Heterogeneous resource allocation can change social hierarchy in public goods games

Public Goods Games represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions between individuals. However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies, they are not able to reproduce some key features observed in social and economical interactions. The typical shape of wealth distribution - known as Pareto Law - and the microscopic organization of wealth production are two of them. Here, we introduce a modification to the classical formulation of Public Goods Games that allows for the emergence of both of these features from first principles. Unlike traditional Public Goods Games on networks, where players contribute equally to all the games in which they participate, we allow individuals to redistribute their contribution according to what they earned in previous rounds. Results from numerical simulations show that not only a Pareto distribution for the payoffs naturally emerges but also that if players don't invest enough in one round they can act as defectors even if they are formally cooperators. Finally, we also show that the players self-organize in a very productive backbone that covers almost perfectly the minimum spanning tree of the underlying interaction network. Our results not only give an explanation for the presence of the wealth heterogeneity observed in real data but also points to a conceptual change regarding how cooperation is defined in collective dilemmas.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures, 55 reference

Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas

In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators is gloomy. While network reciprocity promotes collaborative efforts, chances of averting the impending social decline are slim if the temptation to defect is strong. It is therefore of interest to identify viable mechanisms that provide additional support for the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by the fact that the environment may be just as important as inheritance for individual development, we introduce a simple switch that allows a player to either keep its original payoff or use the average payoff of all its neighbors. Depending on which payoff is higher, the influence of either option can be tuned by means of a single parameter. We show that, in general, taking into account the environment promotes cooperation. Yet coveting the fitness of one's neighbors too strongly is not optimal. In fact, cooperation thrives best only if the influence of payoffs obtained in the traditional way is equal to that of the average payoff of the neighborhood. We present results for the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game, for different levels of uncertainty governing the strategy adoption process, and for different neighborhood sizes. Our approach outlines a viable route to increased levels of cooperative behavior in structured populations, but one that requires a thoughtful implementation.Comment: 10 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Journal of Theoretical Biolog

A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons : a chapter from Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: from Theory to Practice.

Who hasn’t heard of the six blind men of Indostan encircled around an elephant?1 The six—one a political scientist, one a librarian, one an economist, one a law professor, one a computer scientist, and one an anthropologist—discover, based on their own investigations, that the object before them is a wall, spear, a snake, a tree, a fan, and a rope. The story fits well with the question that propelled this chapter: how can an interdisciplinary group of scholars best analyze a highly complex, rapidly evolving, elephantine resource such as knowledge? Trying to get one’s hands around knowledge as a shared resource is even more challenging when we factor in the economic, legal, technological, political, social and psychological components—each complex in their own right—that make up this global commons

Benefits of tolerance in public goods games

Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest income for non-participants. In this paper we demonstrate that showing some tolerance toward defectors could not only save cooperation in harsh environments, but in fact results in a surprisingly high average payoff for group members in public goods games. Phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal the high complexity of evolving states where cyclic dominant strategies or two-strategy alliances can characterize the final state of evolution. We identify microscopic mechanisms which are responsible for the superiority of global solutions containing tolerant players. This phenomenon is robust and can be observed both in well-mixed and in structured populations highlighting the importance of tolerance in our everyday life.Comment: 10 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

International ethics and globalization

In the inherently anarchic international system the validity of moral principles is weakening. To overcome anarchy global governance is needed. It means efficient international institutions, but also pressures from the global civil society and the self-regulation of business. Multinational firms have the duty of cooperating in governance systems. They also have the duty of reconciling in their activity the two, equally legitimate claims of universalism and cultural relativism; i.e., applying universal moral principles and respecting local moral norms. Finally, multinationals must be guided by the principle of enhanced responsibility. However, although globalizing efforts are important in overcoming international anarchy and coordinating the protection of global commons, strong arguments support the notion that economic globalization does not promote sustainable development. Some form of localization of the economy is certainly needed. The challenge is to find a way towards more global governance with less economic globalization

A review of social dilemmas and social-ecological traps in conservation and natural resource management

Successful conservation depends as much on people working together as it does on sound science and good governance. Research on cooperation in businesses, economics, psychology, and natural resource management has identified shared social and social-ecological dynamics, reviewed and categorized in this article that can create unwanted surprises and problems for conservation efforts. Cooperation may fail when: (1) individual and group benefits are in conflict (social dilemmas) or (2) social-ecological systems become caught in problem-causing and problem-enhancing feedbacks (SES traps). Knowing about and recognizing these dynamics can help decision makers to understand and change key elements of problems and learn from the experiences of others. Social dilemmas have winners and losers, and involve give-some or take-some choices; SES traps are lose-lose situations. Solutions to problems of cooperation in conservation contexts involve identifying the conservation objective and context, diagnosing systemic social dilemmas and SES traps, and developing practical solutions that work with group processes and individuals toward shared and positively reinforcing goals, goal structures, and expectations. Research on cooperation in conservation has largely ignored problems of scale, scaling, and group heterogeneity. The field would benefit from a shift from a probabilistic, empirical approach to a stronger theory-driven, mechanistic, and more diagnostic approach