Family and gender values in contemporary Europe: The attitudinal gender gap from a cross-national perspective

Drawing on data from the International Social Survey Programme 2002 survey ‘Family and changing gender roles’, this article looks at the diversity in attitudes towards gender relations and family values in contemporary Europe from a gender perspective. Rather than the idea of a one-dimensional move from tradition to modernity that would gradually erase the attitudinal gender gap, the findings corroborate that gender differentiation plays a key role in attitudinal patterns. Furthermore, the attitudinal gender gap is path-specific and varies according to country-specific societal modernisation. Hence, I examine differences in the statements of men and women to portray attitudinal gender gaps on the national level. I follow the idea that wide gender gaps are associated either with women’s financial autonomy or with greater societal equality in education and political participation, since they allow for greater female awareness of masculine domination. I also argue that family deinstitutionalisation also correlates with greater attitudinal gender gaps

Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children's intuitive reasoning

This is an author-created version of this article. The original source of publication is Psychon Bull Rev. 2006 Dec;13(6):935-53 The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com Published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF0321390

Nietzsche or Aristotle: The implications for social psychology

YesIn this article, I argue that there is a divide in social psychology between a mainstream paradigm for investigating the flow of power in a largely competitive social life (such as social cognition, social identity theory, and discourse analysis) and a fringe paradigm for investigating the experience of flourishing in conditions of social learning (such as ‘the community of practice metaphor’, ‘dialogical theory’, ‘phenomenological analysis’). Assumptions of power and flourishing demand different conceptions of the self and the social world (e.g. a strategic subject or motivated tactician in a social group versus a reflective learner/artist in a community of practice). The first goal of this article is to reveal the assumptions that lead to this new classification. The second goal is to draw dotted lines to the blind-spots within these paradigms that each reveals. These blind spots are: 1) internal goods could be useful to consider for the power paradigm and external goods for the flourishing paradigm; 2) communicative rationality is underplayed within the power paradigm; while instrumental rationality is underplayed for the flourishing paradigm; 3) judgements and skill are underplayed in the power paradigm; self-interested motivations are underplayed in the flourishing paradigm

Nietzsche or Aristotle: The implications for social psychology

YesIn this article, I argue that there is a divide in social psychology between a mainstream paradigm for investigating the flow of power in a largely competitive social life (such as social cognition, social identity theory, and discourse analysis) and a fringe paradigm for investigating the experience of flourishing in conditions of social learning (such as ‘the community of practice metaphor’, ‘dialogical theory’, ‘phenomenological analysis’). Assumptions of power and flourishing demand different conceptions of the self and the social world (e.g. a strategic subject or motivated tactician in a social group versus a reflective learner/artist in a community of practice). The first goal of this article is to reveal the assumptions that lead to this new classification. The second goal is to draw dotted lines to the blind-spots within these paradigms that each reveals. These blind spots are: 1) internal goods could be useful to consider for the power paradigm and external goods for the flourishing paradigm; 2) communicative rationality is underplayed within the power paradigm; while instrumental rationality is underplayed for the flourishing paradigm; 3) judgements and skill are underplayed in the power paradigm; self-interested motivations are underplayed in the flourishing paradigm

R2P from Below: Does the British Public View Humanitarian Interventions as Ethical and Effective?

One of the major barriers to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect principle is the lack of a political will. Public attitudes towards intervention will have a crucial impact on elite willingness to prevent mass atrocities, yet we have little understanding of the factors that influence those attitudes. This article provides the first examination of UK public perceptions about the moral justifiability and effectiveness of humanitarian interventions. The article shows that decisions about justifiability and effectiveness are very different. Attitudes towards justification were more easily explained suggesting that judgements about effectiveness are more contextual and less easily accounted for by individuals’ background characteristics and attitudes. Experiences with both Iraq and Afghanistan have contaminated public perceptions of both the ethics and effectiveness of humanitarian interventions. Although the public is broadly supportive about the justifiability of humanitarian interventions they are extremely sceptical about the likelihood that those interventions will be successful

Risk preference and choice stochasticity during decisions for other people

In several contexts, such as finance and politics, people make choices that are relevant for others but irrelevant for oneself. Focusing on decision-making under risk, we compared monetary choices made for one’s own interest with choices made on behalf of an anonymous individual. Consistent with the previous literature, other-interest choices were characterized by an increased gambling propensity. We also investigated choice stochasticity, which captures how much decisions vary in similar conditions. An aspect related to choice stochasticity is how much decisions are tuned to the option values, and we found that this was higher during self-interest than during other-interest choices. This effect was observed only in individuals who reported a motivation to distribute rewards unequally, suggesting that it may (at least partially) depend on a motivation to make accurate decisions for others. Our results indicate that, during decision-making under risk, choices for other people are characterized by a decreased tuning to the values of the options, in addition to enhanced risk seeking

Discrete Emotion Effects on Lexical Decision Response Times

Our knowledge about affective processes, especially concerning effects on cognitive demands like word processing, is increasing steadily. Several studies consistently document valence and arousal effects, and although there is some debate on possible interactions and different notions of valence, broad agreement on a two dimensional model of affective space has been achieved. Alternative models like the discrete emotion theory have received little interest in word recognition research so far. Using backward elimination and multiple regression analyses, we show that five discrete emotions (i.e., happiness, disgust, fear, anger and sadness) explain as much variance as two published dimensional models assuming continuous or categorical valence, with the variables happiness, disgust and fear significantly contributing to this account. Moreover, these effects even persist in an experiment with discrete emotion conditions when the stimuli are controlled for emotional valence and arousal levels. We interpret this result as evidence for discrete emotion effects in visual word recognition that cannot be explained by the two dimensional affective space account

Large scale variation in the rate of germ-line de novo mutation, base composition, divergence and diversity in humans

It has long been suspected that the rate of mutation varies across the human genome at a large scale based on the divergence between humans and other species. However, it is now possible to directly investigate this question using the large number of de novo mutations (DNMs) that have been discovered in humans through the sequencing of trios. We investi- gate a number of questions pertaining to the distribution of mutations using more than 130,000 DNMs from three large datasets. We demonstrate that the amount and pattern of variation differs between datasets at the 1MB and 100KB scales probably as a consequence of differences in sequencing technology and processing. In particular, datasets show differ- ent patterns of correlation to genomic variables such as replication time. Never-the-less there are many commonalities between datasets, which likely represent true patterns. We show that there is variation in the mutation rate at the 100KB, 1MB and 10MB scale that can- not be explained by variation at smaller scales, however the level of this variation is modest at large scales–at the 1MB scale we infer that ~90% of regions have a mutation rate within 50% of the mean. Different types of mutation show similar levels of variation and appear to vary in concert which suggests the pattern of mutation is relatively constant across the genome. We demonstrate that variation in the mutation rate does not generate large-scale variation in GC-content, and hence that mutation bias does not maintain the isochore struc- ture of the human genome. We find that genomic features explain less than 40% of the explainable variance in the rate of DNM. As expected the rate of divergence between spe- cies is correlated to the rate of DNM. However, the correlations are weaker than expected if all the variation in divergence was due to variation in the mutation rate. We provide evidence that this is due the effect of biased gene conversion on the probability that a mutation will become fixed. In contrast to divergence, we find that most of the variation in diversity can be explained by variation in the mutation rate. Finally, we show that the correlation between divergence and DNM density declines as increasingly divergent species are considered

Brand Suicide? Memory and Liking of Negative Brand Names

Negative brand names are surprisingly common in the marketplace (e.g., Poison perfume; Hell pizza, and Monster energy drink), yet their effects on consumer behavior are currently unknown. Three studies investigated the effects of negative brand name valence on brand name memory and liking of a branded product. Study 1 demonstrates that relative to nonnegative brand names, negative brand names and their associated logos are better recognised. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that negative valence of a brand name tends to have a detrimental influence on product evaluation with evaluations worsening as negative valence increases. However, evaluation is also dependent on brand name arousal, with high arousal brand names resulting in more positive evaluations, such that moderately negative brand names are equally as attractive as some non-negative brand names. Study 3 shows evidence for affective habituation, whereby the effects of negative valence reduce with repeated exposures to some classes of negative brand name