Autoregressive Time Series Forecasting of Computational Demand

We study the predictive power of autoregressive moving average models when forecasting demand in two shared computational networks, PlanetLab and Tycoon. Demand in these networks is very volatile, and predictive techniques to plan usage in advance can improve the performance obtained drastically. Our key finding is that a random walk predictor performs best for one-step-ahead forecasts, whereas ARIMA(1,1,0) and adaptive exponential smoothing models perform better for two and three-step-ahead forecasts. A Monte Carlo bootstrap test is proposed to evaluate the continuous prediction performance of different models with arbitrary confidence and statistical significance levels. Although the prediction results differ between the Tycoon and PlanetLab networks, we observe very similar overall statistical properties, such as volatility dynamics

Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium

game theory

Negative externalities and evolutionary implementation

game theory;externalities

Potential games with continuous player sets

game theory

Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation

pricing;game theory

Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

We show that any evolutionary dynamic that satisfies three mild requirements— continuity, positive correlation, and innovation—does not eliminate strictly dominated strategies in all games. Likewise, we demonstrate that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics

Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core

Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents to abide to a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game theory. However, the computational questions around this constraint have received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly explicit. In this paper we define a concise general representation for games in characteristic form that relies on superadditivity, and show that it allows for efficient checking of whether a given outcome is in the core. We then show that determining whether the core is nonempty is $\mathcal{NP}$-complete both with and without transferable utility. We demonstrate that what makes the problem hard in both cases is determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of outcomes possible for the grand coalition), by showing that if these are given, the problem becomes tractable in both cases. However, we then demonstrate that for a hybrid version of the problem, where utility transfer is possible only within the grand coalition, the problem remains $\mathcal{NP}$-complete even when the collaborative possibilities are given

Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing

game theory;pricing

Notes on Cloud computing principles

This letter provides a review of fundamental distributed systems and economic Cloud computing principles. These principles are frequently deployed in their respective fields, but their inter-dependencies are often neglected. Given that Cloud Computing first and foremost is a new business model, a new model to sell computational resources, the understanding of these concepts is facilitated by treating them in unison. Here, we review some of the most important concepts and how they relate to each other