Allocating Limited Resources to Protect a Massive Number of Targets using a Game Theoretic Model

Resource allocation is the process of optimizing the rare resources. In the area of security, how to allocate limited resources to protect a massive number of targets is especially challenging. This paper addresses this resource allocation issue by constructing a game theoretic model. A defender and an attacker are players and the interaction is formulated as a trade-off between protecting targets and consuming resources. The action cost which is a necessary role of consuming resource, is considered in the proposed model. Additionally, a bounded rational behavior model (Quantal Response, QR), which simulates a human attacker of the adversarial nature, is introduced to improve the proposed model. To validate the proposed model, we compare the different utility functions and resource allocation strategies. The comparison results suggest that the proposed resource allocation strategy performs better than others in the perspective of utility and resource effectiveness.Comment: 14 pages, 12 figures, 41 reference

Game Theory Models for Multi-Robot Patrolling of Infraestructures

Abstract This work is focused on the problem of performing multi‐robot patrolling for infrastructure security applications in order to protect a known environment at critical facilities. Thus, given a set of robots and a set of points of interest, the patrolling task consists of constantly visiting these points at irregular time intervals for security purposes. Current existing solutions for these types of applications are predictable and inflexible. Moreover, most of the previous centralized and deterministic solutions and only few efforts have been made to integrate dynamic methods. Therefore, the development of new dynamic and decentralized collaborative approaches in order to solve the aforementioned problem by implementing learning models from Game Theory. The model selected in this work that includes belief‐based and reinforcement models as special cases is called Experience‐Weighted Attraction. The problem has been defined using concepts of Graph Theory to represent the environment in order to work with such Game Theory techniques. Finally, the proposed methods have been evaluated experimentally by using a patrolling simulator. The results obtained have been compared with previous availabl

Developing an online cooperative police patrol routing strategy

A cooperative routing strategy for daily operations is necessary to maintain the effects of hotspot policing and to reduce crime and disorder. Existing robot patrol routing strategies are not suitable, as they omit the peculiarities and challenges of daily police patrol including minimising the average time lag between two consecutive visits to hotspots, as well as coordinating multiple patrollers and imparting unpredictability to patrol routes. In this research, we propose a set of guidelines for patrol routing strategies to meet the challenges of police patrol. Following these guidelines, we develop an innovative heuristic-based and Bayesian-inspired real-time strategy for cooperative routing police patrols. Using two real-world cases and a benchmark patrol strategy, an online agent-based simulation has been implemented to testify the efficiency, flexibility, scalability, unpredictability, and robustness of the proposed strategy and the usability of the proposed guidelines

Embodied Evolution in Collective Robotics: A Review

This paper provides an overview of evolutionary robotics techniques applied to on-line distributed evolution for robot collectives -- namely, embodied evolution. It provides a definition of embodied evolution as well as a thorough description of the underlying concepts and mechanisms. The paper also presents a comprehensive summary of research published in the field since its inception (1999-2017), providing various perspectives to identify the major trends. In particular, we identify a shift from considering embodied evolution as a parallel search method within small robot collectives (fewer than 10 robots) to embodied evolution as an on-line distributed learning method for designing collective behaviours in swarm-like collectives. The paper concludes with a discussion of applications and open questions, providing a milestone for past and an inspiration for future research.Comment: 23 pages, 1 figure, 1 tabl

Analysis of Key Installation Protection using Computerized Red Teaming

This paper describes the use of genetic algorithms (GAs) for computerized red teaming applications, to explore options for military plans in specific scenarios. A tool called Optimized Red Teaming (ORT) is developed and we illustrate how it may be utilized to assist the red teaming process in security organizations, such as military forces. The developed technique incorporates a genetic algorithm in conjunction with an agent-based simulation system (ABS) called MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform Automata). Both enemy forces (the red team) and friendly forces (the blue team) are modelled as intelligent agents in a multi-agent system and many computer simulations of a scenario are run, pitting the red team plan against the blue team plan. The paper contains two major sections. First, we present a description of the ORT tool, including its various components. Second, experimental results obtained using ORT on a specific military scenario known as Key Installation Protection, developed at DSO National Laboratories in Singapore, are presented. The aim of these experiments is to explore the red tactics to penetrate a fixed blue patrolling strategy

Patrolling security games: Definition and algorithms for solving largeinstances with single patroller and single intruder

Security games are gaining significant interest in artificial intelligence. They are characterized by two players (a defender and an attacker) and by a set of targets the defender tries to protect from the attacker\u2bcs intrusions by committing to a strategy. To reach their goals, players use resources such as patrollers and intruders. Security games are Stackelberg games where the appropriate solution concept is the leader\u2013follower equilibrium. Current algorithms for solving these games are applicable when the underlying game is in normal form (i.e., each player has a single decision node). In this paper, we define and study security games with an extensive-form infinite-horizon underlying game, where decision nodes are potentially infinite. We introduce a novel scenario where the attacker can undertake actions during the execution of the defender\u2bcs strategy. We call this new game class patrolling security games (PSGs), since its most prominent application is patrolling environments against intruders. We show that PSGs cannot be reduced to security games studied so far and we highlight their generality in tackling adversarial patrolling on arbitrary graphs. We then design algorithms to solve large instances with single patroller and single intruder

Semi-Informed Multi-Agent Patrol Strategies

The adversarial multi-agent patrol problem is an active research topic with many real-world applications such as physical robots guarding an area and software agents protecting a computer network. In it, agents patrol a graph looking for so-called critical vertices that are subject to attack by adversaries. The agents are unaware of which vertices are subject to attack by adversaries and when they encounter such a vertex they attempt to protect it from being compromised (an adversary must occupy the vertex it targets a certain amount of time for the attack to succeed). Even though the terms adversary and attack are used, the problem domain extends to patrolling a graph for other interesting noncompetitive contexts such as search and rescue. The problem statement adopted in this work is formulated such that agents obtain knowledge of local graph topology and critical vertices over the course of their travels via an API ; there is no global knowledge of the graph or communication between agents. The challenge is to balance exploration, necessary to discover critical vertices, with exploitation, necessary to protect critical vertices from attack. Four types of adversaries were used for experiments, three from previous research – waiting, random, and statistical - and the fourth, a hybrid of those three. Agent strategies for countering each of these adversaries are designed and evaluated. Benchmark graphs and parameter settings from related research will be employed. The proposed research culminates in the design and evaluation of agents to counter these various types of adversaries under a range of conditions. The results of this work are agent strategies in which each agent becomes solely responsible for protecting those critical vertices it discovers. The agents use emergent behavior to minimize successful attacks and maximize the discovery of new critical vertices. A set of seven edge choosing primitives (ECPs) are defined that are combined in different ways to yield a range of agent strategies using the chain of responsibility OOP design pattern. Every permutation of them were tested and measured in order to identify those strategies that perform well. One strategy performed particularly well against all adversaries, graph topology, and other experimental variables. This particular strategy combines ECPs of: A hard-deadline return to covered vertices to counter the random adversary, efficiently checking vertices to see if they are being attacked by the waiting adversary, and random movement to impede the statistical adversary