It wasn't me! Motor activation from irrelevant spatial information in the absence of a response

Embodied cognition postulates that perceptual and motor processes serve higher-order cognitive faculties like language. A major challenge for embodied cognition concerns the grounding of abstract concepts. Here we zoom in on abstract spatial concepts and ask the question to what extent the sensorimotor system is involved in processing these. Most of the empirical support in favor of an embodied perspective on (abstract) spatial information has derived from so-called compatibility effects in which a task-irrelevant feature either facilitates (for compatible trials) or hinders (in incompatible trials) responding to the task-relevant feature. This type of effect has been interpreted in terms of (task-irrelevant) feature-induced response activation. The problem with such approach is that incompatible features generate an array of task relevant and irrelevant activations [e.g., in primary motor cortex (M1)], and lateral hemispheric interactions render it difficult to assign credit to the task-irrelevant feature per se in driving these activations. Here, we aim to obtain a cleaner indication of response activation on the basis of abstract spatial information. We employed transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to probe response activation of effectors in response to semantic, task-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., the words left and right) that did not require an overt response. Results revealed larger motor evoked potentials (MEPs) for the right (left) index finger when the word right (left) was presented. Our findings provide support for the grounding of abstract spatial concepts in the sensorimotor system

Building Embodied Spaces for Spatial Memory Neurorehabilitation with Virtual Reality in Normal and Pathological Aging

Along with deficits in spatial cognition, a decline in body-related information is observed in aging and is thought to contribute to impairments in navigation, memory, and space perception. According to the embodied cognition theories, bodily and environmental information play a crucial role in defining cognitive representations. Thanks to the possibility to involve body-related information, manipulate environmental stimuli, and add multisensory cues, virtual reality is one of the best candidates for spatial memory rehabilitation in aging for its embodied potential. However, current virtual neurorehabilitation solutions for aging and neurodegenerative diseases are in their infancy. Here, we discuss three concepts that could be used to improve embodied representations of the space with virtual reality. The virtual bodily representation is the combination of idiothetic information involved during virtual navigation thanks to input/output devices; the spatial affordances are environmental or symbolic elements used by the individual to act in the virtual environment; finally, the virtual enactment effect is the enhancement on spatial memory provided by actively (cognitively and/or bodily) interacting with the virtual space and its elements. Theoretical and empirical findings will be presented to propose innovative rehabilitative solutions in aging for spatial memory and navigation

Multisensory spatial mechanisms of the bodily self and social cognition : a commentary on Vittorio Gallese & Valentina Cuccio

This commentary aims to find the right description of the pre-reflective brain mechanisms underlying our phenomenal experience of being a subject bound to a physical body (bodily self) and basic cognitive, perceptual, and subjective aspects related to interaction with other individuals (social cognition). I will focus on the proposal by Gallese and Cuccio that embodied simulation, in terms of motor resonance, is the primary brain mechanism underlying the pre-reflective aspects of social cognition and the bodily self. I will argue that this proposal is too narrow to serve a unified theory of the neurobiological mechanisms of both target phenomena. I support this criticism with theoretical considerations and empirical evidence suggesting that multisensory spatial processing, which is distinct from but a pre-requisite of motor resonance, substantially contributes to the bodily self and social cognition. My commentary is structured in three sections. The first section addresses social cognition and compares embodied simulation to an alternative account, namely the attention schema theory. According to this theory we pre-reflectively empathize with others by predicting their current state of attention which involves predicting the spatial focus of attention. Thereby we derive a representational model of their state of mind. On this account, spatial coding of attention, rather than motor resonance, is the primary mechanism underlying social cognition. I take this as a theoretical alternative complementing motor resonance mechanisms. The second section focuses on the bodily self. Comparison of the brain networks of the bodily self and social cognition reveals strong overlap, suggesting that both phenomena depend on shared multisensory and sensorimotor mechanisms. I will review recent empirical data about altered states of the bodily self in terms of self-location and the first-person perspective. These spatial aspects of the bodily self are encoded in brain regions distinct from the brain network of embodied simulation. I argue that while motor resonance might contribute to body ownership and agency, it does not account for spatial aspects of the bodily self. Thus, embodied simulation appears to be a necessary but insufficiently “primary” brain mechanism of the bodily self and social cognition. The third section discusses the contributions of the vestibular system, i.e., the sensory system encoding head motion and gravity, to the bodily self and social cognition. Vestibular cortical processing seems relevant to both processes, because it directly encodes the world-centered direction of gravity and allows us to distinguish between motions of the own body and motions of other individuals and the external world. Furthermore, the vestibular cortical network largely overlaps with those neural networks relevant to the bodily self and social cognition. Thus, the vestibular system may play a crucial role in multisensory spatial coding relating the bodily self to other individuals in the external world

Lissitzky : new materialism and diagrammatic living

Lissitsky\u27s spatial and architectural work anticipates the contemporary fascination with expanded fields of activity that have resulted in transdisciplinary approaches to research and the role of practice-led research. This paper will discuss Lissitzky\u27s suprematist perspective in relation to contemporary practices - under the rubric of the &quot;diagram&quot; - that re-imagine and enact the relationship between the built surround and embodied cognition. Lissitzky\u27s work will serve as the starting point for a discussion of contemporary practitioners and theorists working across philosophy, cognitive science and built environment in order to draw out, through the act of diagramming, life on new terms.<br /

The Mitigation of Stereotype Threat Through Embodied Cogition

Stereotype threat has been well-supported by decades of research. It is a pervasive phenomenon which affects multiple social groups with both immediate and lasting consequences. Therefore, it has been of a particular importance to study strategies that may serve at mitigating the effects of stereotype threat. Women, in particular, often face stereotypes that state that women are inferior to men in certain domains, among which are mathematics, spatial reasoning, driving ability, leadership, and making financial decisions. In the current study, we evaluate whether embodied cognition can be used to mitigate the effects of stereotype threat experienced by women in the financial domain. Furthermore, we conclude to what extent embodied cognition is more effective at stereotype threat mitigation than threat reframing

Level-2 visuo-spatial perspective-taking and interoception:More evidence for the embodiment of perspective-taking

Level-2 visuo-spatial perspective-taking is an embodied process during which the perspective-taker mentally simulates a movement of his or her body into the location of the target. Evidence for the embodiment of this process so far exclusively stems from congruency effects in visuo-spatial perspective-taking experiments. Here, additional triangulation for the embodiment of this process is provided from an interindividual differences perspective. In a cross-sectional observational study, participants completed a behavioral level-2 visuo-spatial perspective-taking task and the heartbeat tracking task, which measures interoceptive accuracy and sensibility. Interoceptive accuracy is the objective ability to accurately perceive signals from within the body. In the present study, interoceptive accuracy was quantified by comparing the number of actual heartbeats observed via electrocardiographic recording to subjectively perceived heartbeats during that time. This measure was related to faster perspective-taking and better overall perspective-taking performance. Interoceptive sensibility refers to subjective beliefs about interoceptive abilities. Here, confidence in the estimated number of heartbeats served as a measure if interoceptive sensibility. Finally, the correspondence between interoceptive accuracy and sensibility is referred to as interoceptive awareness. Interoceptive sensibility and awareness were unrelated to perspective-taking. The study is a demonstration of the role interindividual differences in different facets of interoception play for embodied cognition. Implications for future research on links between embodied cognition and interoception are outlined and critically discussed.</p

TEST: A Tropic, Embodied, and Situated Theory of Cognition

TEST is a novel taxonomy of knowledge representations based on three distinct hierarchically organized representational features: Tropism, Embodiment, and Situatedness. Tropic representational features reflect constraints of the physical world on the agent’s ability to form, reactivate, and enrich embodied (i.e., resulting from the agent’s bodily constraints) conceptual representations embedded in situated contexts. The proposed hierarchy entails that representations can, in principle, have tropic features without necessarily having situated and/or embodied features. On the other hand, representations that are situated and/or embodied are likely to be simultaneously tropic. Hence while we propose tropism as the most general term, the hierarchical relationship between embodiment and situatedness is more on a par, such that the dominance of one component over the other relies on the distinction between offline storage vs. online generation as well as on representation-specific properties

Four applications of embodied cognition

This article presents the views of four sets of authors, each taking concepts of embodied cognition into problem spaces where the new paradigm can be applied. The first considers consequences of embodied cognition on the legal system. The second explores how embodied cognition can change how we interpret and interact with art and literature. The third examines how we move through archi- tectural spaces from an embodied cognition perspective. And the fourth addresses how music cogni- tion is influenced by the approach. Each contribution is brief. They are meant to suggest the potential reach of embodied cognition, increase the visibility of applications, and inspire potential avenues for research

A Connectionist Approach to Embodied Conceptual Metaphor

A growing body of data has been gathered in support of the view that the mind is embodied and that cognition is grounded in sensory-motor processes. Some researchers have gone so far as to claim that this paradigm poses a serious challenge to central tenets of cognitive science, including the widely held view that the mind can be analyzed in terms of abstract computational principles. On the other hand, computational approaches to the study of mind have led to the development of specific models that help researchers understand complex cognitive processes at a level of detail that theories of embodied cognition (EC) have sometimes lacked. Here we make the case that connectionist architectures in particular can illuminate many surprising results from the EC literature. These models can learn the statistical structure in their environments, providing an ideal framework for understanding how simple sensory-motor mechanisms could give rise to higher-level cognitive behavior over the course of learning. Crucially, they form overlapping, distributed representations, which have exactly the properties required by many embodied accounts of cognition. We illustrate this idea by extending an existing connectionist model of semantic cognition in order to simulate findings from the embodied conceptual metaphor literature. Specifically, we explore how the abstract domain of time may be structured by concrete experience with space (including experience with culturally specific spatial and linguistic cues). We suggest that both EC researchers and connectionist modelers can benefit from an integrated approach to understanding these models and the empirical findings they seek to explain

The Mechanics of Embodiment: A Dialogue on Embodiment and Computational Modeling

Embodied theories are increasingly challenging traditional views of cognition by arguing that conceptual representations that constitute our knowledge are grounded in sensory and motor experiences, and processed at this sensorimotor level, rather than being represented and processed abstractly in an amodal conceptual system. Given the established empirical foundation, and the relatively underspecified theories to date, many researchers are extremely interested in embodied cognition but are clamouring for more mechanistic implementations. What is needed at this stage is a push toward explicit computational models that implement sensory-motor grounding as intrinsic to cognitive processes. In this article, six authors from varying backgrounds and approaches address issues concerning the construction of embodied computational models, and illustrate what they view as the critical current and next steps toward mechanistic theories of embodiment. The first part has the form of a dialogue between two fictional characters: Ernest, the �experimenter�, and Mary, the �computational modeller�. The dialogue consists of an interactive sequence of questions, requests for clarification, challenges, and (tentative) answers, and touches the most important aspects of grounded theories that should inform computational modeling and, conversely, the impact that computational modeling could have on embodied theories. The second part of the article discusses the most important open challenges for embodied computational modelling