75 research outputs found

    Antimicrobial resistance among migrants in Europe: a systematic review and meta-analysis

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    BACKGROUND: Rates of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) are rising globally and there is concern that increased migration is contributing to the burden of antibiotic resistance in Europe. However, the effect of migration on the burden of AMR in Europe has not yet been comprehensively examined. Therefore, we did a systematic review and meta-analysis to identify and synthesise data for AMR carriage or infection in migrants to Europe to examine differences in patterns of AMR across migrant groups and in different settings. METHODS: For this systematic review and meta-analysis, we searched MEDLINE, Embase, PubMed, and Scopus with no language restrictions from Jan 1, 2000, to Jan 18, 2017, for primary data from observational studies reporting antibacterial resistance in common bacterial pathogens among migrants to 21 European Union-15 and European Economic Area countries. To be eligible for inclusion, studies had to report data on carriage or infection with laboratory-confirmed antibiotic-resistant organisms in migrant populations. We extracted data from eligible studies and assessed quality using piloted, standardised forms. We did not examine drug resistance in tuberculosis and excluded articles solely reporting on this parameter. We also excluded articles in which migrant status was determined by ethnicity, country of birth of participants' parents, or was not defined, and articles in which data were not disaggregated by migrant status. Outcomes were carriage of or infection with antibiotic-resistant organisms. We used random-effects models to calculate the pooled prevalence of each outcome. The study protocol is registered with PROSPERO, number CRD42016043681. FINDINGS: We identified 2274 articles, of which 23 observational studies reporting on antibiotic resistance in 2319 migrants were included. The pooled prevalence of any AMR carriage or AMR infection in migrants was 25·4% (95% CI 19·1-31·8; I2 =98%), including meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (7·8%, 4·8-10·7; I2 =92%) and antibiotic-resistant Gram-negative bacteria (27·2%, 17·6-36·8; I2 =94%). The pooled prevalence of any AMR carriage or infection was higher in refugees and asylum seekers (33·0%, 18·3-47·6; I2 =98%) than in other migrant groups (6·6%, 1·8-11·3; I2 =92%). The pooled prevalence of antibiotic-resistant organisms was slightly higher in high-migrant community settings (33·1%, 11·1-55·1; I2 =96%) than in migrants in hospitals (24·3%, 16·1-32·6; I2 =98%). We did not find evidence of high rates of transmission of AMR from migrant to host populations. INTERPRETATION: Migrants are exposed to conditions favouring the emergence of drug resistance during transit and in host countries in Europe. Increased antibiotic resistance among refugees and asylum seekers and in high-migrant community settings (such as refugee camps and detention facilities) highlights the need for improved living conditions, access to health care, and initiatives to facilitate detection of and appropriate high-quality treatment for antibiotic-resistant infections during transit and in host countries. Protocols for the prevention and control of infection and for antibiotic surveillance need to be integrated in all aspects of health care, which should be accessible for all migrant groups, and should target determinants of AMR before, during, and after migration. FUNDING: UK National Institute for Health Research Imperial Biomedical Research Centre, Imperial College Healthcare Charity, the Wellcome Trust, and UK National Institute for Health Research Health Protection Research Unit in Healthcare-associated Infections and Antimictobial Resistance at Imperial College London

    COVID-19 risk score as a public health tool to guide targeted testing: A demonstration study in Qatar

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    We developed a Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) risk score to guide targeted RTPCR testing in Qatar. The Qatar national COVID-19 testing database, encompassing a total of 2,688,232 RT-PCR tests conducted between February 5, 2020-January 27, 2021, was analyzed. Logistic regression analyses were implemented to derive the COVID-19 risk score, as a tool to identify those at highest risk of having the infection. Score cut-off was determined using the ROC curve based on maximum sum of sensitivity and specificity. The score's performance diagnostics were assessed. Logistic regression analysis identified age, sex, and nationality as significant predictors of infection and were included in the risk score. The ROC curve was generated and the area under the curve was estimated at 0.63 (95% CI: 0.63-0.63). The score had a sensitivity of 59.4% (95% CI: 59.1%-59.7%), specificity of 61.1% (95% CI: 61.1%-61.2%), a positive predictive value of 10.9% (95% CI: 10.8%- 10.9%), and a negative predictive value of 94.9% (94.9%-95.0%). The concept and utility of a COVID-19 risk score were demonstrated in Qatar. Such a public health tool can have considerable utility in optimizing testing and suppressing infection transmission, while maximizing efficiency and use of available resources. 2022 Abu-Raddad et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited

    Two prolonged viremic SARS-CoV-2 infections with conserved viral genome for two months.

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    We document two cases of viremic and prolonged active infection with the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) where the viral genome was conserved for two months, but infection was with little or no symptoms. The first infection persisted for 80 days and the second for 62 days. Clearance of infection occurred 40 and 41 days, respectively, after development of detectable antibodies. Both cases were identified incidentally in an investigation of reinfection in a cohort of 133,266 laboratory-confirmed infected persons

    Epidemiological impact of prioritizing SARS-CoV-2 vaccination by antibody status: Mathematical modeling analyses

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    AbstractBackgroundVaccines against SARS-CoV-2 have been developed, but their availability falls far short of global needs. This study aimed to investigate the impact of prioritizing available doses on the basis of recipient antibody status, that is by exposure status, using Qatar as an example.MethodsVaccination impact was assessed under different scale-up scenarios using a deterministic meta-population mathematical model describing SARS-CoV-2 transmission and disease progression in the presence of vaccination.ResultsFor a vaccine that protects against infection with an efficacy of 95%, half as many vaccinations were needed to avert one infection, disease outcome, or death by prioritizing antibody-negative individuals for vaccination. Prioritization by antibody status reduced incidence at a faster rate and led to faster elimination of infection and return to normalcy. Further prioritization by age group amplified the gains of prioritization by antibody status. Gains from prioritization by antibody status were largest in settings where the proportion of the population already infected at the commencement of vaccination was 30-60%, which is perhaps where most countries will be by the time vaccination programs are up and running. For a vaccine that only protects against disease and not infection, vaccine impact was reduced by half, whether this impact was measured in terms of averted infections or disease outcomes, but the relative gains from using antibody status to prioritize vaccination recipients were similar.ConclusionsMajor health, societal, and economic gains can be achieved more quickly by prioritizing those who are antibody-negative while doses of the vaccine remain in short supply.</jats:sec

    Epidemiological impact of prioritising SARS-CoV-2 vaccination by antibody status: Mathematical modelling analyses

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    Background Vaccines against SARS-CoV-2 have been developed, but their availability falls far short of global needs. This study aimed to investigate the impact of prioritising available doses on the basis of recipient antibody status, that is by exposure status, using Qatar as an example. Methods Vaccination impact (defined as the reduction in infection incidence and the number of vaccinations needed to avert one infection or one adverse disease outcome) was assessed under different scale-up scenarios using a deterministic meta-population mathematical model describing SARS-CoV-2 transmission and disease progression in the presence of vaccination. Results For a vaccine that protects against infection with an efficacy of 95%, half as many vaccinations were needed to avert one infection, disease outcome or death by prioritising antibody-negative individuals for vaccination. Prioritisation by antibody status reduced incidence at a faster rate and led to faster elimination of infection and return to normalcy. Further prioritisation by age group amplified the gains of prioritisation by antibody status. Gains from prioritisation by antibody status were largest in settings where the proportion of the population already infected at the commencement of vaccination was 30%-60%. For a vaccine that only protects against disease and not infection, vaccine impact was reduced by half, whether this impact was measured in terms of averted infections or disease outcomes, but the relative gains from using antibody status to prioritise vaccination recipients were similar. Conclusions Major health and economic gains can be achieved more quickly by prioritizing those who are antibody-negative while doses of the vaccine remain in short supply.This study received support from the Biomedical Research Program, and the Biostatistics, Epidemiology, and Biomathematics Research Core, all at Weill Cornell MedicineQatar, as well as support provided by the Ministry of Public Health and Hamad Medical Corporation. The developed mathematical models were made possible by NPRP grant number 9-040-3-008 (principal investigator: LJA-R) and NPRP grant number 12S-0216-190094 (principal investigator: LJA-R) from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation; https://www.qnrf.org)

    Assessment of the Risk of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Reinfection in an Intense Reexposure Setting.

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    BACKGROUND: Risk of reinfection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is unknown. We assessed the risk and incidence rate of documented SARS-CoV-2 reinfection in a cohort of laboratory-confirmed cases in Qatar. METHODS: All SARS-CoV-2 laboratory-confirmed cases with at least 1 polymerase chain reaction-positive swab that was ≥45 days after a first positive swab were individually investigated for evidence of reinfection. Viral genome sequencing of the paired first positive and reinfection viral specimens was conducted to confirm reinfection. RESULTS: Out of 133 266 laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 cases, 243 persons (0.18%) had at least 1 subsequent positive swab ≥45 days after the first positive swab. Of these, 54 cases (22.2%) had strong or good evidence for reinfection. Median time between the first swab and reinfection swab was 64.5 days (range, 45-129). Twenty-three of the 54 cases (42.6%) were diagnosed at a health facility, suggesting presence of symptoms, while 31 (57.4%) were identified incidentally through random testing campaigns/surveys or contact tracing. Only 1 person was hospitalized at the time of reinfection but was discharged the next day. No deaths were recorded. Viral genome sequencing confirmed 4 reinfections of 12 cases with available genetic evidence. Reinfection risk was estimated at 0.02% (95% confidence interval [CI], .01%-.02%), and reinfection incidence rate was 0.36 (95% CI, .28-.47) per 10 000 person-weeks. CONCLUSIONS: SARS-CoV-2 reinfection can occur but is a rare phenomenon suggestive of protective immunity against reinfection that lasts for at least a few months post primary infection

    Immune Imprinting and Protection against Repeat Reinfection with SARS-CoV-2

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    More than 2 years into the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic, the global population carries heterogeneous immune histories derived from various exposures to infection, viral variants, and vaccination.1 Evidence at the level of binding and neutralizing antibodies and B-cell and T-cell immunity suggests that a history of infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) can have a negative effect on subsequent protective immunity.1 In particular, the immune response to B.1.1.529 (omicron) subvariants could be compromised by differential immune imprinting in persons who have had a previous infection with the original virus or the B.1.1.7 (alpha) variant.

    Characterizing the Qatar advanced-phase SARS-CoV-2 epidemic.

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    The overarching objective of this study was to provide the descriptive epidemiology of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) epidemic in Qatar by addressing specific research questions through a series of national epidemiologic studies. Sources of data were the centralized and standardized national databases for SARS-CoV-2 infection. By July 10, 2020, 397,577 individuals had been tested for SARS-CoV-2 using polymerase-chain-reaction (PCR), of whom 110,986 were positive, a positivity cumulative rate of 27.9% (95% CI 27.8-28.1%). As of July 5, case severity rate, based on World Health Organization (WHO) severity classification, was 3.4% and case fatality rate was 1.4 per 1,000 persons. Age was by far the strongest predictor of severe, critical, or fatal infection. PCR positivity of nasopharyngeal/oropharyngeal swabs in a national community survey (May 6-7) including 1,307 participants was 14.9% (95% CI 11.5-19.0%); 58.5% of those testing positive were asymptomatic. Across 448 ad-hoc testing campaigns in workplaces and residential areas including 26,715 individuals, pooled mean PCR positivity was 15.6% (95% CI 13.7-17.7%). SARS-CoV-2 antibody prevalence was 24.0% (95% CI 23.3-24.6%) in 32,970 residual clinical blood specimens. Antibody prevalence was only 47.3% (95% CI 46.2-48.5%) in those who had at least one PCR positive result, but 91.3% (95% CI 89.5-92.9%) among those who were PCR positive > 3 weeks before serology testing. Qatar has experienced a large SARS-CoV-2 epidemic that is rapidly declining, apparently due to growing immunity levels in the population

    SARS-CoV-2 antibody-positivity protects against reinfection for at least seven months with 95% efficacy.

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    BACKGROUND: Reinfection with the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has been documented, raising public health concerns. SARS-CoV-2 reinfections were assessed in a cohort of antibody-positive persons in Qatar. METHODS: All SARS-CoV-2 antibody-positive persons from April 16 to December 31, 2020 with a PCR-positive swab ≥14 days after the first-positive antibody test were investigated for evidence of reinfection. Viral genome sequencing was conducted for paired viral specimens to confirm reinfection. Incidence of reinfection was compared to incidence of infection in the complement cohort of those who were antibody-negative. FINDINGS: Among 43,044 antibody-positive persons who were followed for a median of 16.3 weeks (range: 0-34.6), 314 individuals (0.7%) had at least one PCR positive swab ≥14 days after the first-positive antibody test. Of these individuals, 129 (41.1%) had supporting epidemiological evidence for reinfection. Reinfection was next investigated using viral genome sequencing. Applying the viral-genome-sequencing confirmation rate, the incidence rate of reinfection was estimated at 0.66 per 10,000 person-weeks (95% CI: 0.56-0.78). Incidence rate of reinfection versus month of follow-up did not show any evidence of waning of immunity for over seven months of follow-up. Meanwhile, in the complement cohort of 149,923 antibody-negative persons followed for a median of 17.0 weeks (range: 0-45.6), incidence rate of infection was estimated at 13.69 per 10,000 person-weeks (95% CI: 13.22-14.14). Efficacy of natural infection against reinfection was estimated at 95.2% (95% CI: 94.1-96.0%). Reinfections were less severe than primary infections. Only one reinfection was severe, two were moderate, and none were critical or fatal. Most reinfections (66.7%) were diagnosed incidentally through random or routine testing, or through contact tracing. INTERPRETATION: Reinfection is rare in the young and international population of Qatar. Natural infection appears to elicit strong protection against reinfection with an efficacy ~95% for at least seven months. FUNDING: Biomedical Research Program, the Biostatistics, Epidemiology, and Biomathematics Research Core, and the Genomics Core, all at Weill Cornell Medicine-Qatar, the Ministry of Public Health, Hamad Medical Corporation, and the Qatar Genome Programme

    Protection of Omicron sub-lineage infection against reinfection with another Omicron sub-lineage

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    There is significant genetic distance between SARS-CoV-2 Omicron (B.1.1.529) variant BA.1 and BA.2 sub-lineages. This study investigates immune protection of infection with one sub-lineage against reinfection with the other sub-lineage in Qatar during a large BA.1 and BA.2 Omicron wave, from December 19, 2021 to March 21, 2022. Two national matched, retrospective cohort studies are conducted to estimate effectiveness of BA.1 infection against reinfection with BA.2 (N = 20,994; BA.1-against-BA.2 study), and effectiveness of BA.2 infection against reinfection with BA.1 (N = 110,315; BA.2-against-BA.1 study). Associations are estimated using Cox proportional-hazards regression models after multiple imputation to assign a sub-lineage status for cases with no sub-lineage status (using probabilities based on the test date). Effectiveness of BA.1 infection against reinfection with BA.2 is estimated at 94.2% (95% CI: 89.2–96.9%). Effectiveness of BA.2 infection against reinfection with BA.1 is estimated at 80.9% (95% CI: 73.1–86.4%). Infection with the BA.1 sub-lineage appears to induce strong, but not full immune protection against reinfection with the BA.2 sub-lineage, and vice versa, for at least several weeks after the initial infection
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