Sumanenylferrocenes and their solid state self-assembly

The first ferrocene-fused organometallic compounds derived from the buckybowl sumanene (C21H12) are presented. Both compounds, sumanenylferrocene and 1,1′-disumanenylferrocene, have been synthesized by Negishi-type cross- coupling of iodosumanene and were studied crystallographically. Sumanenylferrocenes form unique packing motifs, which are both different from those of their corannulene congeners and sumanene itself

Front in the mouth, front in the word: The driving mechanisms of the in-out effect

Words for which the consonantal articulation spots wander from the front to the back of the mouth (inward) elicit more positive attitudes than words with the reversed order (outward). The present article questions the common theoretical explanation of this effect, namely an association between articulation movements and oral movements during ingestion and expectoration (inward resembles eating which is positive; outward resembles spitting which is negative). In 4 experiments (total N = 468), we consistently replicated the basic in-out effect; but no evidence was found supporting an eating-related underlying mechanism. The in-out effect was not modulated by disgust inductions (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 10) or food deprivation (Experiment 3). In 6 further experiments (total N = 1,067), we explored a novel alternative explanation, namely that the in-out effect is simply a position-specific preference for front consonants over back consonants. In these experiments, we found in-out-like preference effects for fragments that lacked an actual front-to-back movement but featured only starting (e.g., B _ _ _ _) or ending (e.g., _ _ _ K) consonants (Experiments 6-8). Consonants that are articulated in the front of the mouth were generally preferred over those articulated in the back of the mouth, and this basic preference was stronger at the beginning of a word-like stimulus (Experiments 6-10), thus explaining the preference pattern of the in-out effect. The present evidence speaks against an eating-related (embodied) explanation and suggests a simple word-morphologic explanation of the in-out effect

The intersection between Descriptivism and Meliorism in reasoning research: further proposals in support of 'soft normativism'

The rationality paradox centres on the observation that people are highly intelligent, yet show evidence of errors and biases in their thinking when measured against normative standards. Elqayam and Evans (e.g., 2011) reject normative standards in the psychological study of thinking, reasoning and deciding in favour of a ‘value-free’ descriptive approach to studying high-level cognition. In reviewing Elqayam and Evans’ position, we defend an alternative to descriptivism in the form of ‘soft normativism’, which allows for normative evaluations alongside the pursuit of descriptive research goals. We propose that normative theories have considerable value provided that researchers: (1) are alert to the philosophical quagmire of strong relativism; (2) are mindful of the biases that can arise from utilising normative benchmarks; and (3) engage in a focused analysis of the processing approach adopted by individual reasoners. We address the controversial ‘is–ought’ inference in this context and appeal to a ‘bridging solution’ to this contested inference that is based on the concept of ‘informal reflective equilibrium’. Furthermore, we draw on Elqayam and Evans’ recognition of a role for normative benchmarks in research programmes that are devised to enhance reasoning performance and we argue that such Meliorist research programmes have a valuable reciprocal relationship with descriptivist accounts of reasoning. In sum, we believe that descriptions of reasoning processes are fundamentally enriched by evaluations of reasoning quality, and argue that if such standards are discarded altogether then our explanations and descriptions of reasoning processes are severely undermined

The Epistemic Status of Processing Fluency as Source for Judgments of Truth

This article combines findings from cognitive psychology on the role of processing fluency in truth judgments with epistemological theory on justification of belief. We first review evidence that repeated exposure to a statement increases the subjective ease with which that statement is processed. This increased processing fluency, in turn, increases the probability that the statement is judged to be true. The basic question discussed here is whether the use of processing fluency as a cue to truth is epistemically justified. In the present analysis, based on Bayes’ Theorem, we adopt the reliable-process account of justification presented by Goldman (1986) and show that fluency is a reliable cue to truth, under the assumption that the majority of statements one has been exposed to are true. In the final section, we broaden the scope of this analysis and discuss how processing fluency as a potentially universal cue to judged truth may contribute to cultural differences in commonsense beliefs

Paving the Way to Eureka-Introducing "Dira" as an Experimental Paradigm to Observe the Process of Creative Problem Solving

“Dira” is a novel experimental paradigm to record combinations of behavioral and metacognitive measures for the creative process. This task allows assessing chronological and chronometric aspects of the creative process directly and without a detour through creative products or proxy phenomena. In a study with 124 participants we show that (a) people spend more time attending to selected vs. rejected potential solutions, (b) there is a clear connection between behavioral patterns and self-reported measures, (c) the reported intensity of Eureka experiences is a function of interaction time with potential solutions, and (d) experiences of emerging solutions can happen immediately after engaging with a problem, before participants explore all potential solutions. The conducted study exemplifies how “Dira” can be used as an instrument to narrow down the moment when solutions emerge. We conclude that the “Dira” experiment is paving the way to study the process, as opposed to the product, of creative problem solving

Emotional facial activation induced by unconsciously perceived dynamic facial expressions

Do facial expressions of emotion influence us when not consciously perceived? Methods to investigate this question have typically relied on brief presentation of static images. In contrast, real facial expressions are dynamic and unfold over several seconds. Recent studies demonstrate that gaze contingent crowding (GCC) can block awareness of dynamic expressions while still inducing behavioural priming effects. The current experiment tested for the first time whether dynamic facial expressions presented using this method can induce unconscious facial activation. Videos of dynamic happy and angry expressions were presented outside participants' conscious awareness while EMG measurements captured activation of the zygomaticus major (active when smiling) and the corrugator supercilii (active when frowning). Forced-choice classification of expressions confirmed they were not consciously perceived, while EMG revealed significant differential activation of facial muscles consistent with the expressions presented. This successful demonstration opens new avenues for research examining the unconscious emotional influences of facial expressions

Relativity in social cognition: basic processes and novel applications of social comparisons

A key challenge for social psychology is to identify unifying principles that account for the complex dynamics of social behaviour. We propose psychological relativity and its core mechanism of comparison as one such unifying principle. Social cognition is relative in that it is shaped by comparative thinking. If comparative thinking is indeed a central mechanism in social psychology, then it should be affected by, and affect itself, a wide variety of phenomena. To support our proposal, we review recent evidence investigating basic processes underlying and novel applications of social comparisons. Specifically, we clarify determinants of assimilation and contrast, evaluative consequences of comparing similarities vs. differences, attitudinal effects of spatial relativity, and how spatial arrangements determine perceived similarity, one of the antecedents of social comparisons. We then move to behavioural relativity effects on motivation and self-regulation, as well as imitation behaviour. Finally, we address relativity within the more applied areas of morality and political psychology. The reviewed research thereby illustrates how unifying principles of social cognition may be instrumental in answering old questions and discovering new phenomena and explanations