Perceptions of corruption and anti-corruption efforts in Bulgaria: Results of a national survey 2023

The Working Paper presents the results of a nationwide survey of 1,209 individuals in Bulgaria, conducted in February to early March 2023. The survey examined how corruption is perceived in Bulgaria by different types of respondents, and what kind of behaviour is considered acceptable. It also looked at respondents' perceptions of anti-corruption efforts and under which circumstances they would be more likely to report corruption to the authorities

Power-seeking, networking and competition: why women do not rise in parties

Why do women fail to rise in parties, especially youth parties? This analysis shows that female party members' preferences regarding the purpose of a committee, networking and the election rule in party organisations differ from male party members' which is likely a reason why women face challenges to rise in parties. This article investigates for the first time these gender based differences in preferences simultaneously by conducting a survey experiment with youth party members. Respondents ( n > 1200) were asked if they would run for a seat in a decision-making committee of their youth party. In order to analyse which youth party members opt for which opportunities, the purpose of these committees, the networking opportunities they provide, and the election rule for these committees vary at random. The results show that female members hesitate to join committees that would grant them power, and that they are less likely to opt for upward networking opportunities than their male party colleagues. This effect is particularly strong in hierarchically organised youth parties of centre-right parties. Findings on preferred election rules mostly hold for women from left-wing parties. In contrast to men, this group prefers party quotas. Analysing differences by gender and political orientation, this article shows a clear gender preference gap exists both within and across youth parties

Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?

To what extent did the European Monetary Union crisis alter the logic of European Union decision making? We analyze the relevance of asymmetric market pressures as compared to that of formal voting and agenda setting rules by applying three established bargaining models to the 'EMU Positions' data. Accounting for the interdependence between issues and agreements, we locate actors' positions on three reform dimensions, namely the level of fiscal discipline, transfer payments and institutionalization. We find that market pressure during the height of the Eurozone crisis was particularly relevant, and that debtor countries were weakened by their difficulty in refinancing their public debt. Our finding shows that formal rules determining agenda setting and veto rights remain relevant even in times of crisis

Policy or person?:What voters want from their representatives on Twitter

Social media have the potential to transform democracies as they allow for direct contact between representatives and represented. Politicians can use social media to show their policy positions but they can also give insight into their private lives. Based on survey experiments in Germany and Switzerland we show that social media messages about politicians’ private lives rather deter voters. Instead, we find that voters prefer candidates that communicate policy positions. The effect of a policy-oriented communication style on Twitter can even lead to appreciating a politician from a different party in Switzerland, which has an electoral system that gives a strong incentive to cultivate a personal vote

Roll-Call Votes in the German Bundestag: A New Dataset, 1949-2013

This letter introduces a comprehensive data collection on roll-call votes (RCVs) in the German Bundestag between 1949 and 2013. RCVs are one of the most important data sources on parliamentary behavior. Beyond producing legislative output, RCVs put the positions of Members of Parliament (MPs) and party groups on the public record, serve party leaders as an instrument with which to monitor backbench behavior, and enable opposition parties to obstruct parliamentary business (Saalfeld 1995a). RCVs from various parliaments have been used to investigate, among others, party competition and legislative coalition formation, the strategic behavior of individual MPs and legislative parties, party unity and intraparty politics, and MP responsiveness to voters and other outside interests (for example, Carey 2007; Carrubba, Gabel and Hug 2008; Eggers and Spirling 2016; Hix 2004; Hix and Noury 2016; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Empirical research can rely on comprehensive longitudinal roll-call data for a number of countries, most notably the US Congress (for example, Lewis et al. 2017; Poole and Rosenthal 1997),1 the European Parliament (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005), and the British House of Commons (for example, Eggers and Spirling 2016; Norton 1975); on some cross-country comparative datasets for shorter periods of time (Carey 2007; Coman 2015; Hix and Noury 2016; Sieberer 2006); and on numerous contemporary and historical single-country datasets.2 For the German Bundestag, RCV data has thus far only been available for limited periods of time (Ohmura 2014b; Saalfeld 1995b; Sieberer 2010; Stratmann 2006). At the same time, the Bundestag is an attractive parliament to study. It is one of the most powerful legislatures in a parliamentary democracy (Sieberer 2011); its internal organization is rather elaborate (Saalfeld 2000); and its mixed electoral system offers attractive opportunities to analyze one of the most fundamental aspects of legislative behavior: the effect of electoral rules on legislative voting (for example, Manow 2015; Sieberer 2010; Sieberer 2015). The datasets described here contain information on individual voting behavior and a wide array of variables that characterize the MPs and RCVs they voted on. The data are freely available to the academic community at Harvard Dataverse.3 In this letter, we describe the structure of the datasets, present descriptive information on key variables and discuss potential research questions to be addressed with the data

Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone

This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 2010 to 2015. Theoretically, we develop an argument about preferences and institutions as determinants of bargaining success and contrast this argument with an alternative account privileging states' power resources. Empirically, we conduct a statistical analysis of new data covering all key reform proposals. Our findings are threefold. First, contrary to a conventional narrative of German dominance, the negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Second, while power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist or close to the European Commission favored bargaining success-particularly when adoption only required the support of a qualified majority. Third, these descriptive and explanatory results reflect dynamics of compromise and reciprocity

Bargaining in Legislatures, Portfolio Allocation, and the Electoral Costs of Governing

What motivates political parties in the legislative arena? Existing legislative bargaining models stress parties’ office and policy motivations. A particularly important question concerns how parties in coalition government agree the distribution of cabinet seats. We add to this portfolio allocation literature by suggesting that future electoral considerations affect bargaining over the allocation of cabinet seats in multi-party cabinets. Some parties are penalized by voters for participating in government, increase the attractiveness of staying in opposition. This “cost of governing” shifts their seat reservation price– the minimum cabinet seats demanded in return for joining the coalition. Results of a randomized survey experiment of Irish legislators support our expectation, demonstrating that political elites are sensitive to future electoral losses when contemplating the distribution of cabinet seats. This research advances our understanding of how parties’ behavior between elections is influenced by anticipation of voters’ reaction

SDSS-III: Massive Spectroscopic Surveys of the Distant Universe, the Milky Way Galaxy, and Extra-Solar Planetary Systems

Building on the legacy of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS-I and II), SDSS-III is a program of four spectroscopic surveys on three scientific themes: dark energy and cosmological parameters, the history and structure of the Milky Way, and the population of giant planets around other stars. In keeping with SDSS tradition, SDSS-III will provide regular public releases of all its data, beginning with SDSS DR8 (which occurred in Jan 2011). This paper presents an overview of the four SDSS-III surveys. BOSS will measure redshifts of 1.5 million massive galaxies and Lya forest spectra of 150,000 quasars, using the BAO feature of large scale structure to obtain percent-level determinations of the distance scale and Hubble expansion rate at z<0.7 and at z~2.5. SEGUE-2, which is now completed, measured medium-resolution (R=1800) optical spectra of 118,000 stars in a variety of target categories, probing chemical evolution, stellar kinematics and substructure, and the mass profile of the dark matter halo from the solar neighborhood to distances of 100 kpc. APOGEE will obtain high-resolution (R~30,000), high signal-to-noise (S/N>100 per resolution element), H-band (1.51-1.70 micron) spectra of 10^5 evolved, late-type stars, measuring separate abundances for ~15 elements per star and creating the first high-precision spectroscopic survey of all Galactic stellar populations (bulge, bar, disks, halo) with a uniform set of stellar tracers and spectral diagnostics. MARVELS will monitor radial velocities of more than 8000 FGK stars with the sensitivity and cadence (10-40 m/s, ~24 visits per star) needed to detect giant planets with periods up to two years, providing an unprecedented data set for understanding the formation and dynamical evolution of giant planet systems. (Abridged)Comment: Revised to version published in The Astronomical Journa

"The European Commission's power: Overrated or Justified?"

For decades the bureaucratic and legislative power of the European Commission has interested scholars of EU studies. Yet, relatively little data are known about the exact division of power of the European Commission in legislative affairs apart from case studies (Cini, 2000; Schmidt, 2000). This paper presents analyses of qualitative and quantitative data to analyse how powerful some experts consider the Commission to be and to see how influential it actually is. Based on recently collected expert interviews I show that senior EU officials rate the Commission highly against other EU institutions and the member states. I contrast these results with the actual influence of the Commission on the legislative process. Using the data set "Decision Making in the European Union" (Thomson, Stokman, König, & Achen, 2005), which contains data on positions of EU member states and institutions in 60 legislative acts, I show the direct influence which the Commission exerts with its agenda setting and bureaucratic power. Multivariate analyses of 150 negotiation issues between the member states, the European Parliament and the European Commission demonstrate that the influence of the European Commission is overrated because it cannot defend its original proposal as much as intended. The more the Commission takes EU members positions into account, the more success it has in the EU negotiations. Thus, it functions rather as agent dependent on member states than as supranational entrepreneur