An empirical analysis of limited recourse project

Our study extends on conventional measures of contagion by directly investigating changes in the existence and the directions of causality. In particular, we apply a Granger-causality methodology on sovereign bond spreads as a measure of perceived country risk. For the Asian crisis, we find evidence for new and changed causality patterns on a regional level. With the arrival of the Russian crisis, causality patterns were changing not only on a regional but also on a global level.Economics ;

From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization

This study surveys the academic and professional literature examining the privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with a focus on empirical studies. Privatisation has been instrumental in reducing state ownership in many countries and had a transforming effect on global stock markets, although the role of SOEs in many other countries is similar to what it was two decades ago. Countries have adopted large-scale privatisation programs primarily for two reasons: first, the conclusive evidence that privately-owned firms outperform SOEs and, second, the empirical evidence clearly shows that privatisation significantly (often dramatically) improves the operating and financial performance of divested firms. Governments can also raise significant revenues by selling SOEs. While the choice between privatisation via public share offering versus through asset sales is still imperfectly understood, factors such as firm size, government fiscal condition, and the state of national economic development are important influences. Further, those countries which have chosen the mass (voucher) privatisation route have done so largely out of necessity--and face ongoing efficiency problems as a result. Governments have great discretion in pricing the SOEs they sell, especially those being sold via public share offering, and they use this discretion to pursue political and economic ends. Finally, investors who purchase the shares of firms being privatised earn significantly positive excess returns both in the short-run (due to deliberate underpricing of share issues by the government) and over one, three, and five-year investment horizons.Capital, Investment, Employment, Financing policy, Ownership structure, Investment banking, Venture capital, Brokerage, Public economics, Sources of revenue, Public enterprises, Boundaries of public and private enterprise, Privatisation, Contracting out

Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies

French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2008, we examine the impact of employee-directors on corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders increase firm valuation and profitability, but do not significantly impact corporate payout policy. Directors elected by employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, but do not impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation on corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and perhaps value-enhancing in the case of directors elected by employee shareholders.Employee ownership ; Payout policy ; Privatization ; Corporate boards

Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies.

French law mandates that employees of large publicly listed companies be allowed to elect two types of directors to represent employees. First, partially privatized companies must reserve two or three (depending on board size) board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment. Second, employee-shareholders in any public company have the right to elect one director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. These two rights have engendered substantial employee representation on the boards of over one-quarter of the largest French companies. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2005, we examine the impact of employee-directors on corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders unambiguously increase firm valuation and profitability, but do not significantly impact corporate payout (dividends and share repurchases) policy or board organization and performance. Directors elected by employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, increase overall staff costs, and increase board size, complexity, and meeting frequency—but do not significantly impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation on corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and even value-enhancing in the case of directors elected by employee shareholders.Employee Ownership; Corporate Boards; Privatization; Payout Policy;

The Rise of Accelerated Seasoned Equity Underwritings

Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) executed through accelerated underwritings have increased global market share recently, raising over $850 billion since 1998, and now account for over half (two-thirds) of the value of U.S. (European) SEOs. We examine 31,242 global SEOs, executed during 1991-2004, which raise over$2.9 trillion for firms and selling shareholders. Compared to fully marketed deals, accelerated offerings occur more rapidly, raise more money, and require fewer underwriters. Importantly, accelerated deals reduce total issuance cost by about 250 basis points. Accelerated deals sell equal fractions of primary and secondary shares, whereas in traditional SEOs primary shares dominate. Announcement period returns are comparable for traditional and accelerated offerings, while secondary and mixed offerings trigger more negative market responses than do primary offerings. We conclude that this rapid, worldwide shift towards accelerated underwriting creates a spot market for SEOs, and represents the long-predicted shift towards an auction model for seasoned equity sales.Equity Offerings, Underwriting, Investment Banking

Size and Impact of Privatisation – A Survey of Empirical Studies

Privatisierung, Theorie, Empirische Methode, Privatization, Theory, Empirical method

Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Patterns and Performance

This study describes the newly created Monitor-FEEM Sovereign Wealth Fund Database and discusses the investment patterns and performance of 1,216 individual investments, worth over $357 billion, made by 35 sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) between January 1986 and September 2008. Approximately half of the investments we document occur after June 2005, reflecting a recent surge of SWF activity. We document large SWF investments in listed and unlisted equity, real estate, and private equity funds, with the bulk of investments being targeted in cross-border acquisitions of sizeable but non-controlling stakes in operating companies and commercial properties. The average (median) SWF investment is a$441 million ($55 million) acquisition of a 42.3$57billion on their holdings of listed stock investments alone through March 2009.Sovereign Wealth Funds, International Financial Markets, Government Policy and Regulation

主权财富基金是否受欢迎？

本文记录了西方国家政府对外国直接投资中的主权财富基金态度的变化。作者分析了主权财富基金投资和其对目标公司的影响，使受援国政府能够为主权财富基金投资制订适当的监管

Are SWFs Welcome Now?

This perspective documents the change in attitudes of Western governments to foreign direct investment from sovereign wealth funds. The authors propose an analysis of sovereign wealth fund investments and their impact on target firms in order for recipient governments to formulate the proper regulatory response to sovereign direct investment