, the Resolution was a superb example of a "win- win" deal. The taxes would cost the companies about $1 billion per year, but yield the government about$13 billion per year, and allow the lawyers to claim fees based on hundreds of billions in “damages”. Only consumers, in whose name many of the lawsuits were filed, lost out. Though the strategy seems brilliant for the parties involved, the execution was less intelligent. We show that alternative taxes would be considerably superior to those proposed, and explain problems with the damage payments required from the firms, and the legal protections offered to them. We argue that the legislation was not particularly focused on youth smoking, despite the rhetoric. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, youth smokers are not especially valuable to the companies, so marketing restrictions are a sensible part of any deal. The individual state settlements set very dangerous examples which could open up unprecedented opportunities for collusion throughout the economy, and the multistate settlement of November 1998 is equally flawed. The fees proposed for the lawyers (around $15 billion) and the equally remarkable proposed payoff for Liggett (perhaps$400 million annually, for a company with a prior market value of about $100 million) also set terrible examples. We conclude with some views about how public policy might do better.

Matching and Price Competition

We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implying little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case against the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results.

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry - precisely because of its inefficiency - it usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc.Auctions, jump bidding, sequential sales, procurement, entry

Auctions vs. Negotiations

Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: a public auction or an optimally structured negotiation with a smaller number of bidders? We show that under standard assumptions the public auction is always preferable, even if it forfeits all the seller's negotiating power, including the ability to withdraw the object from sale, provided that it attracts at least one extra bidder. An immediate public auction also dominates negotiating while maintaining the right to hold an auction subsequently with more bidders. The results hold for both the standard independent private values model and a common values model. They suggest that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition.