Beyond shareholder primacy? Reflections on the trajectory of UK corporate governance.

Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance and the law on directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards the norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, however, stakeholder interests are better represented, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law. This reflects the influence of European Community laws on information and consultation of employees. In addition, there are signs that some institutional shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies, under government encouragement, away from a focus on short-term returns, in such a way as to favour stakeholder-inclusive practices by firms. On this basis we suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded

Extraneous menu-effects influence financial decisions made by pension trustees

Pension scheme trustees are responsible for the investment decisions of future generations’ retirement assets. However, behavioural finance research has mostly focussed on retail investors. While trustees are relatively sophisticated investors, they are not immune from biases. Across three experiments, we tested 252 pension scheme trustees for the influence of extraneous manipulations to the menu of options on investment decisions. Trustees were influenced by changes to the menu item mix, context, and layout. Care should therefore be taken when preparing information presented to trustees, in order to reduce biases that can be detrimental to pension outcomes

Decentralized Investment Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry

Using a unique data set, we document two secular trends in the shift from centralized to decentralized pension fund management over the past few decades. First, across asset classes, sponsors replace generalist balanced managers with better-performing specialists. Second, within asset classes, funds replace single managers with multiple competing managers following diverse strategies to reduce scale diseconomies as funds grow larger relative to capital markets. Consistent with a model of decentralized management, sponsors implement risk controls that trade off higher anticipated alphas of multiple specialists against the increased difficulty in coordinating their risk-taking and the greater uncertainty concerning their true skills

Mutual fund performance: Measurement and evidence

The paper provides a critical review of empirical findings on the performance of mutual funds, mainly for the US and UK. Ex-post, there are around 0-5% of top performing UK and US equity mutual funds with truly positive-alpha performance (after fees) and around 20% of funds that have truly poor alpha performance, with about 75% of active funds which are effectively zero-alpha funds. Key drivers of relative performance are, load fees, expenses and turnover. There is little evidence of successful market timing. Evidence suggests past winner funds persist, when rebalancing is frequent (i.e., less than one year) and when using sophisticated sorting rules (e.g., Bayesian approaches) - but transactions costs (load and advisory fees) imply that economic gains to investors from winner funds may be marginal. The US evidence clearly supports the view that past loser funds remain losers. Broadly speaking results for bond mutual funds are similar to those for equity funds. Sensible advice for most investors would be to hold low cost index funds and avoid holding past 'active' loser funds. Only sophisticated investors should pursue an active ex-ante investment strategy of trying to pick winners - and then with much caution. © 2010 New York University Salomon Center and Wiley Periodicals, Inc

Debunking the myth of shareholder ownership of companies: Some implications for corporate governance and financial reporting

The shareholder primacy model is dominant in Anglo-Saxon corporate governance and financial reporting even though it is considered to be dysfunctional and a source of crisis. The possibilities of reforms are routinely stymied with the claims that shareholders are the owners of large corporations and management should promote their interests. This paper seeks to debunk such claims. It shows that a corporation is a distinct legal person and cannot be owned by its shareholders. It argues that shareholders in contemporary corporations are owners of ?fictitious? capital which is very distinct from ?real? capital. The systemic pressures require the holders of fictitious capital to constantly buy/sell shares in pursuit of short-term gains. The paper further shows that in a globalised economy, the shareholding duration in major UK companies has shrunk and shareholders are more dispersed than ever before. They are not in any position to control or direct corporations for the benefit of other stakeholders and society generally. The paper calls for abandonment of the shareholder model of governance and calls for empowerment of stakeholders with a long-term interest in the wellbeing of corporations

The subordination of European finance

European political leaderships have responded to the emergence of global finance with a sustained drive to integrate Europe's own financial systems on the basis of a switch from classical bank credit to tradable securities. In itself, this was a rational response. However, financial integration was pursued at breakneck speed and in disregard of important public goods including economic stability and social justice. Reforms were undertaken in a climate of moral panic, in the false belief that the EU faced a serious problem of external competitiveness. In consequence, Europe's banks and institutional investors were badly exposed to the sub-prime crisis, the Eurozone has been radically disorganized and the EU has had little influence on the evolution of global financial structures and practices