Hebey-Vaugon conjecture II

In this paper we consider the remaining cases of Hebey-Vaugon conjecture

Analytic varieties with finite volume amoebas are algebraic

In this paper, we study the amoeba volume of a given $k-$dimensional generic analytic variety $V$ of the complex algebraic torus (\C^*)^n. When $n\geq 2k$, we show that $V$ is algebraic if and only if the volume of its amoeba is finite. In this precise case, we establish a comparison theorem for the volume of the amoeba and the coamoeba. Examples and applications to the $k-$linear spaces will be given.Comment: 13 pages, 2 figure

A construction of conformal-harmonic maps

Conformal harmonic maps from a 4-dimensional conformal manifold to a Riemannian manifold are maps satisfying a certain conformally invariant fourth order equation. We prove a general existence result for conformal harmonic maps, analogous to the Eells-Sampson theorem for harmonic maps. The proof uses a geometric flow and relies on results of Gursky-Viaclovsky and Lamm

A MIP framework for non-convex uniform price day-ahead electricity auctions

It is well-known that a market equilibrium with uniform prices often does not exist in non-convex day-ahead electricity auctions. We consider the case of the non-convex, uniform-price Pan-European day-ahead electricity market "PCR" (Price Coupling of Regions), with non-convexities arising from so-called complex and block orders. Extending previous results, we propose a new primal-dual framework for these auctions, which has applications in both economic analysis and algorithm design. The contribution here is threefold. First, from the algorithmic point of view, we give a non-trivial exact (i.e. not approximate) linearization of a non-convex 'minimum income condition' that must hold for complex orders arising from the Spanish market, avoiding the introduction of any auxiliary variables, and allowing us to solve market clearing instances involving most of the bidding products proposed in PCR using off-the-shelf MIP solvers. Second, from the economic analysis point of view, we give the first MILP formulations of optimization problems such as the maximization of the traded volume, or the minimization of opportunity costs of paradoxically rejected block bids. We first show on a toy example that these two objectives are distinct from maximizing welfare. We also recover directly a previously noted property of an alternative market model. Third, we provide numerical experiments on realistic large-scale instances. They illustrate the efficiency of the approach, as well as the economics trade-offs that may occur in practice

Revisiting minimum profit conditions in uniform price day-ahead electricity auctions

We examine the problem of clearing day-ahead electricity market auctions where each bidder, whether a producer or consumer, can specify a minimum profit or maximum payment condition constraining the acceptance of a set of bid curves spanning multiple time periods in locations connected through a transmission network with linear constraints. Such types of conditions are for example considered in the Spanish and Portuguese day-ahead markets. This helps describing the recovery of start-up costs of a power plant, or analogously for a large consumer, utility reduced by a constant term. A new market model is proposed with a corresponding MILP formulation for uniform locational price day-ahead auctions, handling bids with a minimum profit or maximum payment condition in a uniform and computationally-efficient way. An exact decomposition procedure with sparse strengthened Benders cuts derived from the MILP formulation is also proposed. The MILP formulation and the decomposition procedure are similar to computationally-efficient approaches previously proposed to handle so-called block bids according to European market rules, though the clearing conditions could appear different at first sight. Both solving approaches are also valid to deal with both kinds of bids simultaneously, as block bids with a minimum acceptance ratio, generalizing fully indivisible block bids, are but a special case of the MP bids introduced here. We argue in favour of the MP bids by comparing them to previous models for minimum profit conditions proposed in the academic literature, and to the model for minimum income conditions used by the Spanish power exchange OMIE