Newton's Scholium on Time, Space, Place and Motion

In the Scholium to the Definitions at the beginning of the {\em Principia\/} Newton distinguishes absolute time, space, place and motion from their relative counterparts and attempts to justify they are indeed ontologically distinct in that the absolute quantity cannot be reduced to some particular category of the relative, as Descartes had attempted by defining absolute motion to be relative motion with respect to immediately ambient bodies. Newton's bucket experiment, rather than attempting to show that absolute motion exists, is one of five arguments from the properties, causes and effects of motion that attempts to show that no such program can succeed, and thus that true motion can be adequately analyzed only by invoking immovable places, i.e., the parts of absolute space

On Some Recent Attempted Non-Metaphysical Dissolutions of the Hole Dilemma

The hole argument of Earman and Norton (1987) is designed to establish a dilemma: either give up the possibility of determinism in a wide class of spacetime theories, which they believe substantivalists must do, or else embrace a principal called `Leibniz equivalence' that identifies isomorphic models as representing one and the same physical situation, a principle certainly necessary for relationalism but also thought by many to be sufficient for relationalism. It would seem, then, that any resolution of the hole dilemma must engage in major metaphysical maneuvering, as is typical of the enormous literature on the hole argument. Recently, however, a number of authors have claimed metaphysical excursions can be avoided and the dilemma dissolved if sufficient attention is paid to how the mathematics used in the hole argument, and spacetime theories in general, applies to the world2 (Weatherall 2018, Curiel 2018, Fletcher 2019). We think these attempts are unsuccessful and intend to explain why, but not because we believe resolution of the hole dilemma calls for metaphysical tinkering. For at the end we will suggest a resolution that is non-metaphysical, at least to the extent that basic facts about reference are not metaphysical

The relativity of inertia and reality of nothing

We first see that the inertia of Newtonian mechanics is absolute and troublesome. General relativity can be viewed as Einstein's attempt to remedy, by making inertia relative, to matter---perhaps imperfectly though, as at least a couple of freedom degrees separate inertia from matter in his theory. We consider ways the relationist (for whom it is of course unwelcome) can try to overcome such undetermination, dismissing it as physically meaningless, especially by insisting on the right transformation properties.Comment: This is the best version available (the Studies version having suffered the many initiatives of an imaginative and zealous typesetter

Spatial adventures in energy studies: an introduction to the special issue

This paper has two purposes: first, it makes a case for the development of energy studies perspectives that consider ‘relational space’ as a critical concept organising the provision and use of energy. Second, it presents an overview of this field of research with consideration of the papers included in this special issue. The argument has three parts: first, there is an analysis of the growth of relational perspectives on space and energy looking at current debates within the literature; second, there is an analysis of visual representations of different energy features to demonstrate the empirical importance of a grounded understanding of relational space; third, there is an overview of the papers in this special issue as a means to put forward a diverse research agenda in this area. We conclude that relational perspectives have the potential to inform future energy studies and provide new insights for policy and practice