The Interrelationships Between REIT Capital Structure and Investment

We investigate whether Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) managers actively manipulate performance measures in spite of the strict regulation under the REIT regime. We provide empirical evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, manipulation strategies may rely on the opportunistic use of leverage. However, manipulation does not appear to be uniform across REIT sectors and seems to become more common as the level of competition in the underlying property sector increases. We employ a set of commonly used traditional performance measures and a recently developed manipulation-proof measure (MPPM, Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2007)) to evaluate the performance of 147 REITs from seven different property sectors over the period 1991-2009. Our findings suggest that the existing REIT regulation may fail to mitigate a substantial agency conflict and that investors can benefit from evaluating return information carefully in order to avoid potentially manipulative funds

Debt Maturity Choices, Multi-stage Investments and Financing Constraints

We develop a dynamic investment options framework with optimal capital structure and analyze the effect of debt maturity. We find that in the absence of financing constraints short-term debt maximizes firm value. In contrast with most literature results, in the absence of constraints, higher volatility may increase initial debt for firms with low initial revenues, issuing long term debt that expires after the investment option maturity. This effect, which is due to the option value of receiving the value of assets and remaining tax savings, does not hold for short term debt and firms with high profitability, where an increase in volatility reduces the firm value. The importance of short-term debt is reduced in the presence of non-negative equity net worth or debt financing constraints and firms behave more conservatively in the use of initial debt. With non-negative equity net worth, higher volatility has adverse effects on the firm value, while with debt financing constraints higher volatility may enhance firm value for firms with relatively low revenue that have out-of-the-money investment options

Estimating the Cost of Executive Stock Options: Evidence from Switzerland

It is often argued that Black-Scholes (1973) values overstate the subjective NEWLINE value of stock options granted to risk-averse and under-diversified executives. NEWLINE We construct a “representative” Swiss executive and extend the certainty- NEWLINE equivalence approach presented by Hall and Murphy (2002) to assess NEWLINE the value-cost wedge of executive stock options. Even with low coefficients NEWLINE of relative risk aversion, the discount can be above 50% compared to the NEWLINE Black-Scholes values. Regression analysis reveals that the equilibrium level NEWLINE of executive compensation is explained by economic determinant variables NEWLINE such as firm size and growth opportunities, whereas the managers’ pay-forperformance NEWLINE sensitivity remains largely unexplained. Firms with larger NEWLINE boards of directors pay higher wages, indicating potentially unresolved NEWLINE agency conflicts. We reject the hypothesis that cross-sectional differences in NEWLINE the amount of executive pay vanish when risk-adjusted values are used as NEWLINE the dependent variable

REIT Capital Structure Choices: Preparation Matters

Sun, Titman and Twite find that capital structure risks, namely, high leverage and a high share of short-term debt, reduced the cumulative total return of U.S. REITs in the 2007–2009 financial crisis. We find that mitigating capital structure risks ahead of the crisis by reducing leverage and extending debt maturity in 2006 was associated with a significantly higher cumulative total return 2007–2009, after controlling for the levels of those variables at the start of the financial crisis. We further identify two systematic cross-sectional differences between those REITs that reduced capital structure risks prior to the financial crisis and those that did not: the exposure to capital structure risks and the strength of corporate governance. On balance, our findings are consistent with the interpretation of risk-reducing adjustments to capital structure ahead of the crisis as a component of managerial skill and discipline with significant implications for firm value during the crisis.Andrey Pavlov acknowledges financial support from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Eva Steiner acknowledges support from the Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance. Susan Wachter acknowledges financial support from the Zell Lurie Real Estate Center at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania