Climate justice and the international regime: before, during and after Paris

With a focus on key themes and debates, this article aims to illustrate and assess how the interaction between justice and politics has shaped the international regime and defined the nature of the international agreement that was signed in COP21 Paris. The work demonstrates that despite the rise of neo-conservatism and self-interested power politics, questions of global distributive justice remain a central aspect of the international politics of climate change. However, while it is relatively easy to demonstrate that international climate politics is not beyond the reach of moral contestations, the assessment of exactly how much impact justice has on climate policies and the broader normative structures of the climate governance regime remains a very difficult task. As the world digests the Paris Agreement, it is vital that the current state of justice issues within the international climate change regime is comprehensively understood by scholars of climate justice and by academics and practitioners, not least because how these intractable issues of justice are dealt with (or not) will be a crucial factor in determining the effectiveness of the emerging climate regime

Sectoral and regional expansion of emissions trading

We consider an international emissions trading scheme with partial sectoral and regional coverage. Sectoral and regional expansion of the trading scheme is beneficial in aggregate, but not necessarily for individual countries. We simulate international CO2 emission quota markets using marginal abatement cost functions and the Copenhagen 2020 climate policy targets for selected countries that strategically allocate emissions in a bid to manipulate the quota price. Quota exporters and importers generally have conflicting interests about admitting more countries to the trading coalition, and our results indicate that some countries may lose substantially when the coalition expands in terms of new countries. For a given coalition, expanding sectoral coverage makes most countries better off, but some countries (notably the USA and Russia) may lose out due to loss of strategic advantages. In general, exporters tend to have stronger strategic power than importers

Global congruence of carbon storage and biodiversity in terrestrial ecosystems

Deforestation is a main driver of climate change and biodiversity loss. An incentive mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is being negotiated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Here we use the best available global data sets on terrestrial biodiversity and carbon storage to map and investigate potential synergies between carbon and biodiversity-oriented conservation. A strong association (rS= 0.82) between carbon stocks and species richness suggests that such synergies would be high, but unevenly distributed. Many areas of high value for biodiversity could be protected by carbon-based conservation, while others could benefit from complementary funding arising from their carbon content. Some high-biodiversity regions, however, would not benefit from carbon-focused conservation, and could become under increased pressure if REDD is implemented. Our results suggest that additional gains for biodiversity conservation are possible, without compromising the effectiveness for climate change mitigation, if REDD takes biodiversity distribution into account

Consumption-based carbon accounting: does it have a future?

Internationally, allocation of responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions is currently based on the production-based (PB) accounting method, which measures emissions generated in the place where goods and services are produced. However, the growth of emissions embodied in trade has raised the question whether we should switch to, or amalgamate PB accounting, with other accounting approaches. Consumption-based (CB) accounting has so far emerged as the most prominent alternative. This approach accounts for emissions at the point of consumption, attributing all the emissions that occurred in the course of production and distribution to the final consumers of goods and services. This review has a fourfold objective. First, it provides an account of the logic behind attributing responsibility for emissions on the basis of consumption instead of production. Issues of equity and justice, increased emissions coverage, encouragement of cleaner production practices, and political benefits are considered. Second, it discusses the counterarguments, focusing in particular on issues of technical complexity, mitigation effectiveness, and political acceptability. Third, it presents the spectrum of implementation possibilities—ranging from the status quo to more transformative options—and considers the implications for international climate policy that would accrue under various scenarios of adopting CB accounting in practice. Fourth, it looks at how CB accounting may be adjusted to fit with current political realities and it identifies policy mechanisms that could potentially be utilized to directly or indirectly address CB emissions. Such an approach could unlock new opportunities for climate policy innovation and for climate mitigation

Chinese energy and climate policies after Durban: save the Kyoto Protocol

Nowadays, one of the urgent issues regarding global climate change is to discuss the future of the second period of the Kyoto Protocol. However, the divergence of views and opinions among parties in the last Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Durban in December 2011, is still large. One of the bones of contention is whether the emerging developing countries, like China, should make commitments and legally bind themselves to a Green House Gas (GHG) reduction target in near future. As the largest GHG emitting country, China and its energy and climate policies will play an important role in global climate change and will also significantly influence the other countries? policies and the global climate negotiation. In this paper, we review the current differences among parties in the Durban Conference, and we analyze the recent situation, barriers, and future policies in China. Finally we highlight the impact and potential effect of Clean Development Mechanisms in avoiding China?s barriers regarding climate change. Results show that China is making a great effort to mitigate climate change by establishing and reforming its energy and climate policies in order to achieve a low-carbon development. At the same time, more innovation and international collaboration is needed in China to achieve this goal

Trapped in the prison of the mind: notions of climate-induced (im)mobility decision-making and wellbeing from an urban informal settlement in Bangladesh

The concept of Trapped Populations has until date mainly referred to people ‘trapped’ in environmentally high-risk rural areas due to economic constraints. This article attempts to widen our understanding of the concept by investigating climate-induced socio-psychological immobility and its link to Internally Displaced People’s (IDPs) wellbeing in a slum of Dhaka. People migrated here due to environmental changes back on Bhola Island and named the settlement Bhola Slum after their home. In this way, many found themselves ‘immobile’ after having been mobile—unable to move back home, and unable to move to other parts of Dhaka, Bangladesh, or beyond. The analysis incorporates the emotional and psychosocial aspects of the diverse immobility states. Mind and emotion are vital to better understand people’s (im)mobility decision-making and wellbeing status. The study applies an innovative and interdisciplinary methodological approach combining Q-methodology and discourse analysis (DA). This mixed-method illustrates a replicable approach to capture the complex state of climate-induced (im)mobility and its interlinkages to people’s wellbeing. People reported facing non-economic losses due to the move, such as identity, honour, sense of belonging and mental health. These psychosocial processes helped explain why some people ended up ‘trapped’ or immobile. The psychosocial constraints paralysed them mentally, as well as geographically. More empirical evidence on how climate change influences people’s wellbeing and mental health will be important to provide us with insights in how to best support vulnerable people having faced climatic impacts, and build more sustainable climate policy frameworks

The Political Dimension of Vulnerability: Implications for the Green Climate Fund

As the availability of adaptation finance for developing countries increases, so does the need for a transparent way of prioritising countries for the allocation of money. It is intuitive that some countries are more vulnerable to climate change than others, and that countries that are particularly vulnerable should be given priority for adaptation finance. However, research has shown that science cannot be relied upon for a single objective ranking of vulnerability. This article analyses how the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) and the Adaptation Fund currently make decisions on adaptation finance allocations. It finds that each of the funds uses vulnerability to prioritise among countries, but the criteria applied vary and other criteria also play a role. Thus, vulnerability is politically, as well as scientifically, ambiguous. The Cancun Agreements have not resolved this, leaving a challenge for the Green Climate Fund

Are we willing to give what it takes? Willingness to pay for climate change adaptation in developing countries

Climate change adaptation is gaining traction as a necessary policy alongside mitigation, particularly for developing countries, many of which lack the resources to adapt. However, funding for developing country adaptation remains woefully inadequate. This paper identifies the burden of responsibility that individuals in the UK are willing to incur in support of adaptation projects in developing countries. Results from a nationally representative survey indicate that UK residents are willing to contribute £27 per year (or a median of £6 per year) towards developing country adaptation (US$30 and$7 using the World Bank’s purchasing power conversion factors). This represents less than one third of the back-of-the-envelope $100-140 per capita per year that the authors estimate would be needed to raise the$70-100bn per year recommended by the World Bank to fund developing country adaptation. Regressions indicate that WTP is driven mostly by a combination of beliefs and perceptions about one’s own knowledge levels, rather than actual knowledge of climate change. We conclude that, to engage the many different audiences that make up the ‘public’, communication efforts must move beyond the simple provision of information and instead, connect with people’s existing values and beliefs

Environmental screening tools for assessment of infrastructure plans based on biodiversity preservation and global warming (PEIT, Spain).

Most Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) research has been concerned with SEA as a procedure, and there have been relatively few developments and tests of analytical methodologies. The first stage of the SEA is the ‘screening’, which is the process whereby a decision is taken on whether or not SEA is required for a particular programme or plan. The effectiveness of screening and SEA procedures will depend on how well the assessment fits into the planning from the early stages of the decision-making process. However, it is difficult to prepare the environmental screening for an infrastructure plan involving a whole country. To be useful, such methodologies must be fast and simple. We have developed two screening tools which would make it possible to estimate promptly the overall impact an infrastructure plan might have on biodiversity and global warming for a whole country, in order to generate planning alternatives, and to determine whether or not SEA is required for a particular infrastructure plan

[Letter] Zero emission targets as long-term global goals for climate protection

Recently, assessments have robustly linked stabilization of global-mean temperature rise to the necessity of limiting the total amount of emitted carbon-dioxide (CO2). Halting global warming thus requires virtually zero annual CO2 emissions at some point. Policymakers have now incorporated this concept in the negotiating text for a new global climate agreement, but confusion remains about concepts like carbon neutrality, climate neutrality, full decarbonization, and net zero carbon or net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Here we clarify these concepts, discuss their appropriateness to serve as a long-term global benchmark for achieving temperature targets, and provide a detailed quantification. We find that with current pledges and for a likely (>66%) chance of staying below 2 °C, the scenario literature suggests net zero CO2 emissions between 2060 and 2070, with net negative CO2 emissions thereafter. Because of residual non-CO2 emissions, net zero is always reached later for total GHG emissions than for CO2. Net zero emissions targets are a useful focal point for policy, linking a global temperature target and socio-economic pathways to a necessary long-term limit on cumulative CO2 emissions