Leveraging Static Analysis Tools for Improving Usability of Memory Error Sanitization Compilers

Memory errors such as buffer overruns are notorious security vulnerabilities. There has been considerable interest in having a compiler to ensure the safety of compiled code either through static verification or through instrumented runtime checks. While certifying compilation has shown much promise, it has not been practical, leaving code instrumentation as the next best strategy for compilation. We term such compilers Memory Error Sanitization Compilers (MESCs). MESCs are available as part of GCC, LLVM and MSVC suites. Due to practical limitations, MESCs typically apply instrumentation indiscriminately to every memory access, and are consequently prohibitively expensive and practical to only small code bases. This work proposes a methodology that applies state-of-the-art static analysis techniques to eliminate unnecessary runtime checks, resulting in more efficient and scalable defenses. The methodology was implemented on LLVM\u27s Safecode, Integer Overflow, and Address Sanitizer passes, using static analysis of Frama-C and Codesurfer. The benchmarks demonstrate an improvement in runtime performance that makes incorporation of runtime checks a viable option for defenses

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Advertisement on p. [2].Illustrations on p. [4], 29, 43, 89, 121 and 192.Verso of t.p.: Set up, electrotyped and printed by the Vail-Ballou Co., Binghamton, N.Y. Paper furnished by W.F. Etherington & Co., New York, N.Y. Bound by the H. Wolff Estate, New York, N.Y.Verso of t.p.: Published September, 1922.Lucifer -- The death of the last Centaur -- The funeral of St. Mary Magdalene -- The funeral of a romantic poet -- The death of a dandy -- The death of an efficiency expert -- The funeral of an undertaker -- The death of a soldier -- The madman's funeral -- Emily in hades -- The death of God -- Resurrection -- Apollo.Mode of access: Internet