Backwards in Retrospect

This work has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant agreement no 284123This Author Accepted Manuscript version of the article "Backwards in Retrospect" is embargoed until 26/08/2015 to meet the publisher requirements. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0370-

The nature of philosophy and the philosophy of nature: Peter Godfrey-Smith: Philosophy of Biology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014

Peter Godfrey-Smith’s introduction to the philosophy of biology is excellent. This review questions one implication of his book, namely that Darwin’s case for the efficacy of natural selection was hampered by his ignorance of the particulate nature of inheritance. I suggest, instead, that Darwin was handicapped by an inability to effectively engage in quantitative population thinking. I also question Godfrey-Smith’s understanding of the role that Malthusian struggle plays in linking natural selection to the origination of new adaptive traits, and I raise problems for his defence of apparently unproblematic conceptions of human nature. Finally, I highlight the welcome conception of a ‘philosophy of nature’ developed by Godfrey-Smith.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-015-9485-

The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis: What is the debate about, and what might success for the extenders look like?

Abstract Debate over the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) ranges over three quite different domains of enquiry. Protagonists are committed to substantive positions regarding (1) empirical questions concerning (for example) the properties and prevalence of systems of epigenetic inheritance; (2) historical characterizations of the modern synthesis; and (3) conceptual/philosophical matters concerning (among other things) the nature of evolutionary processes, and the relationship between selection and adaptation. With these different aspects of the debate in view, it is possible to demonstrate the range of cross-cutting positions on offer when well-informed evolutionists consider their stance on the EES. This overview of the multiple dimensions of debate also enables clarification of two philosophical elements of the EES debate, regarding the status of niche-construction and the role of selection in explaining adaptation. Finally, it points the way to a possible resolution of the EES debate, via a pragmatic approach to evolutionary enquiry.John Templeton Foundatio

Neo-Paleyan biology.

There is a 'Neo-Paleyan' tradition in British evolutionary theorising, which began with Darwin and continues to the present day. This tradition conceives of adaptation in terms of design, and it often puts natural selection in the role of an ersatz designer. There are significant disanalogies between Paleyan conceptions of design and modern conceptions of adaptation and selection, which help to explain why the neo-Paleyan programme is sometimes treated with hostility. These general disanalogies do not suffice to dismiss the most interesting forms of recent neo-Paleyanism, which draw on theoretical principles such as Fisher's Fundamental Theorem to ground a general approach to what we can call (following Grafen) the 'criterion' of evolutionary design. It is important to distinguish between justifications of this 'criterion' and justifications of approaches to nature which presuppose that natural selection produces good designs.John Templeton Foundatio

Gremlins in the Germline.

Bryan Cwik shows the importance of asking questions such as: what is goal of a given germline intervention? Does the specific method of intervention have its own idiosyncratic ethical texture? Are there alternative means of producing the same end that are less risky and less morally contentious? In this commentary I argue that the considerations underlying Cwik’s position indicate that: (i) when we think about the ethics of germline interventions, we should make use of a general set of tools that inform how we should think about risk; and, (ii) once we see this, we see that there are no ethical concerns that are unique to the category of germline genetic interventions (Lewens 2020)

The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Random Drift

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub‐population‐level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biology—the ‘explananda of selection’ debate and the ‘units of selection’ debate

An art therapy education response: linking inequality and intersectional identity

Background: An account of how one Art Therapy training course links information about inequalities with the theory of intersectionality. In trying to understand intersectionality, the course community questions how clients and therapists respond to and experience health inequalities and discrimination. For both, there may be the pain of being ‘othered’ and the effects of unconscious privilege. Nevertheless, there are examples to be celebrated of how some people manage to use their identity in moving forward. Context: Bizarrely, how identities link to socio-political conditions is not readily acknowledged within therapy professions. The focus of therapy has tended to stay on the inner world. Also, since the end of the second world war, there has been a gradual decoupling of political approaches concerned with social justice and the redistribution of resources and political approaches concerned with identity recognition. Approaches: When health inequalities and identity issues became sharply visible during the Covid 19 pandemic, the profession responded with adaptations to its educational and therapeutic work. It is possible to see how clients, students, art therapists and colleagues adapt, consult and collaborate. The paper provides descriptions of students' adapted and collaborative practice. Outcomes, conclusions and implications for research: The use of culture, art and identity-aware supervision in art therapy are ways of developing our understanding of health inequalities and intersecting identities. The research implications for Art Therapy are that generic knowledge of research about discrimination and glaring health inequalities is a valuable foundation for research in our discipline

Decision and Discovery in Defining “Disease”

This version (May 17, 2005) was published in its final form as: Schwartz PH. Decision and discovery in defining 'disease'. In: Kincaid H, McKitrick J, editors. Establishing medical reality: essays in the metaphysics and epistemology of biomedical science. Dordrecht: Springer; 2007. p. 47-63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5216-2_5The debate over how to analyze the concept of disease has often centered on the question of whether to include a reference to values, in particular the ‘disvalue’of diseases, or whether to avoid such notions. ‘Normativists,’such as King ([1954], 1981) and Culver and Gert (1982) emphasize the undesirability of diseases, while ‘Naturalists,’ most prominently Christopher Boorse (1977, 1987, 1997), instead require just the presence of biological dysfunction. The debate between normativism and naturalism often deteriorates into stalemate, with each side able to point out significant problems with the other. It starts to look as if neither approach can work. In this paper, I argue that the standoff stems from deeply questionable assumptions that have been used to formulate the opposing positions and guide the debate. In the end, I propose an alternative set of guidelines that offer a more constructive way to devise and compare theories

What Constitutes an Explanation in Biology?

One of biology's fundamental aims is to generate understanding of the living world around—and within—us. In this chapter, I aim to provide a relatively nonpartisan discussion of the nature of explanation in biology, grounded in widely shared philosophical views about scientific explanation. But this discussion also reflects what I think is important for philosophers and biologists alike to appreciate about successful scientific explanations, so some points will be controversial, at least among philosophers. I make three main points: (1) causal relationships and broad patterns have often been granted importance to scientific explanations, and they are in fact both important; (2) some explanations in biology cite the components of or processes in systems that account for the systems’ features, whereas other explanations feature large-scale or structural causes that influence a system; and (3) there can be multiple different explanations of a given biological phenomenon, explanations that respond to different research aims and can thus be compatible with one another even when they may seem to disagree