1,776 research outputs found
Actuality and the a priori
We consider a natural-language sentence that cannot be formally represented in a first-order language for epistemic two-dimensional semantics. We also prove this claim in the âAppendixâ section. It turns out, however, that the most natural ways to repair the expressive inadequacy of the first-order language render moot the original philosophical motivation of formalizing a priori knowability as necessity along the diagonal
Worlds and Objects of Epistemic Space : A study of Jaakko Hintikka's modal semantics
This study focuses on meaning and knowledge by assessing a distinctive view
regarding their relation, namely the modal view of Jaakko Hintikka. The
development of this view has not been previously scrutinized. By paying close
attention to the texts of Hintikka, I show that, despite the extensive deployment of
mathematical tools, the articulation of the view remained intuitive and vague. The
study calls attention to several points at which Hintikka omits relevant details or
disregards foundational questions. Attempts are made to articulate Hintikkaâs
certain ideas in a more specific manner, and new problems that result are
identified. The central claim argued for is that Hintikkaâs exposition was
unsatisfactory in many respects and hence the view, as it stands, falls short in its
explanatory scope compared to current theories in the intersection of logic,
semantics, and epistemology. However, I argue that, despite its shortcomings, the
prospects of the modal view are not exhausted. This is verified by introducing a
new interpretation of the framework and by sketching new applications relevant in
philosophy of language and in epistemology. It is also pointed out that certain
early advances of the view closely resemble, and therefore anticipate, the central
tenets of the currently influential two-dimensional approaches in logic and
semantics.Tutkimus paneutuu merkityksen ja tiedon kÀsitteisiin tarkastelemalla Jaakko Hintikan työtÀ modaalisen semantiikan parissa. Tutkimus osoittaa, ettÀ Hintikka jÀtti modaalisen semantiikan kehitystyössÀÀn avoimeksi useita perustavia kysymyksiÀ ja yksityiskohtia. Tutkimuksessa pyritÀÀn artikuloimaan tÀsmÀllisemmin joitakin Hintikan nÀkemyksiÀ, ja tunnistetaan uusia syntyviÀ ongelmia. KeskeisenÀ vÀitteenÀ on, ettÀ Hintikan teoreettinen työ jÀi monilta osin epÀtyydyttÀvÀksi, ja siten hÀnen modaalinen nÀkemyksensÀ ei yllÀ selitysvoimaltaan ja sovelluspotentiaaliltaan samalle tasolle kuin nykyiset filosofiset teoriat, jotka operoivat logiikan, semantiikan ja epistemologian risteyskohdissa. TÀstÀ huolimatta tutkimuksessa argumentoidaan, ettÀ Hintikan teoreettinen viitekehys tarjoaa myös uusia kiinnostavia nÀköaloja. TÀmÀ todennetaan tarjoamalla Hintikan viitekehykselle uusi tulkinta, ja soveltamalla sitÀ uusiin kielifilosofisiin kysymyksiin. Tutkimus nostaa myös esiin kirjallisuudessa ohitetun tosiasian, ettÀ Hintikan työ ennakoi tÀrkeÀllÀ tavalla nykyisin vaikutusvaltaisia kaksi-dimensionaalisia lÀhestymistapoja logiikassa ja semantiikassa
Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal -calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's "criterial" identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of -logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the interaction between epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, epistemic set theory, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebraic automata to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. The hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{2} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, and \textbf{11}. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides four models of hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory
Contingent identity
It is widely held that if an object a is identical (or non-identical) to an object b, then it is necessary that a is identical (non-identical) to b. This view is supported an argument from Leibniz's Law and a popular conception of de re modality. On the other hand, there are good reasons to allow for contingent identity. Various alternative accounts of de re modality have been developed to achieve this kind of generality, and to explain what is wrong with the argument from Leibniz's Law
The price of inscrutability
In our reasoning we depend on the stability of language, the fact that its signs do not arbitrarily change in meaning from moment to moment.(Campbell, 1994, p.82)
Some philosophers offer arguments contending that ordinary names such as âLondonâ are radically indeterminate in reference. The conclusion of such arguments is that there is no fact of the matter whether âLondonâ refers to a city in the south of England, or whether instead it refers to
Sydney, Australia. Some philosophers have even suggested that we accept the conclusion of these arguments.
Such a position seems crazy to many; but what exactly goes wrong if one adopts such a view? This paper evaluates the theoretical costs incurred by one who endorses extreme inscrutability of reference (the âinscrutabilistâ). I show that there is one particular implication of extreme
inscrutability which pushes the price of inscrutabilism too high. An extension of the classic âpermutationâ arguments for extreme inscrutability allow us to establish what I dub âextreme indexical inscrutabilityâ. This result, I argue, unacceptably undermines the epistemology of inference.
The first half of the paper develops the background of permutation arguments for extreme inscrutability
of reference and evaluates some initial attempts to make trouble for the inscrutabilist.
Sections 1 and 2 describe the setting of the original permutation arguments for extreme inscrutability.
Sections 3 and 4 survey four potential objections to extreme inscrutability of reference,
including some recently raised in Vann McGeeâs excellent (2005a). Sections 5 sketches how the permutation arguments can be generalized to establish extreme indexical inscrutability; and shows how this contradicts a âstability principleââthat our words do not arbitrarily
change their reference from one moment to the nextâwhich I claim plays a vital role in the epistemology of inference.
The second half of the paper develops in detail the case for thinking that language is stable
in the relevant sense. In section 6, I use this distinction to call into question the epistemological
relevance of validity of argument types; Kaplanâs treatment of indexical validity partially resolves this worry, but there is a residual problem. In section 7, I argue that stability is exactly what is needed to bridge this final gap, and so secure the relevance of validity to good inferential practice. Section 8 responds to objections to this claim.
An appendix to the paper provides formal backing for the results cited in this paper, including a generalization of permutation arguments to the kind of rich setting required for a realistic semantics of natural language.1 Extreme indexical inscrutability results can be proved within
this setting. The first half of the paper shows that the inscrutabilist is committed to extreme indexical inscrutability, which implies that language not determinately âstableâ. The second half of the paper argues that good inference requires stability. The price of inscrutabilism, therefore, is to sever the connection between the validity of argument-forms and inferential practice: and this is too high a price to pay
Counteridenticals
A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem non-trivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions to such counterfactuals. In light of this, one could try to save the orthodox theories either by appealing to pragmatics or by denying that the antecedents of alleged counteridenticals really contain identity claims. Or one could reject the orthodox theory of counterfactuals in favor of a hyperintensional semantics that accommodates non-trivial counterpossibles. In this paper, I argue that none of these approaches can account for all the peculiar features of counteridenticals. Instead, I propose a modified version of Lewisâs counterpart theory, which rejects the necessity of identity, and show that it can explain all the peculiar features of counteridenticals in a satisfactory way. I conclude by defending the plausibility of contingent identity from objections
Counterfactual Double Lives
Expressions typically thought to be rigid designators can refer to distinct individuals in the consequents of counterfactuals. This occurs in counteridenticals, such as âIf I were you, I would arrest meâ, as well as more ordinary counterfactuals with clearly possible antecedents, like âIf I were a police officer, I would arrest meâ. I argue that in response we should drop rigidity and deal with de re modal predication using something more flexible, such as counterpart theory
Epistemic Reasoning in OWL 2 DL
We extend the description logic SROIQ (OWL 2 DL) with the epistemic operator K and argue that unintended effects occur when imposing the semantics traditionally employed. Consequently, we identify the most expressive DL for which the traditional approach can still be adapted. For the epistemic extension of SROIQ and alike expressive DLs, we suggest a revised semantics that behaves more intuitively in these cases and coincides with the traditional semantics on less expressive DLs
Reference and Indexicality
Tese arquivada ao abrigo da Portaria nÂș 227/2017 de 25 de Julho-Registo de Grau EstrangeiroThis thesis is a general defence of a context-dependent description theory of reference with
special regards to indexical reference on the basis of a truth-conditional theory of meaning. It
consists of two parts. In the first part, the roots of the Frege-Russell view are laid out and
contrasted with various aspects of direct reference theory and the New Theory of Reference.
Two description-based accounts of the reference of proper names, nominal and external description
theory, are defended against various known counter-arguments such as Kripkeâs circularity
objection and the Church-Langford translation test. It is shown how the resulting analysis of
de dicto belief ascriptions can be made compositional, but also argued that compositionality
is not mandatory. The second part deals with forms of indexical and non-indexical contextdependence.
Taking into account a range of typological data, referential features of indexical
expressions like their egocentricity, token-reflexivity, and the vagueness of spatial and temporal
indexicals are laid out. Kaplanâs Logic of Demonstratives is then reformulated, but following
Cresswell (1990) it is argued that full quantification over modal indices is needed. Various indicators
and demonstratives are analyzed on the basis of a description theory of reference in
a variant of first-order predicate logic with non-traditional predication theory and two sorts of
reified contexts. Examples analyzed include: I, now, here, actually, we, the former president, the
left entrance, context-shifting indexicals, and demonstratives like Japanese are. Finally, essential
indexicality is addressed and it is conceded that description theory cannot deal with attitudes
de se. In defense of indirect reference it is argued that the cognitive phenomena underlying
essential indexicality, as for example I-thoughts, arenât aspects of the public meaning of natural
language expressions and that speaking of a âlanguage of thinkingâ or âreference in thinkingâ are
unfitting metaphors for general semiotic reasons
- âŠ