SECURITY AS ONE OF THE MAIN ETHOLOGICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL TARGETS OF THE SPEECH MANIPULATION AND MEANS OF ITS SPEECH ACTUALISATION IN THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Основная цель нашего исследования состоит в изучении этофизиологических мишеней речевой манипуляции и средств ее речевой реализации на примере политического дискурса. В данной статье рассматривается такая этофизиологическая мишень манипуляции, как «безопасность».Объектом исследования являются предвыборные агитационные речи кандидатов на пост главы США Д. Трампа и Х. Клинтон. Особенности реализации этофизиологических мишеней на эторецептивном уровне составляют предмет данного исследования.Для достижения основной цели исследования послужили следующие методы: метод структурного моделирования для интерпретации речевого намерения, интерпретативный метод, метод интроспекции и понятийного анализа.Результаты исследования вносят определенный вклад в развитие теории манипулятивного речевого поведения в политическом дискурсе и в предвыборном агитационном дискурсе как его разновидности. Практическая значимость исследования предполагает возможность использования его результатов в вузовских лекционных курсах по общему языкознанию, теории грамматики и стилистики, теории дискурса, а также при руководстве дипломными и курсовыми работами.The aim of our research is to analyze ethological and physiological targets of the speech manipulation and means of its actualization as based on the political discourse. Such aetophysiological target as “security” is analyzed in this paper. The study subject is the pre-election agitational speeches of the candidates for presidency Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, whereby we can research aspects of the ethological and physiological targets actualization.The basis of the research is the structural modelling method for interpreting the speech intention, interpretative method, method of introspection and conceptual analyse. The results of the study contribute to the development of the theory of manipulative speech behavior in the political discourse and in the pre-election agitational discourse as its subtype.The results may be used in lecture courses on general linguistics, theory of grammar and stylistics, theory of discourse as well as for graduate and course papers supervision

Батьківська лінія родоводу князя Дмитра Вишневецького

Найбільш популярною є версія про те, що князь Дмитро Вишневецький свій родовід вів від Корибута-Димитрія, сина Великого князя Литовського Ольгерда Гедиміновича. Правнук Корибута-Димитрія Солтан заснував замок Вишневець і першим почав називати себе князем Корибут-Вишневецьким. Брат Солтана Василій мав сина Михайла, який і став родоначальником князів Вишневецьких. А вже Дмитро Іванович був його онуком. По лінії матері Дмитро Вишневецький був споріднений із знатним албанським родом Скандерберга, з княжим сербським родом Якшичів і молдавським господарем Стефаном Великим. При цитуванні документа, використовуйте посилання http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/3371

Democracy Playbook 2021: 10 Commitments for Advancing Democracy

This special edition of our Democracy Playbook updates our 2019 compendium of evidence-based democracy best practices with the research and developments of the eventful past two years. Most importantly, we here extract from that rich body of knowledge ten proposed pro-democracy commitments for consideration by participants in the upcoming first Summit for Democracy on December 9–10, 2021, and the subsequent year of action. We break down each of the ten commitments into a series of specific and measurable steps that all stakeholders can undertake to renew and strengthen democracy, fight democratic backsliding, and usher in an era of improved governance. After the Summit, we will update the Playbook again with the best of the learnings from that gathering for use as we build towards the 2022 follow-up event a year from now

Prospects for using amorphous ferromagnetic alloy microwire for reinforcement of cement mortar

Traditionally, fibers for fiber-reinforced concrete are made of metal, polypropylene, basalt or glass. На сегодняшний день для строительства актуально использование волокон с уникальными электрофизическими свойствами. The possibilities of using a microwire made of an amorphous ferromagnetic alloy based on cobalt with a shell of borosilicate glass in concrete technologies are studied in this paper. The influence of the content of fibers of different sizes (length 7 and 15 mm) on the rheological and physico-mechanical properties of the solution was established. The deterioration of the workability of mixtures and the average density of the composite with the introduction of the studied fiber is shown. It has been established that the spread diameter of the mortar mixture with a fiber content of 0.5...3.0 % by weight of Portland cement is reduced by 9.8...26.1% compared to the control composition. It is shown that the short fiber (7 mm) at the maximum content (3 %) leads to a more significant decrease in the average density (up to 9.6 %) compared to the long fiber (15 mm) of the same concentration (reduction is no more than 4 %). A positive effect on the flexural strength and crack resistance of the solution was established. The increment of flexural and compressive strength ranges from 1.11 to 1.54 and from 0.99 to 0.78 respectively with increasing fiber concentration. The presence of fiber in the composition of the solution allows you to increase the crack resistance from 0.098 to 0.164. The increase in the crack resistance coefficient for compositions with a fiber 7 mm long is 51...68 % and compositions with a fiber 15 mm long is 22...37 %. The possibility of using such microwire based on a ferromagnetic alloy for dispersed reinforcement of cement solutions opens up prospects for the creation of “smart” materials

GrassPlot - a database of multi-scale plant diversity in Palaearctic grasslands

GrassPlot is a collaborative vegetation-plot database organised by the Eurasian Dry Grassland Group (EDGG) and listed in the Global Index of Vegetation-Plot Databases (GIVD ID EU-00-003). GrassPlot collects plot records (releves) from grasslands and other open habitats of the Palaearctic biogeographic realm. It focuses on precisely delimited plots of eight standard grain sizes (0.0001; 0.001;... 1,000 m(2)) and on nested-plot series with at least four different grain sizes. The usage of GrassPlot is regulated through Bylaws that intend to balance the interests of data contributors and data users. The current version (v. 1.00) contains data for approximately 170,000 plots of different sizes and 2,800 nested-plot series. The key components are richness data and metadata. However, most included datasets also encompass compositional data. About 14,000 plots have near-complete records of terricolous bryophytes and lichens in addition to vascular plants. At present, GrassPlot contains data from 36 countries throughout the Palaearctic, spread across elevational gradients and major grassland types. GrassPlot with its multi-scale and multi-taxon focus complements the larger international vegetationplot databases, such as the European Vegetation Archive (EVA) and the global database " sPlot". Its main aim is to facilitate studies on the scale-and taxon-dependency of biodiversity patterns and drivers along macroecological gradients. GrassPlot is a dynamic database and will expand through new data collection coordinated by the elected Governing Board. We invite researchers with suitable data to join GrassPlot. Researchers with project ideas addressable with GrassPlot data are welcome to submit proposals to the Governing Board

Social Movements and International Relations: A Relational Framework

Social movements are increasingly recognized as significant features of contemporary world politics, yet to date their treatment in international relations theory has tended to obfuscate the considerable diversity of these social formations, and the variegated interactions they may establish with state actors and different structures of world order. Highlighting the difficulties conventional liberal and critical approaches have in transcending conceptions of movements as moral entities, the article draws from two under-exploited literatures in the study of social movements in international relations, the English School and Social Systems Theory, to specify a wider range of analytical interactions between different categories of social movements and of world political structures. Moreover, by casting social movement phenomena as communications, the article opens international relations to consideration of the increasingly diverse trajectories and second-order effects produced by social movements as they interact with states, intergovernmental institutions, and transnational actors

The Dark Side of European Integration: Nationalism and Radical Right Mobilization in Contemporary Europe

Social integration--a goal integral to the European project--has not followed economic integration. The main argument I set forth here is that European economic integration is producing the very opposite of its intended goals, namely, it is leading to cultural disintegration in the form of rising nationalism and radical right mobilization. Using cross-national statistical survey data, an original longitudinal dataset, in-depth interviews, and first hand observations, I examine various aspects of how nationalism manifests in contemporary Europe: as national identity, as support for radical right political parties, and as a process of political mobilization. I focus specifically on the cultural and political consequences of the EU integration process on the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe.One consequence of European integration is Europeans' increasing tendency to identify more with their nations than with Europe. Analysis of Eurobarometer survey data from before and after the 2007-2009 economic crisis shows that Europeans' support for the European project is deeply tied to their identities: those who see themselves in primarily nationalist terms are more likely to oppose their country's continued membership in the EU as well as further European integration. the EU's response to the economic crisis drove European citizens to pull away from Europe: across all countries, Europeans saw themselves in increasingly nationalist, as opposed to European, terms. In countries that were hardest hit by the economic crisis, individuals turned towards their national governments and national identities in dramatically high numbers. European citizens have grown increasingly disillusioned with the EU, and this disillusionment, anchored by sense of detachment from the European project, has taken shape along nationalist lines. Over the last two decades, radical right parties that advocate for ethnic vision of national belonging have garnered increasing electoral support in both Western and Eastern Europe. Comparing electoral support for such parties across 27 European countries from 1991 to 2012 shows that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, economic decline does not explain differences in the electoral success of radical right parties in Western and Eastern Europe. Support for radical right parties is lower in the less prosperous Eastern than Western Europe, and differences in immigration rates cannot explain this divergence. Rather, I find that political stability and social trust are more important determinants of support for radical right parties. Whereas higher stability decreases support for radical right parties in all European countries, the effect is much greater in Eastern Europe. In other words, when the governing regime is perceived as unstable in an Eastern European country, a radical right party is more likely to win support than in a Western European country. The greater effect of political instability in Eastern European countries may explain why support for radical right parties begins to decline in those countries after the late 1990s just as the political and economic conditions were stabilizing after the post-socialist transition. As in the West, Eastern Europeans' have become more likely to see themselves in national, as opposed to European, terms and radical right parties have recently gained support in countries like Hungary and Ukraine. Yet, in terms of popular support for exclusionary ethic nationalism, it is the West that appears more backward. The fear for the "new Europe" is no longer about the integration of the East, but rather the disintegration of the West. Large comparisons, however, can only provide a snapshot of radical right mobilization. To answer why and how individuals join radical right movements, I trace the rise of a radical right movement in Ukraine by conducting over 100 in-depth interviews between 2009 and 2012 with members of Ukraine's radical right wing party, Freedom (Svoboda). I find that activists were primarily recruited to the movement through friendship networks, reflecting the recruitment practices of progressive social movements. A surprising finding of this case study is that even the most ardent radical right activists were ambivalent about the political aims or ideology of the party before joining. Rather, they developed well formed political beliefs after continued interaction with other activists and participation in political events. Individuals were thus radicalized through the process of mobilization. By showing that radical ideas result from the mobilization process, this finding builds on emerging research of right-wing activists challenging the underlying assumption of social movement theory that activists, and radical right activists in particular, join movements to express preexisting beliefs

Explaining Support for Radical Right Parties in New Democracies: The Limits of Structural Determinants and the Potentiality of Civil Society

Europe has undergone a “Right turn” in politics over the last three decades, as evidenced by the continued success of radical right parties in Western European countries. Early studies of Western European radical right parties examined country level sociostructural factors for explaining variation in electoral support of radical right parties, but studies left unanswered if the same aggregate level factors are sufficient for explaining different levels of support that radical right parties secure outside of Western Europe. This paper builds upon the early studies of Western European radical right parties to examine whether structural factors – low economic growth, high unemployment, and high ethnic heterogeneity – are associated with high electoral support for radical right parties in the Central Eastern European EU member states from 1990 to 2010. The findings show that these factors are associated with support for radical right parties in some countries but not others. The paper then draws on theories of democratization to show that civic participation is a potentially important factor for understanding differences in support for radical right parties. This study contributes to a growing literature on the role of civic organizations in democratization and the body of knowledge on right-wing politics in Europe

The Dark Side of European Integration: Nationalism and Radical Right Mobilization in Contemporary Europe

Social integration--a goal integral to the European project--has not followed economic integration. The main argument I set forth here is that European economic integration is producing the very opposite of its intended goals, namely, it is leading to cultural disintegration in the form of rising nationalism and radical right mobilization. Using cross-national statistical survey data, an original longitudinal dataset, in-depth interviews, and first hand observations, I examine various aspects of how nationalism manifests in contemporary Europe: as national identity, as support for radical right political parties, and as a process of political mobilization. I focus specifically on the cultural and political consequences of the EU integration process on the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe.One consequence of European integration is Europeans' increasing tendency to identify more with their nations than with Europe. Analysis of Eurobarometer survey data from before and after the 2007-2009 economic crisis shows that Europeans' support for the European project is deeply tied to their identities: those who see themselves in primarily nationalist terms are more likely to oppose their country's continued membership in the EU as well as further European integration. the EU's response to the economic crisis drove European citizens to pull away from Europe: across all countries, Europeans saw themselves in increasingly nationalist, as opposed to European, terms. In countries that were hardest hit by the economic crisis, individuals turned towards their national governments and national identities in dramatically high numbers. European citizens have grown increasingly disillusioned with the EU, and this disillusionment, anchored by sense of detachment from the European project, has taken shape along nationalist lines. Over the last two decades, radical right parties that advocate for ethnic vision of national belonging have garnered increasing electoral support in both Western and Eastern Europe. Comparing electoral support for such parties across 27 European countries from 1991 to 2012 shows that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, economic decline does not explain differences in the electoral success of radical right parties in Western and Eastern Europe. Support for radical right parties is lower in the less prosperous Eastern than Western Europe, and differences in immigration rates cannot explain this divergence. Rather, I find that political stability and social trust are more important determinants of support for radical right parties. Whereas higher stability decreases support for radical right parties in all European countries, the effect is much greater in Eastern Europe. In other words, when the governing regime is perceived as unstable in an Eastern European country, a radical right party is more likely to win support than in a Western European country. The greater effect of political instability in Eastern European countries may explain why support for radical right parties begins to decline in those countries after the late 1990s just as the political and economic conditions were stabilizing after the post-socialist transition. As in the West, Eastern Europeans' have become more likely to see themselves in national, as opposed to European, terms and radical right parties have recently gained support in countries like Hungary and Ukraine. Yet, in terms of popular support for exclusionary ethic nationalism, it is the West that appears more backward. The fear for the "new Europe" is no longer about the integration of the East, but rather the disintegration of the West. Large comparisons, however, can only provide a snapshot of radical right mobilization. To answer why and how individuals join radical right movements, I trace the rise of a radical right movement in Ukraine by conducting over 100 in-depth interviews between 2009 and 2012 with members of Ukraine's radical right wing party, Freedom (Svoboda). I find that activists were primarily recruited to the movement through friendship networks, reflecting the recruitment practices of progressive social movements. A surprising finding of this case study is that even the most ardent radical right activists were ambivalent about the political aims or ideology of the party before joining. Rather, they developed well formed political beliefs after continued interaction with other activists and participation in political events. Individuals were thus radicalized through the process of mobilization. By showing that radical ideas result from the mobilization process, this finding builds on emerging research of right-wing activists challenging the underlying assumption of social movement theory that activists, and radical right activists in particular, join movements to express preexisting beliefs