Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots

Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation of fellows unless the selection pressure is very strong. Then, zealous cooperators can transform the population to be even fully cooperative under standard evolutionary dynamics.Comment: 5 figure

Makeni City Council and the Politics of Co?production in Post?conflict Sierra Leone

Policymakers in Sierra Leone have identified recently established local councils as the main vehicles for delivering on commitments to improve local public goods provision, but little is known about which strategies work for councils as public goods providers, and why. I compare two cases of public goods provision led by a single urban council, one relatively successful, another less so. I find that both are examples of co?production of public goods by the council and interest?based associations and that the dynamics of the relationships between these actors strongly influence the quality of public goods outcomes. I argue that the presence of a pattern of reciprocal exchange is the most significant determinant of success in co?production. I conclude by considering the conditions under which reciprocity is most likely to emerge in the context of co?productive relationships between local councils and interest?based associations

Social exchange:Relations and networks

In this short paper, I review the literature on social exchange networks, with specific attention to theoretical and experimental research. I indicate how social exchange theory is rooted in general social theory and mention a few of its main links to social network analysis and empirical network research. The paper provides an accessible entry into the literature on social exchange

Motivating employee referrals: The interactive effects of the referral bonus, perceived risk in referring, and affective commitment

Research has provided compelling evidence that employee referrals result in positive outcomes for organizations and job seekers, but it has been limited on how organizations can increase the likelihood of obtaining employee referrals. Using the theoretical lens of social exchange theory and tenets from expectancy theory, we tested two common assumptions of most employers: A referral bonus motivates employees to refer, and higher bonus amounts incite greater likelihood of referring. We theoretically developed and tested a model integrating the effects of perceived risk in referring and affective commitment and their interactions with the referral bonus to better explain the likelihood of referring. Results largely supported our predictions. Referral bonus presence, referral bonus amount, and affective commitment positively related to likelihood of referring, while perceived risk in referring negatively related to likelihood of referring. The findings also suggest that larger referral bonuses can help offset perceived risk in referring and low affective commitment levels. We contribute to the literature by developing theory, expanding the scope of the current referral literature, and offering a quantitative examination of previously theorized variables in the referring process. We conclude with suggestions to practicing managers on ways to improve the motivating potential of their employee referral programs

Re-Examining the Frustrated Homemaker Hypothesis

Multiple Classification Analyses on responses from 946 white women, drawn from the 1972 American National Election Study survey, were used to test the "frustrated homemaker hypothesis" that full-time homemakers are more dissatisfied with their lives than women employed outside the home. The fit between actual and desired roles proved to be a better predictor of personal satisfaction than the traditional dichotomy between homemakers and employed women. Homemakers who had wanted a career were more personally dissatisfied than homemakers who had never wanted a career. The career-oriented homemakers were the ones who expressed greater personal dissatisfaction than employed women. Employed women and career-oriented homemakers were about equally critical of women's collective position in society, while homemakers who had never wanted a career were more accepting of women's status quo. The importance of including evaluations of both personal and collective well-being was shown by the fact that these two domains bore different relationships to employment-homemaker status.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/69078/2/10.1177_073088848100800404.pd

Risk and Cooperation: Managing Hazardous Fuel in Mixed Ownership Landscapes

Managing natural processes at the landscape scale to promote forest health is important, especially in the case of wildfire, where the ability of a landowner to protect his or her individual parcel is constrained by conditions on neighboring ownerships. However, management at a landscape scale is also challenging because it requires cooperation on plans and actions that cross ownership boundaries. Cooperation depends on people’s beliefs and norms about reciprocity and perceptions of the risks and benefits of interacting with others. Using logistic regression tests on mail survey data and qualitative analysis of interviews with landowners, we examined the relationship between perceived wildfire risk and cooperation in the management of hazardous fuel by nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) owners in fire-prone landscapes of eastern Oregon. We found that NIPF owners who perceived a risk of wildfire to their properties, and perceived that conditions on nearby public forestlands contributed to this risk, were more likely to have cooperated with public agencies in the past to reduce fire risk than owners who did not perceive a risk of wildfire to their properties. Wildfire risk perception was not associated with past cooperation among NIPF owners. The greater social barriers to private–private cooperation than to private–public cooperation, and perceptions of more hazardous conditions on public compared with private forestlands may explain this difference. Owners expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with others in future cross-boundary efforts to reduce fire risk, however. We explore barriers to cooperative forest management across ownerships, and identify models of cooperation that hold potential for future collective action to reduce wildfire risk

Why people resort to coercion: The role of utility and legitimacy

This study focuses on why people may resort to coercive tactics. We tested the proposition that considerations of utility and legitimacy mediate effects of a powerholder's competence and reward structure on the use of coercion. Results showed that in general coercive tactics are employed less often than softer tactics, that coercive tactics are used more by more competent individuals than by less competent individuals, and that coercive tactics are used more often when the revenues of task performance benefited the agent of power than when they benefited both agent and target or when they benefited the target solely. Results identified perceived utility and perceived legitimacy as mediators of the decision to coerce the other or not. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Clustering in large networks does not promote upstream reciprocity

Upstream reciprocity (also called generalized reciprocity) is a putative mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations with which players help others when they are helped by somebody else. It is a type of indirect reciprocity. Although upstream reciprocity is often observed in experiments, most theories suggest that it is operative only when players form short cycles such as triangles, implying a small population size, or when it is combined with other mechanisms that promote cooperation on their own. An expectation is that real social networks, which are known to be full of triangles and other short cycles, may accommodate upstream reciprocity. In this study, I extend the upstream reciprocity game proposed for a directed cycle by Boyd and Richerson to the case of general networks. The model is not evolutionary and concerns the conditions under which the unanimity of cooperative players is a Nash equilibrium. I show that an abundance of triangles or other short cycles in a network does little to promote upstream reciprocity. Cooperation is less likely for a larger population size even if triangles are abundant in the network. In addition, in contrast to the results for evolutionary social dilemma games on networks, scale-free networks lead to less cooperation than networks with a homogeneous degree distribution.Comment: 5 figure

Managing for Stakeholders, Stakeholder Utility Functions, and Competitive Advantage

A firm that manages for stakeholders allocates more resources to satisfying the needs and demands of its legitimate stakeholders than what is necessary to simply retain their willful participation in the productive activities of the firm. Firms that exhibit this sort of behavior develop trusting relationships with stakeholders based on principles of distributional, procedural and interactional justice. Under these conditions, stakeholders are more likely to share nuanced information regarding their utility functions, which increases the ability of the firm to allocate its resources to areas that will best satisfy them (thus increasing demand for business transactions with the firm). In addition, this information can spur innovation, as well as allowing the firm to deal better with changes in the environment. Competitive advantages stemming from a managing-for-stakeholders approach are argued to be sustainable because they are associated with path dependence and causal ambiguity. These explanations provide a strong rationale for including stakeholder theory in the discussion of firm competitiveness and performance

Interaction, Emotion, and Collective Identities

[Excerpt] This chapter poses the question: How do emotional aspects of social interaction affect the emergence and salience of collective identities? I assume that social interaction inherently involves an implicit or explicit joint task—namely to accomplish some result that can only be produced with others. The most fundamental “task” of social interaction can be construed as the coordination and alignment of behavior, such that actors successfully conclude the interact ion episode. Essential to this task is a working consensus about definitions of self and other in the social situation, i.e., consensual self-other identities. A central component of my argument is that social interaction has emotional effects that vary with the success of actors at accomplishing this fundamental task. This paper theorizes the conditions under which emotional effects of social interaction promote collective identities that bridge or transcend self-other role identities