The origins of risk sharing: An experimental approach

Controversy exists about the act of giving as altruistic instead of self-interested behavior. Each side of this argument interprets similar results from similar experiments in diff erent ways. One side argues the results show that the appearance of altruistic behavior can be explained by self-interested motives. The other side argues these results are evidence of group selection,where a group member takes an action that is harmful to itself but benefi cial to the group. We consider this question using a novel approach. We create a rich experimental environment in which subjects have the ability to cooperate to improve the group's outcome by sharing their wealth in non-compulsory, non-enforceable risk-sharing arrangements. We find that average subject behavior appears to be motivated by self-interest more than group survival

Random mobility and spatial structure often enhance cooperation

The effects of an unconditional move rule in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift and Stag Hunt games are studied. Spatial structure by itself is known to modify the outcome of many games when compared with a randomly mixed population, sometimes promoting, sometimes inhibiting cooperation. Here we show that random dilution and mobility may suppress the inhibiting factors of the spatial structure in the Snowdrift game, while enhancing the already larger cooperation found in the Prisoner's dilemma and Stag Hunt games.Comment: Submitted to J. Theor. Bio

Dynamics of growth factor production in monolayers of cancer cells and evolution of resistance to anticancer therapies

Tumor heterogeneity is well documented for many characters, including the production of growth factors, which improve tumor proliferation and promote resistance against apoptosis and against immune reaction. What maintains heterogeneity remains an open question that has implications for diagnosis and treatment. While it has been suggested that therapies targeting growth factors are robust against evolved resistance, current therapies against growth factors, like antiangiogenic drugs, are not effective in the long term, as resistant mutants can evolve and lead to relapse. We use evolutionary game theory to study the dynamics of the production of growth factors by monolayers of cancer cells and to understand the effect of therapies that target growth factors. The dynamics depend on the production cost of the growth factor, on its diffusion range and on the type of benefit it confers to the cells. Stable heterogeneity is a typical outcome of the dynamics, while a pure equilibrium of nonproducer cells is possible under certain conditions. Such pure equilibrium can be the goal of new anticancer therapies. We show that current therapies, instead, can be effective only if growth factors are almost completely eliminated and if the reduction is almost immediate

Monotonicity of Fitness Landscapes and Mutation Rate Control

A common view in evolutionary biology is that mutation rates are minimised. However, studies in combinatorial optimisation and search have shown a clear advantage of using variable mutation rates as a control parameter to optimise the performance of evolutionary algorithms. Much biological theory in this area is based on Ronald Fisher's work, who used Euclidean geometry to study the relation between mutation size and expected fitness of the offspring in infinite phenotypic spaces. Here we reconsider this theory based on the alternative geometry of discrete and finite spaces of DNA sequences. First, we consider the geometric case of fitness being isomorphic to distance from an optimum, and show how problems of optimal mutation rate control can be solved exactly or approximately depending on additional constraints of the problem. Then we consider the general case of fitness communicating only partial information about the distance. We define weak monotonicity of fitness landscapes and prove that this property holds in all landscapes that are continuous and open at the optimum. This theoretical result motivates our hypothesis that optimal mutation rate functions in such landscapes will increase when fitness decreases in some neighbourhood of an optimum, resembling the control functions derived in the geometric case. We test this hypothesis experimentally by analysing approximately optimal mutation rate control functions in 115 complete landscapes of binding scores between DNA sequences and transcription factors. Our findings support the hypothesis and find that the increase of mutation rate is more rapid in landscapes that are less monotonic (more rugged). We discuss the relevance of these findings to living organisms

Evolution of Cooperation among Mobile Agents

We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius $R$. Adopting the prisoner's dilemma game and the snowdrift game as metaphors, we find that cooperation can be maintained and even enhanced for low velocities and small payoff parameters, when compared with the case that all agents do not move. But such enhancement of cooperation is largely determined by the value of $R$, and for modest values of $R$, there is an optimal value of velocity to induce the maximum cooperation level. Besides, we find that intermediate values of $R$ or initial population densities are most favorable for cooperation, when the velocity is fixed. Depending on the payoff parameters, the system can reach an absorbing state of cooperation when the snowdrift game is played. Our findings may help understanding the relations between individual mobility and cooperative behavior in social systems.Comment: 15 pages, 5 figure

Drivers of Cape Verde archipelagic endemism in keyhole limpets

Oceanic archipelagos are the ideal setting for investigating processes that shape species assemblages. Focusing on keyhole limpets, genera Fissurella and Diodora from Cape Verde Islands, we used an integrative approach combining molecular phylogenetics with ocean transport simulations to infer species distribution patterns and analyse connectivity. Dispersal simulations, using pelagic larval duration and ocean currents as proxies, showed a reduced level of connectivity despite short distances between some of the islands. It is suggested that dispersal and persistence driven by patterns of oceanic circulation favouring self-recruitment played a primary role in explaining contemporary species distributions. Mitochondrial and nuclear data revealed the existence of eight Cape Verde endemic lineages, seven within Fissurella, distributed across the archipelago, and one within Diodora restricted to Boavista. The estimated origins for endemic Fissurella and Diodora were 10.2 and 6.7 MY, respectively. Between 9.5 and 4.5 MY, an intense period of volcanism in Boavista might have affected Diodora, preventing its diversification. Having originated earlier, Fissurella might have had more opportunities to disperse to other islands and speciate before those events. Bayesian analyses showed increased diversification rates in Fissurella possibly promoted by low sea levels during Plio-Pleistocene, which further explain differences in species richness between both genera.FCT - Portuguese Science Foundation [SFRH/BPD/109685/2015, SFRH/BPD/111003/2015]; Norte Portugal Regional Operational Program (NORTE), under the PORTUGAL Partnership Agreement, through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) [MARINFO - NORTE-01-0145-FEDER-000031]info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Evolutionary games on graphs

Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure

Cooperation among cancer cells: applying game theory to cancer

Cell cooperation promotes many of the hallmarks of cancer via the secretion of diffusible factors that can affect cancer cells or stromal cells in the tumour microenvironment. This cooperation cannot be explained simply as the collective action of cells for the benefit of the tumour because non-cooperative subclones can constantly invade and free-ride on the diffusible factors produced by the cooperative cells. A full understanding of cooperation among the cells of a tumour requires methods and concepts from evolutionary game theory, which has been used successfully in other areas of biology to understand similar problems but has been underutilized in cancer research. Game theory can provide insights into the stability of cooperation among cells in a tumour and into the design of potentially evolution-proof therapies that disrupt this cooperation

Cooperation among cancer cells as public goods games on Voronoi networks

Cancer cells produce growth factors that diffuse and sustain tumor proliferation, a form of cooperation among cancer cells that can be studied using mathematical models of public goods in the framework of evolutionary game theory. Cell populations, however, form heterogeneous networks that cannot be described by regular lattices or scale-free networks, the types of graphs generally used in the study of cooperation. To describe the dynamics of growth factor production in populations of cancer cells, I study public goods games on Voronoi networks, using a range of non-linear benefits that account for the known properties of growth factors, and different types of diffusion gradients. e results are surprisingly similar to those obtained on regular graphs and different from results on scale-free networks, revealing that network heterogeneity per se does not promote cooperation when public goods diffuse beyond one-step neighbours. e exact shape of the diffusion gradient is not crucial, however, whereas the type of non-linear benefit is an essential determinant of the dynamics. Public goods games on Voronoi networks can shed light on intra-tumor heterogeneity, the evolution of resistance to therapies that target growth factors, and new types of cell therapy

First steps in experimental cancer evolution

Evolutionary processes play a central role in the development, progression and response to treatment of cancers. The current challenge facing researchers is to harness evolutionary theory to further our understanding of the clinical progression of cancers. Central to this endeavour will be the development of experimental systems and approaches by which theories of cancer evolution can be effectively tested. We argue here that the experimental evolution approach – whereby evolution is observed in real time and which has typically employed microorganisms – can be usefully applied to cancer. This approach allows us to disentangle the ecological causes of natural selection, identify the genetic basis of evolutionary changes and determine their repeatability. Cell cultures used in cancer research share many of the desirable traits that make microorganisms ideal for studying evolution. As such, experimental cancer evolution is feasible and likely to give great insight into the selective pressures driving the evolution of clinically destructive cancer traits. We highlight three areas of evolutionary theory with importance to cancer biology that are amenable to experimental evolution: drug resistance, social evolution and resource competition. Understanding the diversity, persistence and evolution of cancers is vital for treatment and drug development, and an experimental evolution approach could provide strategic directions and focus for future research